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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Kantian Sentimentalism: How Justice and Care Can Strengthen the Moral Framework

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Abstract

In the contemporary field of moral philosophy, care ethics can be emphasized as a more recent development—with its roots in feminist philosophy—that highlights the act of caring and human interdependence as fundamental to moral decision-making. Care ethics can be interpreted as revolutionary for the on-going moral discourse, as it underscores the necessity for emotions when partaking in rational, moral decision-making, which is in large contrast to more mainstream theories on the topic that emphasize emotional impassivity [i.e., Immanuel Kant]. With this theory in mind, care ethicists such as Nel Noddings will advocate that a caring attitude and the act of caring itself are sufficient for grounding an ethics of care. I argue against this sentiment as I believe it to be lacking a proper moral framework which loosely guides one on how to act on caring.In my nuanced version of care ethics, I will address these issues by cultivating what I term a *spectrum of morality.* This spectrum will be utilized as a loose guide to assess whether moral situations require more ideals/aspects of justice or care or a combination of the two, as the catalyst for moral decision-making and action. In developing this spectrum, I will focus on what constitutes certain moral situations to require more aspects of justice versus care, specifically by reference to early modern ideals of moral sentimentalism and deontology, spearheaded by philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Thus, when appealing to what will become the extremes of the spectrum, I foster the need for—what I term—*Kantian Sentimentalism*. The latter is a composite of Humean conceptions of sympathy (which I will henceforth refer to as empathy) founded on moral sentimentalist ideals and Kantian conceptions of inclination and duty founded on his ethics of virtue. Throughout this thesis, I will argue for a *spectrum of morality* where *Kantian Sentimentalism* is foundational to our understanding of justice and care as inseparable when partaking in moral decision-making or actions.

1. Introduction to Care Ethics, its Limitations, and How the Spectrum of Morality Aims to be Apart of the Solution

1.1 A Brief Overview of the Ethics of Care

The focal point of this chapter will encompass—what I feel to be—the limitations of care ethics as a contemporary theory of moral philosophy. Care ethics, with its foundation in feminist philosophy, recognizes the act of caring and human interdependence as a fundamental aspect of moral decision-making. Care ethics has revolutionized moral philosophy by highlighting the necessity for human emotions when participating in rational, moral decision-making. This is in large contrast to historical understandings of morality which tend to heavily possess deontological/utilitarian characteristics, mainly stemming from Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill's moral ideologies.

Advocates of care ethics, such as Nel Noddings, will argue that the foundational aspects of the theory stem solely from the establishment of a caring relationship, a caring attitude, and the act of caring itself. However, I disagree with this claim as it lacks a proper moral

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framework, which I believe is necessary to provide loose guidance on how one should act based on principles of care. While Noddings advocates a theory of care founded on emotional attitudes and intimate caring relations, she fails to provide a solution that addresses all particulars when asking how one should act on said attitudes and intimate relations to cultivate moral decision-making. Thus, following care ethicists such as Claudia Card and Virginia Held—who advocate for a justice-based care ethics—I will provide a nuanced version of care ethics which enables individuals to move forward from the emotional attitudes and intimate caring relations that care fosters, by establishing a framework that loosely guides their moral actions and decision-making.

I have found that a combination of a care and justice-based care ethics is pivotal to establishing a moral framework that utilizes care to incite moral decision-making and action. I believe that theories such as Noddings are insufficient as they fail to consider particulars such as the following

(1) They are unable to address the possibility of *caring for* others that are 'proximate' strangers. Through mediums such as technology, we can now communicate on a distant scale, allowing for intimate caring relations with those that are not directly within view.

(2) They are unable to differentiate between intimate caring relations that exploit the care of the one-caring—such as in instances of domestic violence—and those that value and respect them for taking on the role of one-caring.

(3) They are unable to address how to properly care for disadvantaged communities that face xenophobia, racism, and oppression, especially when one has benefitted from said oppression.

Hence, my refinement of care ethics will address the latter issues by promoting a *spectrum of morality*. This spectrum will serve as a loose guide on how to assess whether moral situations require ideals/aspects of justice or care or a blend of the two. When speaking of aspects of justice, I refer to instances where emotional impassivity would be necessary in cultivating moral decision-making. The latter would reflect a more Kantian or Millian type of approach, where the legal and political realm would take precedence over care.

The creation and utilization of the spectrum will allow me to better identify qualities which constitute certain moral situations to require additional aspects of justice versus care or a combination of both. In considering the extremes of the spectrum, I will apply early modern ideals of deontology and moral sentimentalism as theorized by Kant and David Hume, where Hume will represent a more care-based approach and Kant a more justice-based one. I will refer to this nuanced theory as *Kantian Sentimentalism*, which is a composite of Kantian conceptions of inclination and duty and Humean conceptions of empathy and sympathy. The focal point of my argument will be that care ethics requires a *spectrum of morality* to aid in identifying whether certain caring situations require a more justice or caring-based moral approach, and how *Kantian Sentimentalism* will become foundational to our understanding of the inseparability of justice and care when attempting rational, moral decision-making.

1.2 An Ethics of Care Founded Solely on Care

To understand where *Kantian Sentimentalism* and the *spectrum of morality* fit into the moral theory of care ethics, I will provide a brief overview of the ethics of care, explicating its foundational aspects and goals as a moral discourse. Carol Gilligan was the first trailblazer of care ethics. She describes in *Moral Orientation and Moral Development* how:

> As a moral perspective, care is less well elaborated, and there is no ready vocabulary in moral theory to describe its terms. As a framework for moral decision, care is grounded in the assumption that self and other are interdependent, an assumption reflected in a view of action as responsive and, therefore, as arising in relationship rather than the view of action as emanating from within the self and, therefore, 'self-governed'. (Gilligan 24)

Gilligan is offering an alternative approach to the more 'mainstream' theories of utilitarianism and deontology. She, in turn, would add that this tendency to see moral issues from a logical/abstract perspective is highly masculine. This is evident through the research conducted by individuals such as Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget, who found that boys morally reason through more logical, abstract, and mathematical terms. Kohlberg did include girls in his original research, but their results vastly differed from those of the boys, so he decided to forgo those findings, and declare the masculine moral reasoning as the only type in existence (as is commonly done in societies plagued by patriarchal and sexist tendencies). In hindsight, we should thank Kohlberg for casting aside the research obtained about how girls morally

reason as it paved the way for Gilligan to begin her work on what would become the foundation of an ethics of care.

Gilligan, in Ch. 3 of her book *In a Different Voice* describes how:

> Norma Haan's (1975) research on college students and Constance Holstein's (1976) three-year study of adolescents and their parents indicate that the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion and are concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas. (69)

Gilligan highlights how Haan's emphasizes a need to develop a criterion from the "resolution of the 'more frequently occurring, real-life moral dilemmas of interpersonal, empathic, fellow-feeling concerns' which have long been the center of women's moral concerns," (In a Different Voice 70). This theme of empathy will be re-occurring throughout the paper as it is an essential feature of the caring process. I will later reference Noddings regarding the latter as she touches on what she believes to be the difference between empathy and sympathy and how they can—in certain situations—be used interchangeably. I will also engage in a detailed discussion of empathy and sympathy in Ch. 3 when referencing the work of Hume and his cultivation of moral sentimentalism.

Gilligan continues to describe how "women's construction" of any "moral problem" is rooted in "care and responsibility in relationships rather than" that "of rights and rules", and this links "the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships," (*In a Different Voice* 73). She concludes that "the logic underlying an ethics of care" must be "a psychological logic of relationships", and that an "adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships—an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction—" is necessary to inform the development of it (Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* 73-4).

Nel Noddings, in Ch. 1 of Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, makes a parallel claim to Gilligan's when she emphasizes how the more common approach to solving moral issues consists in looking at it in terms of a mathematical problem (which Gilligan would say is the masculine form of moral reasoning). She firmly believes that the rational-cognitive approach is flawed as it "fails to share" with others "the feelings, the conflicts, the hopes, and ideas that influence our eventual choices," (Noddings, Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 8). Instead it only allows us to share "the justification for our acts and not what motivates and touches us," (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 8).

This is a major issue for Noddings as she believes that caring actions stem from feelings that we take into ourselves through the perspective of the cared-for in order to satisfy their needs. She refers to the latter as motivational disp*lacement* and argues that this is an essential feature of an intimate caring relation, as it allows the one-caring to "put aside his or her own projects for the moment and allow the expressed needs of the cared-for to take precedence," (Noddings, *Care Ethics and "Caring Organizations"* 77-8). It is important to note that motivational displacement does not insinuate that the one-caring fully disregard their own needs, as care ethicists recognize that the one-caring is also a dependent who needs to "be tended to and supported in their efforts by others," (Kittay 117).

