The Domestic Contexts of the Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgency in Nigeria and What to Do About It

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ABSTRACT

The purposes of this research paper are trace the history of the origin and evolution of Boko Haram; assess its impacts on the Nigerian state ; identify and discuss the domestic Nigerian factors that drive and sustain Boko Haram terrorist insurgency; and recommend best practices and strategies necessary to fight the threat of Boko Haram terrorist activities in Nigeria and beyond. Relying on the theories of structural functionalism and conflict, this paper asserts that Boko Haram originated as a blend of Maitatsine and Darui national Islamic sects with strong movement in Northern Nigerian sworn to overthrow the Nigerian state, stamp out Western education and lifestyles and then install an Islamic state. After the death of its leader Mohammad Yusuf in July 2009 his successor Abubakar Shekau drove the movement underground and adopted terrorist tactics

The Boko Haram expansion was given impetus by failing domestic factors and conditions in Nigeria, such as poverty, inequality, corruption, interethnic competition, human rights violation, poor governance, materialism, class privileges, excessive consumerism and regional marginalization. The manifestation of these societal ills in fact reinforced Boko Haram's narratives, thus helping it to recruit and metastasize or spread to other regions of Nigeria.

The best strategies for fighting Boko Haram movement and ideology will involve the reinstitution of good governance; fighting official corruption; stopping human rights violations and creating employment through infrastructure development.

Keywords: *Sharia law, Jihad, Indirect Rule, Maitatsine, Terrorism, Boko Haram, kleptocracy, Rotational Presidency, Al-Shabaab, Sabon Garuruwa, Elite, Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), Irredentism, Chibok, Almajirai.*

INTRODUCTION

Boko Haram is a terrorist Organization based in North-eastern Nigeria. It is not only causing turmoil in Africa's most populated nation, but in 2015 was designated as the World's deadliest group. Boko Haram means "western education is forbidden" and opposes anything that resembles western way of life, including voting and secular education. The organization declared open confrontation against the Nigerian state; but after the execution of its leader Mohammad Yusuf by the Nigerian government, Boko Haram went underground under a new Leader Abubakar Shekau and change its tactics from internal resistance to open attacks, including guerilla welfare aligned toward the control of territory and eventual establishment of a caliphate (Islamic government/ Theocracy). Boko Haram is known to derive its weapons through smuggling across the porous borders of Nigerian neighbors – Benin, Cameroon and Niger. It has also received money from disgruntled Nigerian politicians, looting of captured towns and banks, robberies and ransom from captured Nigerian expatriates. Due to its ideological opposition to the education of women, Boko Haram has killed and kidnapped women who do otherwise. Hence, it has burned down schools, killed teachers and slaughtered school girls, culminating in the abduction of 276 school girls from Chibok Government Girls Secondary School in North Eastern Nigeria in April 2014.

Boko Haram has used force to enforce its rules. As such, women and girls have been forced into marriage with its members, recruited and used child soldiers, uneducated and unemployed youths as well as disgruntled mass of people emptied in jail breaks.

In response, the Nigerian government has responded by declaring a state of emergency in May 2013, covering three states – Yobe, Adamawa and Borno. The State of emergence came with it, the launching of military operations in the areas covered by the state of emergency. In November 2014, the then President Goodluck Jonathan extended the state of emergency more than once.

With Boko Haram designated as the deadliest terrorist organization coupled with its pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaida, and the Chibok abduction of 276 school girls, the world could not keep silent anymore. In May 2014, the United Nations Security Council listed the organization for targeted financial sanctions and arms embargo. Many other states, including the United States, United Kingdom and France also pledged assistance to Nigeria, particularly in the areas of intelligence-sharing, training of the Nigerian military and the creation of a regional counter-terrorism strategy with Nigerian neighbors – Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. In the past, Chad, Niger and Nigeria had operated a multi-national joint task force to provide border security among these nations to combat Boko Haram.

