Reconsidering the Imagery of Descartes’ Universal Doubt: Insights from the Foucault-Derrida Debate

In Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, the conceptual imagery of “madness” serves as a motif that has received less attention than dreams and the deceiving God in the context of universal doubt. Foucault and Derrida engage in a debate concerning its relationship with dreams; the former posits a fundamental difference between madness and dreams, while the latter holds an opposing view. From the perspective of ideas and appearances, distinguishing between madness and dreams is challenging; however, their essential difference lies in the application of will and its infinite power. This paper analyzes the underlying causes of these two phenomena from the dimensions of ideas and will. It aims to demonstrate that madness arises because the will possesses only undifferentiated freedom and cannot spontaneously follow clear and distinct ideas to make rational judgments. This indicates that the madman’ s will, with its “godlike” infinite power, is exercised recklessly, making madness a threat that must be excluded in the process of doubt. Therefore, the essential distinction between madness and dreams lies at the level of will, and Foucault’s interpretation is more accurate.

Keywords: Doubt, Madness, Dreams, Will.