Additionally, Noddings argues that the rational-cognitive approach teaches us to view moral matters in terms of a study of moral reasoning, which persuades us to naturally suppose that ethics "is a subject that must be cast in the language of principles and demonstration," (Noddings, Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and *Moral Education* 8). She finds this to be dangerous because when looking at moral reasoning in this fashion, we start to see ourselves as individual, autonomous beings, instead of as a part of a relational network. Noddings builds on Gilligan's arguments to emphasize how dictionaries tell us:

> …that *care* is a state of mental suffering or of engrossment: to care is to be in a burdened mental state, one of anxiety, fear, or solicitude about something or someone. Alternatively, one cares for something or someone if one has a regard for or inclination toward that something or someone. (*Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 9).

Noddings provides us with 3 different types of caring: Cares as burdens, cares as a type of interest/desire/inclination, and cares as responsibility. She characterizes cares as burdens as when one "equates… cares in certain matters (professional, personal, or public) as burdens or worries," (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 9). Care, in the second sense, describes how "I *care*

for someone if I feel a stir of desire or inclination toward him" and relatedly "I *care* for someone if I have regard for his views and interests," (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 9). In the last sense, I care for a person if I am "charged with the responsibility for his physical welfare", but this caretaking must not be "perfunctory" as then it is not classified as caring (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 9). The latter definition will become pivotal when later discussing Kant's view of duty, as he will say that when one acts from duty, there must be no other desires or inclinations, just the attitude that one is doing what one must as stipulated by a *maxim* that can become a *universal law of nature*. Thus, Noddings' array of definitions for care provides us with a broad spectrum for the ways in which it can play out in our everyday lives, and this spectrum of care will become indispensable when I later discuss how it relates to the *spectrum of morality*.

Now that I have sufficiently explained the foundations of care ethics and its perceived goals, I will move forward to simultaneously describe how care can lead to action and define and differentiate niche terms within the moral framework. Noddings claims that there are two roles that comprise a caring relation: The *One-Caring* and the *Cared-For*. When I am the one-caring:

> I do not project; I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a duality. I am not thus caused to see or to feel—that is, to exhibit certain behavioral signs interpreted as seeing and feeling—for I am committed to the receptivity that permits me to see and to feel in this way. The seeing and feelings are mine, but only partly and temporarily mine, as on loan to me. (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 30)

For Noddings, receptivity on the part of the cared-for is essential to the formation of a caring relation, as without it, she claims that no such relation exists. For example, I can claim to care for my sister, but if she is not receptive to my care, Noddings would claim that no caring relations exists. It is also important to note that when I "receive the other into myself", I am not only displaying motivational displacement but also *engrossment* for the cared-for (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 30). Noddings argues that engrossment is crucial when cultivating a caring relation as it allows us to be present and understand the needs and desires of the cared-for. It is also important to note that, for Noddings, engrossment and receptivity are only possible in intimate caring relations (i.e., face-to-face, one-on-one caring). The latter claim is the reason she refuses to endorse caring for 'proximate' strangers, as she believes it impossible to care for someone that we cannot physically see because we are unable to become engrossed and gage their receptivity.

Noddings says:

> To act as the one-caring, then, is to act with special regard for the particular person in a concrete situation. We act not to achieve for ourselves a commendation but to protect or enhance the welfare of the cared-for. Because we are inclined toward the cared-for, we want to act in a way that will please him. But we wish to please him for his sake and not for the promise of his grateful response to our generosity. (*Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 24)

Noddings concludes that "the one-caring desires the well-being of the cared-for and acts (or abstains from acting—makes an internal act of commitment) to promote that well-being. She is inclined to the other," (Caring: A R*elational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 25). I will emphasize that Noddings mentioning the one-caring as occasionally abstaining from action is to highlight that sometimes the one-caring will not agree with the perceived needs or desires of the cared-for but will still have to act according to them because that is what encompasses being receptive and motivationally displaced to them.

By characterizing the one-caring as receptive, engrossed, and attentive, Noddings is cultivating a very intimate notion of empathy that exists in the caring relationship. She would caution us when using the term *empathy* as it was initially "identified with an attempt to understand" but in a "projective", not "receptive" sense (Noddings, *The Language of Ethics* 54). For an ethics of care, caring only occurs when the one-caring is receptive to the needs of the cared-for. Thus, Noddings would approve of using *empathy* only if it includes the duality of "feeling and understanding," (*The Language of Ethics* 55). The one-caring must be empathetic in the sense that she both feels and understands the perspective and needs of the cared-for so that she can fulfill them.

Now, Noddings defines the role of the cared-for as someone that "completes the relation by

acknowledging the efforts of the carer," (Care Ethics and "Caring Organizations" 73). She explains that "the response of the cared-for need not be one of gratitude; it is merely an expression acknowledging that the caring has been received," (Noddings, *Care Ethics and "Caring Organizations"* 73). Noddings emphasizes that "the role of the cared-for is essential", and their "recognition is central to care ethics", as "a carer's act must be evaluated with respect to its effect on the relevant web of care," (*Care Ethics and "Caring Organizations"* 73). It must be emphasized thought, that "there is no caring *relation* to begin with" —no matter how much effort the carer exerts— "if there is no acknowledging response from the cared-for," (Noddings, *Care Ethics and "Caring Organizations"* 73). I mentioned this previously with the example of my attempt to care for my sister which involves her receptivity or lack thereof. Noddings explicates the caring relationship as follows:

> We shall see that for (A, B) to be a caring relation, both A (the one-caring) and B (the cared-for) must contribute appropriately. Something from A must be received, completed, in B. Generally, we characterize this something as an attitude. B looks for something which tells him that A has regard for him, that he is not being treated perfunctorily. (*Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 19)

Noddings highlights that "caring is largely reactive and responsive", so it is "better characterized as receptive," (Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 19). To reiterate, she defines receptivity as when:

> The one-caring reflects reality as she sees it to the child. She accepts him as she hopes he will accept himself…but the commitment, the decision to embrace a particular possibility, must be the child's. Her commitment is to him. While she expresses herself honestly when his vision of himself is unlovely and enthusiastically when it is beautiful, she never reflects a reality that pictures him detached, alone, abandoned. (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 60).

Noddings claims that whatever the one-caring "does for the cared-for is embedded in a relationship that reveals itself as engrossment and in an attitude that warms and comforts the cared-for," (*Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 19). When:

> …the cared-for sees the concern, delight, or interest in the eyes of the one-caring and feels her warmth in both verbal and body language, no act on his behalf is quite as important or influential as the attitude she displays…And it is when the attitude of the one-caring emanates caring that the cared-for glows, grows stronger, and feels not so much that he has been given something as that something has been added to him. (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 19-20)

Here, Noddings seems to be alluding to her definition of reciprocity, which is not the same as contractual reciprocity "(i.e., I scratch your back, you scratch mine) but simply a mutual recognition and appreciation of response," (The *Language of Care Ethics* 53). Reciprocity thought of in this way "does not limit the relational parties to the roles taken in any one encounter", but this becomes complicated in relationships with unequal power dynamics (Noddings, *The Language of Care Ethics* 54). In those types of situations only one person can take the role as carer, and then reciprocity rests entirely on "the cared-for's response of recognition," (Noddings, *The Language of Care Ethics* 54).

Lastly, I must distinguish what we mean when we care-for something/someone versus care-about something/someone as this will provide evidence for my later argument about the possibility of caring on a wider (more distant) scale. Noddings claims that "it is not possible to care-for everyone in the world; caring-for requires the attention and response cultivated in relations," (*Caring and "Caring Organizations"* 74). When Noddings refers to *caring-for* someone, it occurs on a deeply personal/intimate level, which necessitates face-to-face interaction in order to bring about engrossment and motivational displacement. You must have a close relational tie with the cared-for as you are attempting to discern their most essential needs by taking them into yourself. She claims, however, that it is possible to "*care-about*/ be concerned for multitudes at a distance", and that "we can and should care-about everyone and work from that basic attitude to establish policies that will facilitate the caring-for that must occur on-site," (Noddings, *Caring and "Caring Organizations"* 75).

Although the latter seems to contradict one of Noddings' main claims, — in Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education—that universal care is impossible, she is not advocating for universal care in the intimate caring-for sense but in

the less intimate caring-about sense. This is where the dichotomy between the two terms becomes essential, because Noddings will highlight that caring-about is a foundational aspect of "justice in care theory," (Noddings, *Caring and "Caring Organizations"* 75). When establishing political and social policies, she believes that we start with *caring-about* multitudes, and then restrict it to *caring-for* specific individuals that we physically meet.