In October 2014, the Lake Chad Basin Commission member states and Benin decided to create a new (MNJTF) Multinational Task Force to fight Boko Haram. While the details of this arrangement are unclear, the member countries of the MNJTF have petitioned the African Union and the United Nations for authorization. The issues surrounding the operational strategy and scope of MNJTF have been the subjects of discussion at the African Union Peace and Security Council, following its meeting on January 29, 2015.

This paper intends to:

- Identify the domestic factors the drive or enhance (enablers) the growth and spread of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria

- Analyze the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria

- Discuss the origin, evolution and ideology of Boko Haram

- Assess Nigerian government responses to the Boko Harm terrorist challenge

- Explain the impacts of Nigerian colonial history on the emergence of Boko Haram

- Define terrorism and explore the theories of terrorism, focusing on the functionalist and conflict theories or perspectives

- Contribute to the body of knowledge available to scholars, security agencies and other stake holders regarding terrorism

- Make recommendations on the best possible strategies for fighting Boko Haram

BOKO HARAM: A TERRORIST ENTITY

The U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism somewhat more broadly, calling it: "The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

According to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) "International terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics:

- Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;

- Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

- Occur primarily outside the territorial juris-diction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

According to Noam Chomsky (1991), for an act to be labeled a terrorist act, it must involve:

- Act dangerous to human life that is in violation of criminal law of the state

- Act intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population

- Act intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion

- Act designed to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping

Already, Northern Nigeria, the region where Boko Haram calls its base is a fertile ground for terrorist activities partly because of certain forces and conditions at work. First, there is a strong belief among Muslims that divine rules and regulations are the answers and solutions to human problems and that such rules are a

panacea to societal peace and stability. Nigeria's northern states, including Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Gombe, Katsina and Sokoto have some form of sharia penal code. Under this regulation, alcohol, bars, discos, gambling, prostitution, lesbianism, homosexuality, brothels, partying, lewd behaviors and conducts, public drinking etc. are banned. In addition, gender separation in public facilities and public buses are required. Punishment for violators might range from flogging, amputation of hands to death by stoning.

Examples of such violations are not far-fetched. In November 2002, Aminu Ruwa who was implicated in a rape incident with under-age girl was subjected to 100 lashes of the cane in Niger State. Also, in August 2002, in the "Zina Trial", Fatima Usman and Ahmadu Ibrahim were condemned to death over marital infidelity (sex outside marriage). Such harsh punishment has led to clashes and riots between Christians and Muslims because it is impossible to impose separate standards of morality for Moslems and Christians in public life.

Hence, these incidents over sharia have grave implications for community integration. First, they caused the fractioning and fragmentation of ethnic cohesion in the so called "melting pot" of Nigeria in terms of religion, language and ethnic diversity. There is fear that the spread of sharia might encourage ethnic Hausas and Fulani and Moslems to dominate in the North against ethnic Igbos and other southerners, including the Yoruba who are mostly Christians and who dominate in commerce and industry in an effort to regain their once lost power and glory. This occurs in the backdrop that for most of the 40 years out of 55 years of Nigerian independence. It may also nurture extremism and anti-western sentiments all in the name of guaranteeing freedom of religion. Further, there is heightened general suspicion among Christians about the North's religious designs to "Islamize the south", thus increasing the tensions between the majority Moslem north and Christian communities already divided along ethnic and religious lines.

The mere fact that Boko Haram terrorist operations take place (has tentacles spread) in multiple countries – Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger make it a transnational organization. Also, the Boko Haram insurgents take refuge/ hideout, acquire weapons procurement and food, swear allegiance and cooperate by sharing tactics, training, leadership, intelligence, financing and resources with other terrorist organization in the Sahel – Al-shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb make it an international terrorist organization. Also, its attacks on the symbols of the global regime – United Nations symbols make it a global terrorist organization. For example, in June 2011, Boko Haram insurgents attacked the UN Headquarters in Abuja; Kidnapped 7 French tourists in Northern Cameroon in February 2013; attacked Cameroonian military base at Folofata on January 12, 2015 and overran Cameroonian town of Fotokol in February 2015,, killing 13 Chadian soldiers, 81 civilians and 6 Cameroonian soldiers. Also, on December 17, 2014, the Insurgents attacked Army convoy in Amchide near the city of Maroua, Cameroon.

STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM AND CONFLICT THEORY OF TERRORISM

The essence of using the theories of conflict and structural functionalism is to try and understand the causes and nature of Boko Haram terrorist movement in Nigeria.

Structural Functionalism

Functionalism is the theory which argues that various social institutions and processes in society exist to serve some important or necessary interest or function to keep society running with maximum social integration. It emphasizes the unity of society and what its members share. This sociological perspective draws on the works of Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spenser, Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons (1940; 1960; 1964; 1970) ideas/ hypotheses that the best way to study society is to identify the roles that different aspects of society play. Social Deviance, which can be loosely understood, can be taken to mean any transgression of socially established norms. An example is a terrorist act. Thus, terrorism is a deviant behavior. Functionalism sees terrorism-which is a form of crime- as a temporary deviation from the normal goings or norms of society and is in a way functional to society by serving as a symptom and warning of societal moral ills. That is, acting like a "canary in the coal mine".

Functionalism would explain the existence of any social phenomena by the function they perform. Therefore, terrorism is functional because it brings about a natural formation of coalition of individuals together against it and brings a sense of belonging to the group opposing it. This feeling of group solidarity would help prevent anomie, which is the stage or condition where people do not need to follow any norms of society in order to survive in

society. In other words, a condition in which society provides little or no moral guidance to its citizens. Anomie which is social instability resulting from breakdown of standards and values has the effect and tendency of breaking down social bonds (social contract) between the individual and society thus, resulting in societal fragmentation and breakdown of social identity and rejection of self-regulatory values.

Terrorists, like other criminals, become a reference point -or standard for evaluating society. In order to protect the status quo, society uses terrorism as a way to reassert the importance of social norms in the lives of individuals. Thus, individuals see terrorism as a threat to the social equilibrium, homeostasis or balance and their lives in a functioning society. Functionalists believe/ hypothesize that social change is required to keep a healthy society (make society pure). These social changes often come about from a drastic need for change and are preceded by a social shock. Terrorism in essence is known to bring about / generates social shocks that move society towards a change in direction thereby enabling it to find new ways in which to protect itself through form of reform or revolution. Functionalists view these new changes as providing society with a healthy and slow-paced social change that is desperately needed.

In the Nigerian context therefore Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency thus become an expected and needed shock, and therefore can be seen or perceived in a sense to encourage Nigerian society to change for the better. In a nutshell and according to Durkheim and other functionalists, terrorism is also functional for society because it leads to heightened awareness of shared moral bonds and increased social cohesion.

Conflict Theory

Conflict Theory posits that conflict between competing interests is the basic, animating force of social change and society in general. Conflict theory owes its origin to the works of Karl Marx which were analyzed and expanded by scholars such as Theda Skopol (1977); Eric Olin wright et al (1988) and Steven Vallas (1987). The major aim of Karl Marx and other conflict theories is to explain the workings of the societal dialectic – the contradictions inherent in capitalism, the demise of capitalism and the coming of the communist era.

The Conflict theory according to Karl Marx argues that capitalist societies are characterized socio-economically by two classes – the bourgeoisie who own the means of production and control and determine the economic, political and social order of such societies and the proletariat (workers) who toil to produce the goods and services with little or no compensation. Marx maintained that the contradiction between the classes of the haves (bourgeoisie) and the "have nots" (proletariat) would eventually lead to or trigger revolution. Revolution in this instance is the fundamental change and transformation of the society thereby setting the stage for the installation of a social order structured upon the common ownership of the means of production and the elimination of class structures and the restoration of an equalitarian society.

Conflict theorists stress divisions or stratification within society and the struggles that arise out of people's pursuit of their varying or different material interests. Conflict Theory generally argues that the control of conflict equals the ability of one group to suppress the group that they are opposing, and that he prevailing law and order in Nigeria is a technique and system of defining and maintaining a social order that benefits some and in the Nigerian context (Christians) at the expense of others (Moslems).

