Strategic Signalling and Coercive Bargaining: Putin’s Game Theory Playbook in the European Security Landscape

This article examines Russia’s evolving strategic behaviour through the analytical lens of game theory, focusing on its implications for international security, continuity management, and strategic risk planning. Specifically, it analyses the recent Russian military build-up near Finland’s border as a potential act of coercive diplomacy designed to signal intent without triggering overt conflict. Using game-theoretic models such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, signalling games, and brinkmanship theory, this paper illustrates how ambiguity, fragmentation, and threat manipulation are weaponised to destabilise Western consensus and create decision-making paralysis. Drawing from historical precedents and present-day developments, this article outlines strategic options for governments, international institutions, and business continuity planners to maintain operational resilience in a climate of persistent strategic uncertainty. The analysis further explores how these theoretical frameworks can be applied to anticipate future developments and formulate effective countermeasures in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

Keywords: Game Theory, Strategic Signalling, Russia, Finland, Ukraine, Nato, Continuity Risk, Coercive Diplomacy, Brinkmanship, Emergency Preparedness.