While I believe the aforementioned to be a good attempt by Noddings to incorporate justice into her theory of care, it is still restrictive in that care takes precedence over justice in all particulars. For example, if I wanted to care-for all women that are domestically abused, Noddings would claim that I would be unable to do so, because I cannot have physical face-to-face interactions with them. Since there is distance between me and these women, Noddings would argue that I am unable to foster the engrossment and motivational displacement necessary to engage in a caring relation. I would have to disagree with this notion though, as with the development of mediums such as technology, I believe it is now possible to care-for these women that exist at a distance.

One possible avenue is to utilize video conferencing platforms such as Zoom to engage in face-to-face conversations, in real time—albeit through a screen—with these women so that I can be receptive to and understand their feelings, needs, and desires. After listening to the aforementioned, I could then coordinate with facilities, such as domestic abuse shelters, in their areas to provide them with a larger network of support that will help them act on-site to alleviate their suffering. While I am not on-site to act for them, —such as by physically taking them to these shelters— I am still able to care-for them, as I have made myself receptive and engrossed to their immediate needs, feelings, and desires through face-to-face conversations via video communication. Thus, I have satisfied all of Noddings' criterion (receptivity, engrossment, and motivational displacement) for the cultivation of a caring relation.

1.3 An Ethics of Care Founded on Justice

Virginia Held in Care and Justice, Still describes how Gilligan differentiated between the two "'perspectives' of justice and care, and identified them with a tendency of men to adopt a justice perspective, and a tendency of some women to adopt a care perspective," (21). Held states that one "can say from the prospective of justice that one looks for universal rules to apply impartially to particular cases, one considers fairness and the rights and obligations of all, one assumes each person involved to be a free and equal agent," (*Care and Justice, Still* 21). She describes how:

> The perspective of justice conceptualizes persons as autonomous individuals; that of care sees persons as relational. Where justice assumes persons to be independent, care understands that instead of being Hobbesian or Lockean or Kantian individuals, we all start out as helpless infants. Without the care that incorporates different values than those of the dominant moral theories, we would not have survived, and we continue to be interdependent for the rest of our lives, embedded in social relations. (Held, *Care and Justice, Still* 21)

Held cites Daniel Engster who argues "that an adequate theory of justice should include adequate attention to care," (Care and Justice, Still 22). Engster claims that "care should be" encompassed within justice, as he believes that it is justice's most important factor (Held. Care and Justice, Still 22). He emphasizes that, "There would be no individual liberty or equality, community values or good life, without the caring practices necessary to sustain and foster human life and society," (Engster 5). Engster continues by arguing that "caring should be placed at the center of a public conception of justice" so that it can be "applied to the basic institutions and policies of society to" increase the "support and accommodations provided for care work," (Engster 13). I will take Engster's ideas as central to my development of *Kantian Sentimentalism*, as his argument encompasses my thoughts on how an ethics of care can utilize both justice and care to foster a society that values liberty, equality, and how to live the good life. This will become evident after the explication of the spectrum of morality at the end of this chapter and its connection to Kant and Hume in Ch. 2 and 3 respectively.

Held agrees with Engster's dualistic view and advocates for an ethics of care that is a "comprehensive morality within which it can be appropriate to see various ethics of justice as applicable to the limited domains of the legal and political," (*Care and Justice, Still* 27). She takes "the network of caring relations as the wider domain of society as a whole", within which there are "subsystems with their own priorities," (Held, *Care and Justice, Still* 27). "This wider domain of society" includes both "the weaker caring relation of civil society that enable legal, political, and other institutions to function and the strongest bonds of care", which takes place among family and friends

(Held, *Care and Justice, Still* 27). Held claims that "while legal and political institutions ought to be more caring than they have been" in the past, "they should still give priority to justice," (*Care and Justice, Still* 27). Simultaneously, she argues, that "while legal and political should look for moral guidance primarily to moral theories of justice, institutions and persons in the wider domain should look primarily to the ethics of care," (Held, *Care and Justice, Still* 27). Thus, Held is arguing for what I believe is one of the largest missing factors of care ethics: A spectrum with a range that determines which ethics of morality should be placed at the forefront, one of justice, one of care, or a combination of the two (i.e., a *spectrum of morality*).

1.4 How the Current Ethics of Care Fails to Address Certain Particulars

Claudia Card, in Caring and Evil, asks the question of whether Noddings' theory of care, which advocates for a caring attitude as its sole activating force, can "adequately enable us to resist evil" as it lacks justice (101). She defines resisting evil as "resisting complicity in evil-doing" and differentiates between two types of evil (Card 102). The first evil is the kind that "strangers do to strangers", and the second is the kind that "intimates do to intimates," (Card 102). Both Card and I agree that to "rest all of ethics on caring threatens to exclude, as ethically insignificant, our relationships with most people in the world because we do not know them individually and never will," (Card 102). This goes back to my previous argument and example about the possibility for a type of distant caring in Section 1.2.

Card also highlights that "regarding as ethically insignificant our relationships with people remote from ourselves is a constituent of racism and xenophobia," (102). Even though we do not see these people or interact with them face-to-face does not mean that our actions will not affect them, and this is especially prevalent with disadvantaged communities. Card describes that:

> Part of the point of justice is to make possible cooperative relationships with more people than one can or should even try to care for. It applies to interactions among many who are not bound by ties of affection but who have a stake in securing certain common advantages by mutual cooperation. (105)

The argument for the inclusion of justice within care ethics readdresses claims that it is necessary in societies wrought with racism, xenophobia, and oppression. "In a poorly integrated multicultural societies dominated by phobic stereotypes, opportunities for interracial caring relationships are not what they should be", and so when "one's ethical repertoire is exhausted by caring", nothing remains "to operate with respect to many of the interracial consequences of one's conduct," (Card 105). Thus, Card concludes—regarding the necessity for caring relations with strangers—, "That the discussion needs to be balanced by an inquiry into the responsibility to create opportunities for caring relationships where such opportunities do not spontaneously present themselves, owing to past injustices," (105).

Lastly, Card emphasizes that "resting all of ethics on caring also" allows for the "danger of valorizing relationships that are sheerly exploitative of our distinctly human capacity to take another's point of view," (102). She states that this danger of valorization in relationships stems from care ethics threatening to "include too much" which "sheerly exploits carers," (Card 105-6). By *sheer exploitation*, Card refers to "valuing others and their capacities sheerly for what they contribute to us or our projects", instead of "valuing them for themselves" (102). It will become clear in Ch. 2 that the latter references Kantian ethics and *the Categorical Imperative*, which will command that we never treat others as mere means but solely as ends.

In terms of the exploitation of carers, domestic abuse can be utilized as a prime example of it. Card describes how:

> The care ethic seems to lack a basis for objecting to an abused carer's remaining in the relationship when leaving becomes possible. Referring to a famous burning bedcase, Nel Noddings holds that if we must exclude from our caring someone for whom we have cared, we thereby act under a 'diminished ethical ideal' (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 114). I should have thought the richness of our ethical ideals enabled us to reject bad relationships and freed us up for ethically fuller ones. After all, it is by contrasting abusive relationships with such ideals that we are finally able to see the abuse for what it is. (106)

And this is where I believe the duality of an ethics of justice and care will come into play. I will follow the model of Marilyn Friedman who "argues on the grounds of respect for the autonomy of abused women that the law should tend toward preventing domestic abuse through mandatory arrest and prosecution of batterers, regardless of victim cooperation," (Held,

Can the Ethics of Care Handle Violence 118). She simultaneously holds though "that professional caregiving services should 'lean toward providing support for abused women', whether or not they" choose "to stay in abusive relationships and hinder legal intervention," (Friedman 141; Held, *Can the Ethics of Care Handle Violence* 118).

Friedman's argument highlights "that the function of the law and of professional support services" are separate, and that the "law is only one, and often not the most important" way "society can try to reduce… incidents and harms of violence," (Held, Can the Ethics of Care Handle Violence 118). Thus, "the ethics of care can recognize how mandatory legal proceedings may reduce future incidents of domestic violence and support them", but "it can also recognize how shelters, counseling, and social support may be more effective in empowering women to leave or avoid abusive relationships to improve their lives," (Held, *Can the Ethics of Care Handle Violence* 118). This combination of justice and care is what I aim to put forth as my nuanced theory of *Kantian Sentimentalism*.

When considering domestic abuse within the moral framework of the ethics of care, I would argue that principles of justice are necessary but so are principles of care. This is because escaping the cycle of abuse is not only associated with the absence of the perpetrator but also with empowering oneself to overcome previous abusive relationships and tendencies. Care ethics solely based on caring is unable to respond to this type of issue as being engrossed and receptive to the needs of the abused does not help change their situation and can perpetuate it if they desire to not prosecute.