Conflict theory views terrorism as nothing but a reaction to injustice, which is probably created in the minds of terrorist due to misguidance, illiteracy, or unrealistic goals, and that violent behaviors expressed by terrorist organizations are the result of individual frustration, aggression or showing a readiness to fight (form of commitment to social activism and change). Political conflict makes people look for ways to explain and solve the problems they are facing. If the conflict is deeply rooted, and the current ideology proves unable to deal with the Nigerian problems that include but not limited to mass corruption, greed, extra-judicial killings, kleptocracy, crime, kidnapping, lawlessness and fornication (crimes against Moslem principles and teaching) people begin to turn to other ideologies that can often carry a religious theme to them (in this case, purist and equalitarian society).

A terrorist organization such as Boko Haram uses violence because it believes that it needs the use of violence to win the revolutionary struggle. In Nigeria, Boko Harm has justified its actions of bombing campaigns in religious terms; and viewing the elected governments as abandoning religious principles. Suicide attacks, against the government controlled by Christians such as the Presidency of Goodluck Ebele

Jonathan are seen as the means in which to accomplish the Boko Haram goal of establishing a "sharia" government. Boko Haram insurgents do not have the money or the political power that is needed to wage war against the Nigerian state. So, it uses terrorism as a means, and not a goal, for political agitation in order to achieve its political objectives. Before committing an act of terror, Boko Haram is not necessarily obliged to always weigh the cost and benefits of its actions, but rather is reacting from the humiliation, alienation, frustration and other forms of victimization it feels the Nigerian masses are being subjected to.

BOKO HARAM: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND IDEOLOGY

Boko Haram was founded as a Sunni Islamic Fundamentalist sect advocating a strict Sharia Law. It is influenced by Wahhabi Movement, an orthodox, ultraconservative/ fundamentalist Islamic religious movement sworn to pure monotheistic worship. Thus, the movement introduced a strict Sharia rule inclined to:

Establish an Islamic state (caliphate or sharia state) in Nigeria

Oppose western education and influence

Fight against the concentration of wealth in the hands of southern Christian political elites

The movement is diffused as it incorporates the followers of Mohammed Marwa known as Maitatsines and members of Darui Islam radical sect who were known for condemning the reading of books and literature other than the Quoran. It should be noted that in the 1980s, in Kano, the seat of Muslim religion in Nigeria, the Muslim fundamentalist sect, Yan Tatsine (followers of Maitatsine) instigated violent riots that resulted in the death of their leaders Maitatsine and its movement. The Maitatsine was a small Islamic sect which opposed the programs and values of a modern state while in support of populist traditional goals committed to reducing class privileges, materialism and other institutional inequalities that dramatized their existence in the riots which led to the death of about five thousand people.

1981 saw reaction to a query to the Emir of Kano from then Governor Abubakar Rimi charging the former of deliberate disrespect of the state government fueled anger which erupted into a massive scale on July 10, 1981 among the followers of the Emir who had frowned at the Governor's challenge of his traditional authority.

The letter from the governor who had been resented by the traditional religious leaders as an enemy of traditional institutions incited violent protests which resulted in the burning down of State Government Secretariat, Radio Kano, State House of Assembly and the death of Governor Rimi's Chief Political Adviser, Dr. Bala Mohammed.

Not only was the Governor accused of treating the Emir as a symbol of feudal institution, but his letter to the Emir was described as the "most disrespectful"; suitable for admonishing a clerk, but most unsuitable for addressing a venerated traditional and religious leader" When the New Nigeria Newspaper reported the circumstances of the letter and suggested the possibility of dethroning the Emir, the later, reported Larry Diamond (1982) called on the people of goodwill to take every constitutional measure to defend their traditional institutions.

