Law and Principal-Agent Interaction
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Published: 17 December 2018 | Article Type :Abstract
Politicians or statesmen are often accused of overstepping the boundaries of their contract with the people. Taking themselves liberties not granted by law, they push their advantages too much. The principal-agent model from game theory of contracting high-lightens the role of law and court independence for constraining political elites from engaging in rent-seeking and political looting, like various forms of corrupt practices or sex crimes.
Keywords: Law, Principal-Agent Model, Montesquieu, Legal Systems, Schools Of Jurisprudence.

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Jan-Erik Lane. (2018-12-17). "Law and Principal-Agent Interaction." *Volume 1*, 4, 39-44