While some may argue that the latter claim is infringing upon the autonomy of the abused, I would controversially contend that they no longer possess autonomy as entering into the abusive relationship causes them to forfeit their "rational personhood" (Slote 301). Since these abused individuals are no longer able to make rational decisions, it then becomes the responsibility of the one-caring to make these decisions for them. These decisions must be made by following laws/policies though, because as previously argued, an ethics of care solely based upon care, is not equipped to handle this type of situation without exploiting the care of the one-caring (i.e., the abused).

1.5 What is the Spectrum of Morality and how does it Aim to Address Certain Particulars that Care Ethics cannot

Now that we see that certain situations within care ethics cannot be resolved solely by caring, I believe that my argument for a spectrum of morality becomes pivotal in providing a solution to these particulars. When speaking of a spectrum, I imagine a scale where the far left represents situations where empathy and care can resolve all moral issues. These situations would occur between intimates as we need to be actively engrossed and receptive to the needs of the cared-for, and this is only possible by engaging in direct contact with them. Additionally, the far left of the spectrum will be rooted in care ethics based solely on care and moral sentimentalism as theorized by Hume. I believe that these two theories have numerous commonalities when considering how we morally deliberate. They both find the foundation of morality to be in feeling and understanding, not reason alone. Both theories also recognize that we are interdependent, social creatures that learn from those around us. Noddings speaks of motivational displacement which seems synonymous to Hume's sympathy (which I will henceforth refer to as empathy), as both require one to share and take in the feelings of another in order to determine their needs and desires. Lastly, they both agree that empathy is better understood between those we possess close relational ties. Thus, when I refer to moral issues that are far left, I mean those that are deeply rooted in intimate caring, feeling, and sentiment, where they can be solved by such means.

In terms of the far right, I am referring to moral issues that need to be resolved through means of strictly justice and emotional impassivity. This would include moral situations that pertain to violence, terrorism, and war. When considering acts of violence such as murder and rape, it is hard to conceive of how care as the primary moral deliberating factor can solve these issues. We need laws and punishments that are enforced against these acts, and they need to pertain to all individuals in society. Essentially, we are attempting to resolve moral issues that concern multitudes and not individuals, and if we take Noddings theory of care to be primary, it is impossible to accomplish with care as the primary moral deliberating factor.

For this reason, I employ justice as the primary moral deliberating factor with Kant and his moral discourse as its foundations. This is because he roots our understanding of morality in reason alone and the following of maxims and categorical imperatives that apply to all rational beings. In order to care about people affected by violence, war, and terrorism, we needed to have set laws and policies in place that allow us to work from the general to the particular.

As an example, we can refer to Noddings conception of the difference between caring-about and caring-for, where the former is general and the latter particular.

In the next chapter, I will explain how Kant can contribute to an ethics of care via his ethics of virtue. He will support the cultivation of feelings such as empathy, but his definition will be different from that of Hume's, and this is purposeful. I will not attempt to find the similarities between these two conceptions of empathy, as I feel that they don't share any. It will be evident that Kant's empathy is rooted in rational desires (which are reason-oriented), while Hume's is rooted in feeling and sentiment. They have opposite foundations, and I acknowledge that, and do not wish to change it. By explicating the extremes of the spectrum of morality, I have shown that both their moral theories fulfill different purposes–within an ethics of care—based upon the root of the moral issue being deliberated. Thus, when discussing moral decision-making within an ethics of care, I will refer to a Kantian version of empathy when discussing moral issues that affect multitudes and will refer to Humean sympathy when discussing moral issues that affect individuals with intimate relations. I also want to further note that I purposely do not discuss the middle of the spectrum in this section, as I will later argue in Chapter 4 that it foregrounds my theory of *Kantian Sentimentalism*.

2. How Kant's Conception of Duty and Inclination Founded on his Ethics of Virtue can Provide Half the Solution

2.1 How Can Kant Contribute to an Ethics of Care

In this chapter, I will discuss how I perceive Kant as adding to the conversation on how to cultivate a more robust ethics of care. Many will outright reject the claim that Kant's discourse can facilitate any type of discussion on care ethics due to their contrasting theories on concepts such as the role that emotions play in moral deliberation, but I find this is because of a gross misunderstanding in his moral theory. I believe that his moral theory has salience when attempting to better understand the foundational claims of care ethics, especially when considering his conception of virtue and how it allows for the cultivation of emotions such as sympathy.

The focal point of this chapter will consider Kant's thoughts on morality in specific relation to his theory of virtue. I am aware that virtue ethicists will argue against this avenue of thinking and claim that Kant does not have a theory of virtue worth considering as it does not allow for the inclusion of emotions when morally deliberating. Another issue is that it is not agent centered. While I agree with the latter, I cannot endorse the former as I believe it cultivates a misunderstanding in Kant's moral philosophy.

I believe that most critics of Kant simply take his moral theory in the first half of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* as his entire thought process on how one should morally deliberate, and this is a mistake as he still has much to offer on the topic in other later works such as *The Metaphysics of Morals*, *Religion Within the Mere Boundaries of Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and his *Lectures on Ethics*. I think when considering his discourse on morality, we must go beyond the first couple pages of the *Groundwork* and his claims about what constitutes a maxim and categorical imperative to see that he is not merely advocating for complete impartiality on the part of the agent when morally deliberating, but rather control of one's inclinations in the name of completing one's duty.

While I acquiesce that Kant's moral theory places particular emphasis on the individual as the main force of moral deliberation, that does not equate to a complete disregard for the personal/communal relations that they hold. In fact, Kant would argue against the claim that we should disregard the thought and feelings of others, as we still have an imperfect duty to humanity which involves taking the happiness of others as one of our own ends. Kant also denies that it is possible to completely rid ourselves of inclinations. In contrast, he claims that both reason and inclination are needed for the agent to be a virtuous person as virtue for him is strength of will in the face of inclination (MM 6:380; 394). Without inclinations, one would not be able to self-regulate against them in order to cultivate one's virtue, as Kant views virtue as a "moral disposition *in conflict*, and not *holiness* in the supposed *possession* of a complete *purity* of dispositions of the will," [CPrR 5:84; 208] (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 399). It is important to note that by endorsing this claim, I am attempting to divest 'inclinations' of its wholly negative connotation within Kant's moral discourse.

2.2 Kant's Conception of Duty and Inclination

In order to understand how I plan to incorporate Kant's conception of duty and inclinations in relation to this theory on virtue, I believe that it would be best to have a better understanding of his thoughts on these two ideals. It will also be helpful to explicate

how the formulation of maxims and categorical imperatives play a major role as well. Anne Margaret Baxley in *Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence* describes how "In the Groundwork, Kant begins to lay out his theory on what he believes to be our mutual philosophical understanding of morality by emphasizing how the good will is the single thing in the world that is good without limitation," (559). She continues in another of her works, *Kantian Virtue*, that "According to Kant, the good will is the only good that has unlimited value. What makes the good will good is that it acts in accordance with duty from the motive of duty, not emotion or inclination." (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 396). It is important to note for later that a good will does not constitute virtuosity as we do not have a duty to virtue, but we do have one to the good will because that allows us to act in accordance with duty via a maxim that can be willed to become a *universal law*.

Kant defines a universal law as "a necessary requirement of reason that guides the conduct of any fully rational agent and, in imperative form, is an inherent standard unavoidable recognized by all imperfectly rational beings," (Hill, *Kant* 159). He divides the universal formulas of the categorical imperative into four different types: the *Formula of Universal Law* (FUL) and the *Formula of a Universal Law of Nature* (FULN), the *Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself* (FH), the *Formula of Autonomy* (FA), and the *Formula of the Realm of End* (FRE). I will focus on the FUL and the FULN in this section, and the FH will be discussed further in Section 2.3 as it relates to Kant's conception of virtue. I will not further explicate the FA and FRE as I do not believe they are relevant to the current conversation at hand.

Kant's FUL and FULN are taken to be one and the same where both contribute to what most people believe is the absolute definition of the *Categorical Imperative*. The FUL states that one should "act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law", and the FULN defines something similar where one should "act as though the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature," (G 4:421). The takeaway from these two formulations is that an agent should always cultivate a maxim that can be appropriated to those around them without cause for contradiction. There are two types of contradictions that Kant considers: Contradiction in conception/formulation and contradiction of the will. A contradiction of conception occurs when we attempt to universalize a maxim that would create a logical contradiction. An example would be we should lie when we need to, but also everyone can lie to you as well if necessary. All this would create is a society full of liars where no one would believe the other thus making the action of lying impossible.

A contradiction of will occurs when we attempt to universalize a maxim that would undermine itself or become a self-contradiction. Kant has us consider this in terms of borrowing money that we know we cannot repay. The maxim we will would state that "when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money, and promise to repay it, even though I know that it will never happen," (G 4: 422). Thus, what occurs is that I am attempting to will my self-interest into a universal law, thus making myself an exception to it, which would defeat the purpose of it being universal.

