On the Emotional Dimension of Williams’ Internal Reasons

Based on Hume’s psychological model of desire and belief, Williams develops and proposes the model of internal reasons. The model of internal reasons holds that agents start from subjective motivational set and arrive at reasons for action through reasonable practical deliberation, with imagination also participating in the process of deliberation. However, the model of internal reasons faces unexplained issues concerning the definition of its core concept—the subjective motivational set, the manner in which imagination participates in deliberation, and the possibility of conversion between internal and external reasons. It has also been criticized for its lack of normativity. To better explain and resolve these problems, it is necessary to understand internal reasons within the framework of Williams’ later practical deliberation model centered on wishes. This can clarify the fundamental and central position of emotions in practical deliberation, as well as the emotional dimension within the model of internal reasons. Emotional attitudes, as part of an overall emotional state, direct towards a certain goal, which initiates the process of practical deliberation. The emotional state influences the practical deliberation process, particularly affecting how imagination functions. Emotions also provide possibility for the transformation between internal and external reasons. By clarifying the emotional status in Williams’ model of internal reasons, this paper proposes a potential direction for the development of the normativity of the theory of internal reasons.

Keywords: Williams, Internal Reasons, Practical Reason, Emotions.