Moreover, I think it would also be best to clarify any misunderstandings that others may have when considering Kant's definition of a maxim and its relation to the *supreme principle of morality*, which he later names the *Categorical Imperative*. Kant considers a maxim to be a type of subjective principle of action that serves as the underlying reason for why an agent should act a certain way in particular situations. Right away we can see that the objection that maxims are a one size fits all type of principle is false. We create maxims based off the type of moral situation we are in, and it is used only as a loose guide rather than a definite course of action. John Paley seconds this by describing how:

> For one thing, as I have already suggested, the categorical imperative is not a rule, and judgements cannot be derived from it without reference to the maxim that an agent proposes to adopt. As any maxim must incorporate the purpose which the proposed action is intended to fulfil, and because the list of purposes that any particular action might be designed to pursue is without limit, it is clear that the categorical imperative is not remotely like a general prescription. It is more like a test to which maxims are subjected, and which tells us whether 'this-in- order-to-achieve-that' is morally acceptable or not. (138)

I believe that the best way to think of the categorical imperative is as Paley explains, as a test of universality, not in the way of a one size fits all type of principle. In fact, universality taken in the context of Kant's ethics is used the same way in care ethics, specifically when Noddings claims that we have a "first and unending

obligation" to the cared-for when entering into an intimate caring relationship (Paley 137). Daryl Koehn makes a similar observation when stating that "what is universal about caring is not its form but rather the demand upon each of us to be caring," (22). Thus, from the latter two statements is becomes obvious that the act of caring is an act taken *from duty* as it invokes in us a primary obligation to care when entering into any type of caring relationship.

In continuation, Allen Wood in *Kantian Ethics* proves to be a great source in explaining Kant's conception of duty and how inclinations factors into it. He describes that for Kant:

> To act *from duty*, in short, is to do something because you know that an objectively valid moral principle demands it, so that this gives you a good reason for deciding to do it, and then making yourself do it…we can (and should) act from duty only when no self-interested reasons or empirical inclination is sufficient to motivate us to perform the action. An action can be done *from duty,* and therefore, only where there is no such empirical inclination—often, though not always, when some inclinations pull *against* our doing the dutiful action. (Wood 26)

We must always act *against* our inclinations in order to act *from duty*, because to act in favor of them means subordinating the moral law to our self-interests. It is important to note that acting *from duty* is different from acting *in conformity* with duty. When one acts *in conformity* with duty there are still underlying inclinations that are driving our reason to act. Kant believes that actions that constitute moral worth only stem from those done *from duty* and not *in conformity* with it. He provides the example of a shopkeeper that does not raise the price of her goods even though a child is purchasing from her and can be more easily fooled compared to an adult (G 4:397). Kant would say that the shopkeeper is acting *in conformity* with duty because even though she is attending to the child honestly, she is concerned about her reputation being tarnished if another found out that she attempted to swindle the child by charging more than the product is worth (G 4: 397). Thus, by the shopkeeper possessing a self-interested reason for acting, she is acting primarily through her inclinations and simultaneously subordinating the moral law to them.

What Kant is attempting to discern through examples such as the shopkeeper is what constitutes an action to have *moral worth*. For Kant, *moral worth* is "supposed to be more central and proper to morality than what belongs to actions merely in conformity with duty" and it "entitles the action not merely to 'praise and encouragement' but also to 'esteem,'" (Wood 27). When speaking of moral worth in this context, he usually includes attributes such as "inner" (G 4:397), "true" (G 4:398), or "authentic" (G 4:398-9), and these pertain to *moral content* as well. Wood states that:

> When Kant distinguishes between actions that have 'moral content' or '[true, authentic, inner] moral worth' and those that do not, he is not distinguishing what has moral value from what has none. Instead, the distinction he is drawing is between what has a special fundamental, essentially or authentically *moral* value from what is valuable from the moral standpoint but does not have the sort of value that lies right at the heart of *morality*. (28)

From this, we see that Kant is not claiming that the shopkeeper, for example, has no moral value when she acted, but that it lacks the true *moral content* in the sense that there was no adversity or inclination for her to overcome. For Kant, true moral value lies in the internal struggle with inclination that moral agents must overcome. This struggle highlights that the agent is taking the moral law as its primary source of acting and not any type of underlying desire or possible end that could occur. The concept is the same when Kant asks us what agent could be considered to have the "most proper *moral* esteem". To explicate this, we must consider the two other examples that he provides in the *Groundwork* to highlight true moral worth. Kant describes a "friend of humanity" who's "beclouded by her own grief, which extinguishes all compassion for the fate of others" and has to "tear herself out of deadly insensibility" to act for the benefit of others (G 4:399). For him, this is someone that displays true moral worth, because even though she is drowning in grief, she is still able to act with the needs of others in mind. Once again, we see this need to overcome adversity—in the latter case overwhelming grief—to be able to claim both true moral worth and acting from duty.

The last example Kant provides is of a woman that "if nature had as such placed little sympathy in the heart… if she were by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others…," (G 4:399). I can admit that this case is the perfect example for the criticism that befalls Kant's moral theory, as it highlights the model moral agent as morally apathetic. Be that as it may, I believe that we can still learn something from this

example, as Kant does admit that even though this person is "a friend of humanity" and is "truly not" nature's "worst product", she is still not the picture of the moral agent that he desires to portray (G 4:399). As previously explicated, Kant does understand that the moral agent must possess some type of desire in order to both have a sensitivity to others which allows for the cultivation of one's virtue and to possess a *motive of duty*.

Wood states that for Kant:

> … 'the motive of duty' includes *all* the properly *moral* reasons we have to perform morally valuable (*pflichtmäBig*) actions…Acting from duty *always* involves desire, even a desire to do the action *for its own sake*… Because it creates an immediate desire to do the action, the motive of duty is inevitably expressed not merely as an objective reason for wanting something and doing something but also as a *feeling*. (159)

It again becomes obvious from the latter that emotions are required in Kant's moral decision-making process, albeit *rational ones*. *Rational desires* are fundamentally different from *inclinations/ empirical desires* as the latter are "where the feeling of pleasure accompanying a representation precedes the determination of the will to bring about the object of the representation", while the former are "where the rational determination of the will comes first and produces in our sensibility a feeling of pleasure accompanying the object we rationally will as an end," (MM 6:212-3). Thus, for Kant, all actions taken by an agent need both feelings and desires, but they must be *rational* ones which "arise as effects of our rational awareness of principles or objective grounds for action on our sensibility or receptivity to feeling," (Wood 36).

Hence, rational desires become a pivotal aspect of Kant's conception of duty because it allows us to understand the different type of duties we have to oneself and others. In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, he describes how we have both imperfect and perfect duties which can be further broken down into duties of love and respect. When referring to perfect duties, Kant is describing those duties that have narrow obligations which necessitate us to "perform or refrain from performing certain acts (e.g., do not lie)," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 401). Baxley in *Kantian Virtue* defines:

> Our perfect duties to self as animal beings include a duty to refrain from killing oneself, a duty to refrain from defiling oneself by lust, and a duty to avoid excessive use of food and drink (the virtue of temperance) …Our perfect duties to self as moral beings involve avoiding the vices of lying, avarice, and false humility (servility) (401) …In addition, we have a duty to ourselves to serve as our own judge, by cultivating our conscience, and a duty of moral cognition – an obligation to scrutinize oneself with respect to one's moral disposition, which Kant portrays as a maxim of knowing one's heart. (MS 6:441; 562)

Perfect duties can also be further divided into duties of respect. Kant characterizes those as "perfect duties of narrow obligation directed at the 'moral well-being' or 'moral contentment' of others. They do not result in obligation on the part of another, and their fulfillment is 'something owed'," (Baxley, *Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence* 572). He would say that these duties are mostly negative in that we are attempting to stay away from vices such as defamation and arrogance to continue to provide the respect owed to those around us (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 402).

In contrast, imperfect duties have wide obligations, "requiring us to adopt a certain end that morality dictates is good to pursue (e.g., practice benevolence)," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 401). When Kant refers to these duties as wide, he is claiming that they:

> …do not, except under very limiting conditions, require us to perform (or refrain from performing) any particular act. What we are required to do is to promote, according to our means, the happiness of others in need, without hope or expectation of something in return. (Baxley, *Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence* 58)

Imperfect duties encompass those of love which are concerned with the "natural welfare or happiness of others," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 401). The performance of these duties place the agent "under an obligation" to promote the happiness of others and Kant would describe them as "meritorious" (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 401; MM 6:391). It is through the performance of duties of love that we can cultivate sympathy, as we are told to take another's happiness as our own end. In the next section, I will expound on how sympathy is paramount for Kant when conceiving of virtue and its development.

2.3 How Kant's Conception of Virtue Can Contribute to an Ethics of Care

Upon examining Kant's conception of duty and inclinations, it become evident that his moral

theory has much to contribute to the ongoing moral discourse of care ethics, especially when we take into consideration his thoughts on virtue. I believe that his thoughts on the cultivation of virtue, which allows for emotions such as sympathy, love, and respect—albeit rational ones—will be pivotal in arguing that he can contribute to ongoing debates in care ethics, especially when discussing issues such as what care looks like as a wider, less intimate obligation.

Kant defines virtue in *The Doctrine of Virtue* as:

> … a morally good disposition (*Gesinnung*) or way of thinking (*Denkungsar*t), a disposition or way of thinking that is freely acquired and for which we are individually responsible… He describes it in terms of an 'ability' or 'capacity', or 'courage' or 'fortitude', and emphasizes that it is a form of 'strength of mind', 'soul', 'will', or 'maxims'…Virtue, Kant informs us, is no mere self-constraint, which might be completely lacking in moral content, but 'a self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom, and so through the mere representation of one's duty in accordance with its formal law' (MM 6:394; 525) (Baxley *Kantian Virtue* 398)

For Kant, virtue is a consistent struggle against the agent's inclinations which must be won so they can live a truly moral life. The foundation of Kant's virtuous agent is a good will where the will "is both good and strong. It is not only able but fully ready to overcome inclinations to act contrary to duty, and it does so effectively and without wavering before temptation," (Hill, *Kantian Virtue and 'Virtue Ethics'* 41). When one's acts are motivated by their good will it emphasizes their *respect for the moral law* and its conforming to a *universal law* (Hill, *Kantian Virtue and 'Virtue Ethics'* 36). This means that we should strive to act from our good will because is highlights that we are first acting *from duty* and second, not subordinating the moral law to our inclinations and desires. Instead, we are utilizing it as our main purpose for acting. Possessing a good will is not the only characteristic of the virtuous agent, as we must have the strength of will that was previously discussed. Thus, true virtuosity in the moral agent for Kant is "a human approximation of a good will who through strength of mind continually acts out of respect for the moral law while still feeling the presence of natural inclinations which could tempt him to act from other motives," (Louden 478).

While virtue ethicists will argue Kant's moral discourse requires moral apathy on the part of the agent and that it only champions independence versus dependence in the moral agent, I believe that I have already disproved this by discussing his views on imperfect duties, specifically duties of love. To reiterate, Baxley highlights how it:

> …it is important to note that the moral strength entailed by virtue does not entail a total repression of natural inclinations. Kant reminds us that the term virtue itself implies a 'moral disposition *in conflict*, and not *holiness* in the supposed *possession* of a complete *purity* of dispositions of the will' (CPrR 5:84; 208; Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 399)

She is affirming what I have been arguing for throughout this whole chapter, that Kant is not asking for complete disassociation with one's inclinations, but control over them so that they do not subordinate the moral law. Kant believes that virtue entails *autocracy*, which is "the moral capacity for self-governance" or mastery over oneself (Baxley, *Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence* 562). I know that this will be an issue for virtue and care ethicists alike because autocracy refers to the individual attempting restraint against their inclinations. However, I believe that autocracy is pivotal to enabling us to be able to care for others. Without autocracy we would not be able to overcome the inclinations that cause us to only think about our own ends and desires. Hence, we would be incapable of caring for others because we would be too focused on satisfying our self-interested ends and desires. We need autocracy as self-restraint to be able to cultivate emotions such as sympathy, love, and respect, as it is only through self-governance that we are then able to look outward to caring for others.

So, the issue that Kant has with the non-autocratic person is not the presence of emotions or inclinations, but the overvaluing of them when compared to the moral law. When he speaks of self-constraint, he is not asking for the ridding of these emotions and desires but the curbing of them so that we do not allow them "priority over moral considerations when the two conflict…," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 399). Thus, for Kant, the virtuous moral agent is one that "limits the influence on her will of feelings and inclinations at odds with duty, but, in addition, perfects herself by cultivating morally favorable feelings and inclinations like sympathy as instruments that facilitate acting well," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 399).

Kant encourages the cultivation of moral feelings claiming that we are obligated to do so as it will better equip us to follow the moral law. It is important to note though that Kant argues that we have no obligation to

sympathize with others, but that we should utilize these feelings "as a means to promoting active and rational benevolence" (MM 6:456; 574-5). This implies that we develop these feelings as tools "towards fulfilling our morally obligatory end of beneficence," [which is another imperfect duty] (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 403). Thus, what we are "directly obligated to do… is to sympathize actively in the fate of others" which "involves adopting a maxim of beneficence" (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 403). This adoption requires us "to promote according to one's means" to "happiness" without expecting anything in return (MM 6:453; 572). Thus, it is the connection to the "end of beneficence" that Kant believes the "indirect duty to cultivate sympathetic feelings" arises from (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 403).

As previously discussed, it is through the imperfect duty of love (or beneficence) that we are instructed to cultivate sympathy as it will allow us to advance the happiness and welfare of others (Baxley, *Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence* 578). Kant's FH—*act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means* [G 4:429]—is what causes us to undertake sympathy as a duty, albeit sometimes an indirect one, because it obligates us to take other's happiness as an end for ourselves.

It is essential to highlight that *humanity* is an important notion for Kant as he believes it to be a "rational nature ('humanity')" that every human being possesses, which enables one to be "*an end in itself*" instead of "a goal to be achieved…," (Hill, *Kant* 161). Kant also refers to the "duty of sympathetic participation" as "humanity" where:

> It includes the duty to cultivate the feeling of sympathy (which in this connection Kant calls *humanitas aesthetica*) in order to strengthen our sensitivity to the needs of others and strengthen our capacity to perform duties of beneficence. (Wood 176)

Sympathy plays an epistemic role for us in the sense that it enables us to cultivate a sensitivity towards the needs/desires of others. Sympathy acts as a "prompting" force for actions done from duty by guiding the virtuous agent on how to properly elevate the happiness of others (Baxley, *Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence* 583). It becomes a necessity when we attempt to "perceive and understand the relevant moral features of a situation and to gain insight into what" we "might do to alleviate the sufferings of others," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 403). Kant understands virtue to necessitate the "adoption of ends" in that "it must involve the development of a range feelings and desires associated with those ends," (Baxley, *Kantian Virtue* 403). Hence, when the happiness of others becomes our end, we require sympathy to understand their needs/desires so that we can alleviate any potential suffering.

From this chapter, we can conclude that Kant is not against the use of feelings and inclinations when attempting to morally deliberate, as it allows us to cultivate virtue which is an essentially part of the moral decision-making process. What he argues against is the subordination of the moral law to said inclinations, which would cause us to only consider satisfying our personal needs/desires, instead of those of the rest of humanity. Thus, our main takeaway is that Kant's moral theory can contribute to an ethics of care as it allows for the cultivation of sympathy, which is a crucial element in the caring relationship, whether intimate or distant.

3. Humean Conceptions of Sympathy/ Empathy Via Moral Sentimentalism: The Second Half of the Solution

3.1 A Quick Introduction to Humean Moral Sentimentalism and Sympathy

In this chapter, I will focus on the sentimentalist aspect of my meta-theory, *Kantian Sentimentalism*. I find that moral sentimentalism plays a pivotal role when discussing an ethics of care, specifically when considering its thoughts on sympathy. It's important to note that the way I will discuss sympathy is equivocal to our understanding of empathy. It will become evident that, especially for Hume, sympathy is the idea of placing oneself in the perspective of another in order to feel their needs and desires. Sympathy is central to care ethics in that a caring relationship begins by the one-caring deciphering the needs of the cared-for and attempting to meet those needs. I will focus on Hume's perspective of moral sentimentalism as I find his theory to be a good example of how both reason and emotion are necessary for the agent to make moral judgements, even though reason is subjugated to emotion.

For Hume, the foundation of morals/moral distinctions is in *sympathy* and the *moral sentiments*. He believes that moral philosophy is and should be considered an *empirical science* of human nature. Hume also thinks that it should include the use of observation, specifically that of human psychology. He argues

that morality is founded in feeling, emotion, pain and pleasure, and not reason (i.e., good/bad, right/wrong/virtue/vicious). Hume believes that moral rightness lies in our ability to discern right and wrong by viewing what others approve or disapprove of when we are spectators to their actions and behaviors. He utilizes virtue and vice as the primary terms of moral evaluation, where virtue signifies approbation and vice disapprobation. Hume specifically focuses on character and the qualities of character that produce pain and pleasure in others, as he believes that pain and pleasure are pivotal to for our understanding of moral rightness/wrongness.

In *an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume claims that:

> MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. (1.1)

Hume's use of the word "science" highlights a relationship that he perceives morality to have with the work/process that Newton utilized when theorizing about astronomical bodies. Hume wants the philosopher to "discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principle, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations", and he believes that Newton accomplished this when theorizing about astronomy (EHU 1.15). He wants to know whether there can be, in morality, some "common principle" that explicates the "vast multitude and diversity" of moral phenomena (EHU 1.15). Hume will later claim this to be sympathy and the moral sentiments.

Hume continues by differentiating between two types of philosophers: The painter and the anatomist. He describes the painter-philosopher as one that:

> …considers man chiefly as born from action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves…They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours. (EHU 1.1)

For Hume, the painter-philosopher is one that utilizes an "easy" manner, examples from common life, and literary devices to make people live and pursue virtue and hate and avoid vice (EHU 1.3). In contrast, there is the anatomist-philosopher who considers:

> …man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. (EHU 1.2)

The latter can be considered a more Kantian approach to morality, as Kant believes morality to stem from our faculty of reason which we utilize to cultivate *maxims* that can become *universal laws of nature* (refer to Ch. 2 for a more in-depth explanation of these concepts). Hume describes the anatomist-philosopher as one who displays "abstruse" manner, and through speculation, analysis, and abstract "metaphysical" investigations, endeavors to uncover hidden truths (EHU 1.3). While he believes that the anatomist-philosopher has her merits, she must serve the painter-philosopher, as the former is uncovering truths that the latter is able to display more accurately.

Hence, Hume is arguing that to correctly make moral judgements, the moral agent must take taste and the sentiments as primary, and reason as secondary. Thus, through his discussion of the two different 'species' of philosopher, we see the way that Hume conceives of human nature. He believes that people care about virtue and want to avoid vice, and that they possess active and easily influenced imaginations and feelings. Lastly, they can be moved and guided by what they read, but also have understanding and reason, which they utilize to maintain a better understanding of other objects. Therefore, Hume believes the goal of moral philosophy to be the *formation of virtuous characters.*

Hume continues his investigation of the *foundation of morality* in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. He first dismisses *moral nihilism*, which "denies the reality of moral distinction" and conceives "that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of others." (EPM 1.2). Then, Hume claims that a controversy has occurred in moral philosophy about whether its foundation lies in *reason* or *sentiments* (EPM 1.3). He describes that:

> There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species. (EPM 1.3)

When considering moral philosophy's foundation lying in reason, it becomes an argument for *moral rationalism*. Moral rationalism is the view that "Moral distinctions…are discernable by *pure reason*…," (EPM 1.5). Hume provides an argument for moral rationalism as such:

1. We argue about moral matters/ "truths".
2. We don't argue about matters of taste and sentiment.
3. If we are arguing about something, we must be utilizing reason when explicating about said arguments.
4. ∴ moral matters are rational. (EPM 1.5)

In terms of premise three, Hume offers the example of a criminal trial. He describes how we would first collect facts that deny the charges brought against the accused, and then prove that even if said crime was committed that there must be a justifiable reason for it (EPM 1.5). Through the latter argument, Hume is highlighting that we, as human beings, do deliberate, analyze, and deduce, as both agents considering how to act and as spectators observing and evaluating others. The argument is *weak* because it only emphasizes that reason is *involved* in the process of moral deliberation, not that it's its sole foundation.

In contrast, when we consider moral philosophy's foundation as lying in sentiments, it becomes an argument for *moral sentimentalism*. Moral sentimentalism highlights that "it is impossible" for reason to be the sole faculty in drawing moral conclusions (EPM 1.6). Moral sentimentalists argue:

1. Humans hate vice and love virtue.
2. Reason is incapable of producing feelings such as hatred and love.
3. ∴ hatred and love (and all other feelings) must come from "the original fabric and formulation of the human mind". (EPM 1.6)

Hume furthers the argument for moral sentimentalism as the foundation of moral philosophy by describing how the "end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other," (EPM 1.7). Since the goal of moral philosophy, according to Hume is *practical*, how can it lie in reason which is not? He concludes that it cannot, because even though reason can "discover truths", it's unable to "beget" any type of desire or aversion, which is essential to influence our conduct and behavior (EPM 1.7). The latter sentence is crucial for Hume's understanding of moral philosophy, as what "animates" us to act is the power of the human mind viewed as active. Reason, on the other hand, is inert and "puts an end to our researches," (EPM 1.7).

Considering the arguments from both sides, Hume is willing to acknowledge that "*reason* and *sentiment* concur in almost all moral deliberations and conclusions," (EPM 1.9). However, when it comes down to the "final sentence", or the reason we come to love virtue as it begets pleasure and hate viciousness as it begets vice, Hume believes that morality lies in "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species," (EPM 1.9). Kant makes an equivocal argument with a different conclusion. He also believes that reason and sentiment (i.e., inclination) are needed to morally deliberate, but that reason is our primary source for said deliberation while sentiment is a secondary, as needed activating force.

In Appendix 1 of EPM, Hume returns to his original question in Section 1 which concerns the "general principles of morals" and the examination of "how far either *reason* or *sentiment* enters into all decisions of praise and censure," (EPM App 1.1). He believes that one foundational aspect of "moral praise" lies in the "usefulness of any quality or action…," (EPM App 1.2). Hume continues to explain that *reason* is necessary in order to determine usefulness, and thus must be a part of morality (EPM App 1.2). Though he finds reason to be necessary for morality, he still holds firm to his claim in EPM Section 1, that reason alone is not sufficient "to produce any moral blame or approbation," (EPM App 1.3). Thus, Hume concludes that "*reason* instructs us in the several tendencies of action" but it is "*humanity*" (or sentiment) that "makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and

beneficial," (EPM App 1.3). Essentially, without feeling, we are "totally indifferent" to any type of goal or end.

In Section 2 of EPM, Hume makes the argument that *usefulness* becomes pivotal to our understanding of virtue, but in Section 5, he will reamend this claim to argue that utility is not the sole basis for approbation and disapprobation of all qualities. He offers alongside utility, the idea of *sympathy*—a capacity that all human beings possess—which is how he believes we come to approve and disapprove of qualities. Hume claims that utility pleases because:

> Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, useful? For what? For some body's interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are served by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one great source of moral distinctions. (EPM 5.15)

For example, in *The Hunger Games*, I approve of Katniss' courage to take her sister's place in the games, because I recognize that her courage is useful to those who depend on and are around her. I recognize, that through her courage, she saved both her sister and her mother, as her sister is the one that personally cares for their mother. The question then becomes how I recognize this courage in someone else, and Hume's answer is our capacity for *sympathy* or *fellow-feeling*.

For Hume:

> Sympathy attunes us to the harm done to victims of injustice and dishonesty, and the feeling of uneasiness which is the result of this sympathy is simply constitutive of moral disapprobation – so long as that feeling survives general reflection about the consequences of that kind of action for society at large. (Harris 125-6)

Hume believes sympathy to be a *natural virtue* which "are those that are recognized as such without need for the prior construction of conventions," (Harris 126). He also thinks, in contrast to most virtue and care ethicists, that even though "sympathy with others varies according to the closeness of our relation to them, our moral judgements do not change in the same way," (Harris 127). This means that we hold approbation and disapprobation for the same moral qualities regardless of where we reside, suggesting that moral qualities possess a kind of general standard.

Hume describes sympathizing as:

> nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression, 'tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence. (T 202)

Essentially, sympathizing allows us to place ourselves in the perspective of others in order to feel their needs and desires. Hence, when we are attempting to discover whether the action of an agent deserves approbation or disapprobation, we must first adopt a common point of view which is crucial to avoid bias as the agent may be someone we hold a personal relation with. Then, as a spectator, we must focus on the action of said agent and sympathize with the people that are affected by it. Consequently, we will experience a moral sentiment as a response to our sympathizing, and this allows us to cultivate a moral judgement of approval or disapproval based on the moral sentiment felt.

For example, I am standing on my front porch and happen to see a child fall off her bike. I see her face begin to scrunch in pain, and I start to feel a sense of pain as well. It is as though I am the one that fell off the bike. I look around and notice that my neighbors have also seen her fall, and that their facial expressions mimic mine, which is one of pain. As the child begins to cry from pain, I also feel a sense of grief that emanates from experiencing said pain. I then see a woman come up behind her, lift her off the ground and into her arms. I watch the woman check the child for any bruises or cuts and rub her head, as an attempt to soothe her. The child's expression changes to one of calmness, and I feel this same calmness envelope me as I continue to watch her. It is as if the woman is directly soothing me.

The woman then produces a band-aid, puts it on the child's knee, and then gives her a lollipop, which causes the child to squeal in happiness. As I watch the child's expression turn to one of happiness, I begin to feel happy as well. It is as though the happiness radiating out from her is mirrored in my own body. Through this example, I have displayed sympathy, because I have taken in the emotions of the child (who is my target as

a spectator) by experiencing her pain and grief from falling off the bike and then her subsequent happiness after being given a lollipop by the woman. To take it one step further, by ultimately experiencing the sentiment of happiness, I can come to a moral judgement about the outcome of this situation. What I mean by this is that through viewing the woman help the child, I felt a sense of approbation because she was alleviating the child's pain and allowing her to feel happiness (i.e., pleasure). To reiterate, Hume claims that our sense of moral rightness and wrongness stems from whether certain situations incite pleasure or pain. Since the latter example ended in the incitement of pleasure on behalf of the child, I can conclude that the action of the woman helping the child is morally right.

The main takeaways of this chapter become that sympathy is a type of fellow-feeling which allows us to place ourselves at the center of the concerns and feelings of others. Then, through sympathy, we can feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction based on the actions performed by agents, which allows us to cultivate moral judgements about them. Thus, it becomes evident, that Humean sympathy also enables us to form relations with others in order to feel and satisfy their needs and desires (something that it pivotal to the caring relation described in care ethics).

4. Kantian Sentimentalism: The Ultimate Solution to Cultivate a Robust Ethics of Care

4.1 What is Kantian Sentimentalism?

Now that it has become apparent why I termed my nuanced theory of *Kantian Sentimentalism* as such, I will explicate its purpose, specifically within the spectrum of morality. To reiterate, Kantian Sentimentalism is my attempt at a care and justice-based theory within an ethics of care. I utilize Kantian conceptions of duty and inclinations and Humean conceptions of sympathy as its foundation, where certain situations will call for a mixture of both concepts and others just one or the other.

I have previously discussed—in Ch. 1—the extremes of the spectrum where the far left represents resolving moral issues, within an ethics of care, solely through care and the far right resolving moral issues with justice as its primary moral decision-making factor. Once again when considering moral issues that would utilize the far left of the spectrum to resolve them, we are keeping a Noddings' conception of care in mind along with a Humean conception of empathy. Situations such as the latter would reflect relations that occur between intimates, such as the way that a mother cares for a child. We do not require aspects of justice to properly address how parents should raise their children, unless violence becomes a factor within the situation. Care ethicists would claim that caring as a sole factor in raising children is sufficient to resolving moral issues that could rise within the relation, as parents are able to maintain engrossment, receptivity and motivational displacement with their children to address their needs and desires.

On the other hand, situations that call for a strictly justice-based approach to care reflect those that tend to affect multitudes, mostly at a distance. These situations would encompass those that require us to instate policies and laws to provide care on a mass scale. Some examples would be the need for laws against physical and mental violence towards others. We, as individuals, are unable to protect all those that suffer from violence as it happens too often and sometimes not within our direct view. To recall a notion from Noddings, the aforementioned allows us to care-about these individuals, but not care-for them as we cannot retain the engrossment, receptivity, and motivational displacement necessary to foster a caring relation.

For the latter reason, we require laws and policies to protect against these types of moral issues, because we are unable to physically, on-site resolve them ourselves. However, I do not support Noddings' claim that following laws and policies, meant to foster care within society, does not qualify as actual care. I believe that these said laws and policies allow us to go from more general caring (i.e., don't commit violence against distant others) to particulars (i.e., don't commit violence against those I have intimate relations with). Laws and policies provide a broad framework to act on moral issues that pertain to care, which then facilitates application to our more intimate caring relations.

Having explicated examples for the extremes of the spectrum, it now becomes a question of what theory should be utilized to resolve moral issues, within an ethics of care, that require aspects of both justice and care. Held deliberates on the latter question as well but does not provide any term or framework to properly expound on a theory that encompasses both aspects of moral action. Thus, I will put forth the notion of Kantian Sentimentalism which will be my working theory to resolve certain moral particulars, within an ethics of care, that require characteristics of both justice and care. I will highlight that these types

of moral situations will require us to pick-and-choose certain aspects of Kant and Hume's moral discourses in order to resolve them.

I have previously emphasized that although both figures have theories on moral concepts such as empathy, I am not attempting to combine their thoughts as they do not share the same foundational aspects. This is what I mean by picking-and-choosing. Kant sees empathy as a rational desire that is rooted in our imperfect duty to care for all of humanity, and Hume views empathy as a fellow-feeling that allows us to feel the sentiments of others in order to morally deliberate. Hence, one theory in founded on reason alone and another on feeling and the sentiments.

However, both conceptions of empathy can remain different and still serve important roles within the spectrum. I would argue that Kant's conception of empathy is useful when thinking of moral issues that are justice-oriented within an ethics of care. By allowing ourselves to cultivate sympathy, we are subordinating our self-interests to the moral law in order to take others happiness as our own end, which reflect justice-based caring. For Hume's conception of sympathy, we take in the feelings of those we have intimate relations with, in order to both feel and understand their needs and desires, which reflects care-based caring. Both philosopher's moral discourses have salience and are useful when considering certain moral particulars, and this is why Kantian Sentimentalism is necessary. Kantian Sentimentalism enables care ethicists to pick-and-choose moral concepts from two moral discourses that view care from different perspectives in order to address moral particulars that care alone cannot resolve. And, as it has become evident throughout this paper, caring is not a one-size-fits-all principle of moral action.

4.2 How Kantian Sentimentalism is the Solution to a More Robust Ethics of Care

I believe Kantian Sentimentalism to be pivotal to cultivating a more robust ethics of care because we do not possess a theory that enables care ethicists to pick-and-choose from multiple different moral discourses. Considering care ethics as it currently stands, we only find its foundation to be in care and the possession of a caring attitude and this creates issues for certain moral particulars. To show how Kantian Sentimentalism—as a combined theory of care and justice—would aid in resolving certain moral particulars within an ethics of care, I will reference the issue of domestic violence from Ch. 2.

We have seen in Ch. 1, that care as a sole moral decision-making factor is unable to resolve issues of domestic violence, as someone like Noddings would claim that by the one-caring ceasing to care for those they have previously cared-for, they would be acting under a "diminished ethical ideal" (Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* 114). This is highly problematic, as we are essentially arguing that victims of abuse should stay with their abusers because if they stop caring for them, they are acting against their innate sense of care. However, what if the one-caring's innate sense of care is causing them to relegate their own care to the background? Someone like Eva Kittay would argue that this is dangerous because all individuals, regardless of the role they play within a caring relation, are dependents. We are all some mother's child, and because of this we are all dependents that require care (Kittay 115). Thus, it would be morally wrong to force victims of abuse—who tend to be the one-caring—to stay in intimate relations that do not consider their care to also be a necessity.

Kantian Sentimentalism can aid in resolving moral issues such as these by protecting victims of abuse under already established laws and policies, and then providing networks of support via housing at domestic abuse shelters, support groups, etc. The latter thus highlights a justice and care-based approach. I would say that we first need a justice-based care ethics similar to Friedman's description. This would entail utilizing established laws to prosecute, penalize, and put away abusers. Domestic abuse victims sometimes need the law to separate themselves from their abusers because they are unable to do it themselves. This could be due to various reasons such as the perceived fear that the violence will escalate or that even if they leave their abusers, they will still be sought out by them to rekindle the abusive relationship. Laws and policies forbidding domestic abuse do only seem to allow us to care-about these victims, as the enforcement of them cannot be physically always seen. However, it will be the inclusion of care that allows us to intimately care-for them.

After leaving these relationships, a care-based care ethics can be applied. This would be a more hands-on, on-site type of care where we are now caring for individuals. For example, these victims could be assigned individual sponsors that would allow for the fostering of caring relations through engrossment, receptivity, and motivational displacement. These sponsors would help individual victims of domestic

violence build a network of support by providing it physically and emotionally. To reiterate, this care could take the form of providing temporary, emergency housing at domestic abuse shelters, engaging in support groups with other domestic abuse victims, therapy, and other resources along similar lines. It is also important to note that even if the abused refuses to leave the abusive relationship, we can still support them. The latter would just entail leaning more towards the left of the spectrum.

It does become evident though, that Kantian Sentimentalism, in practice, can resolve certain moral particulars, that an ethics of care solely based on care, fails to address. Thus, Kantian Sentimentalism is the justice and cared-based approach to an ethics of care that satisfies all moral situations and particulars within the discourse.

Abbreviations

Immanuel Kant's Works

G: *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*

MM: *The Metaphysics of Morals*

CPrR: *Critique of Practical Reason*

David Hume's Works

EHU: *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*

EPM: *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*

T: *A Treatise of Human Nature*

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