In 2012, the U.S. Department of State designated Abubakar Shekau, the surviving leader of Boko Haram a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. The United States designated Boko Haram a terrorist organization in November 2013. In March 2015, Boko Haram declared allegiance to Al Qaeda. Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist movement based in North Eastern Nigeria. It is also active in neighboring countries to Nigeria, including Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf. After its founding in 2002, its radicalization led to sporadic uprisings and clashes in July 2009 involving riots and clashes with the police in 2004 and again in 2009 with an assault on a Bauchi State police station in which over 700 perished, and thereby leading to the incidents resulting in the death of its leader Mohammad Yusuf who was executed. The 2009 Boko Haram uprising was a conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces. Things changed in that year when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into Boko Haram's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves.

Although long-standing tensions existed between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security Forces, the immediate cause of the violence stemmed from an incident in which a group of the sect's members were stopped by police in the city of Maiduguri as they were on the way to the cemetery to bury a comrade. Nigerian security officers, part of a special operation aimed at stamping out violence and rampant crime in

Bornu State, demanded that the Boko Haram members comply with a law requiring motorcycle passengers to wear helmets. They refused and, in the confrontation that followed, several of its members were killed and wounded by police. Thereafter, Boko Haram members launched an attack on a police station in Bauchi state. Clashes between militants and the Nigeria Police Force spread to other northern cities including Kano, Yobe and Borno. In response, Nigerian troops proceeded to arrest Boko Haram leader Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri. But, his followers barricaded themselves inside. In ensuing encounter, Yusuf was captured by the military, taken to police headquarters, and executed in cold blood.

Thereafter, following the death of Mohammad Yusuf, the movement went underground and subsequently declared war against the Nigerian State. Following his death, he was succeeded by his deputy Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram derived its name from two words – Haram (in Arabic meaning forbidden) and Boko (in Hausa meaning Western Education). Hence, Boko Haram became the compound word "Boko Haram"; later became linked to Al Qaeda and swore to the establishment of an Islamic State and its principles.

NIGERIAN COLONIAL HISTORY AND BOKO HARAM

The Nigerian colonial history and politics have shaped or influenced the ideological development of Boko Haram. Usman Dan Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Caliphate had declared Jihad in 1804 against the oppressive rule of the Hausa Fulani. He publicly attacked what he saw as the abuses of the Hausa elites, particularly, the burden of over-taxation placed on the poor. Dan Fodio assembled or recruited the nomads, his clansmen into a jihadist army, thus triggering the Fulani war (Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio – 1804-1808). Dan Fodio, a Fulani, led the Fulani against the Hausa kingdom. The Fulani Jihad started following the exile of Dan Fodio from Gobir by the King of Yumfa, his former student. His forces seized Gobir in October 1808, killing Sarkin Yunfa and establishing an Islamic State – The Sokoto Caliphate. It should be recalled that when Yunfa, the former student of Dan Fodio became the Sultan of Gobir, he restricted Dan Fodio's activities, forcing Dan Fodio into exile in Gudu.

When the British took over the territory in 1903, they abolished the political authority of the Caliph and put the area under Northern Nigeria Protectorate. Under the 1st High Commissioner

of the Protectorate, Frederick Lugard suppressed revolutions- subdued local resistance, reduced titled fief holders in the emirates, deposed and confirmed Emirs and others when necessary, reduced the patronage powers of the rulers, transformed caliphate officials into salaried district heads, and in effect became agents of British authority. He created a system of indirect rule built around native authority. Frederick Lugard relied on the structures of the local Chieftains, The Emirs for leadership, control and taxation.

In 1914, the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates took place. The British introduced the system of "indirect rule" in which the colonial administrator Frederick Lugard relied on indigenous religious rulers in the North (Emirs) while reducing the British footprint. In 1916 a new educational code was launched that would allow Christian churches (missions) with footholds in the south to penetrate the Muslim northern region. However, the British authorities secretly signed a memorandum of understanding with the Emirs prohibiting Christian missions/ churches from operating in Northern Nigeria. This gentleman's agreement would later contribute to the slow development of western education particularly in northern areas of Nigeria. It should be noted that prior to this time, the Muslim North had well-established and revered educational systems based on the Koran. As a matter of fact, the major northern Nigerian cities such as Sokoto, Kano and Katsina were then flourishing and known as centers of Islamic learning, where religious curricular were integrated with the study of the Koran and the practice of Islam to produce scholars with great proficiency in reading and writing in Arabic. There are several reasons why Western education was unappealing and unwelcomed in the Northern parts of Nigeria. In other words, why the British Administration was careful not to press for the introduction of western education in Northern Nigeria:

In order to avoid alienating the local Muslim community, the British administrator had argued that it was not worth fighting over as the north would eventually realize the value of western education of their own accord. There was wide spread fear among the Muslim community that their sons would be converted to Christianity once exposed to it. Western education had long been identified with Christianity. The institution of tuition fees/ school fees contrasted with the Islamic system of education that continued to be

free. The Muslims despised what they called "education tax". The emirs preferred indigenous /local elites to Western educated Nigerians whom they came to regard as arrogant and impatient.

Nevertheless, these conditions never stopped the penetration and influence of Western education as the Emirs only allowed western education to be established only in towns occupied by non-indigenous Hausa Muslims, primarily immigrant communities, most of whom are Christians from the Southern parts of Nigeria. These towns that tolerated western educational institutions were called "Sabon Garuruwa" meaning "new towns" or "stranger towns" in Hausa. In order to show the disdain and hatred the leaders of this movement had for Western education, in a speech made before Boko Haram became a militant group in 2009, Abubakar Shekau was quoted by Zenn, Jacob et al. (2013), to have said the following:

"Western education is meant to pull a wool across our eye. In the modern world, if you cannot speak English, anything you say is considered stupid and unintelligent. It is those who have obtained western education that are seen as educated, civilized and polished! The rest are illiterate. This in essence is what the beneficiaries of western education believe."

In April 2014, the movement gained world-wide notoriety when it kidnapped 276 Nigerian schoolgirls in Chibok, Bornu state of Nigeria. This incident hence marked the eventual resurgence of the movement as it increased its reach to include hard and soft targets attacks, suicide bombings,

The international publicity generated by such activities, especially the Chibok girls not only earned Boko Haram international legitimacy but enhanced its ability to recruit. Increased militant attacks led to its virtual control of swathes of territory in Borno State of Nigeria, the original home of Boko Haram. However, the organization failed to capture and control Maiduguri, the state capital of Borno State of Nigeria, which it would have needed to even make more news and headlines.

DOMESTIC CONTEXTS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

There are numerous domestic forces that provide the fertile ground that drive terrorism or at least make young Nigerians to become predisposed to terrorist tendencies. They include poverty and inequality driven by mismanagement and corruption and the urge to counterbalance or provide a countervailing force to offset other

locally- grown ethnic and regional insurgency groups.

Several dynamics have shaped the Nigerian polity in ways that not only facilitate the rise of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, but made them to flourish. The persistent chasm and divide between the predominantly Northern Muslim and Christian South, with the northern section claiming political and economic marginalization; pervasive corruption in which political power has become a primary means of economic empowerment; and recurrent ethnic and sectional competitions and conflict have contributed to eroded social trust, resulted in wide spread disillusionment with the Nigerian State and thus motivated and attracted a large pool of potential recruits and extremists.

The operational notion projected in this study is that instability as a feature of Nigerian politics is characteristic of the presence of conflict which manifests itself in the form of riot, coups, dis-agreements of policy, demonstrations, assassina-tions, civil wars, pogroms, secessionist movements, legal challenges, violence, political agitations, strikes, demonstrations, hostilities towards ethnic, linguistic or cultural groups and other kinds of disorders. However, different forms of broad usage of the instability concept which, if narrowed in definition and meaning may have direct implication and application to the Nigerian case have been espoused by many political theorists.

First, Etzioni, Amitai (1965) postulated that political integration (in this case, unity and stability) is impossible in a nation with competing regional entities which lack what he called "elements of shared culture". In this case, language, religion or both" Horowitz, D.L. (1973) found that in nation states with vertical relationships among competing groups and regions, there is more likelihood for political instability. Vertical relationship in this respect denotes a relationship where there is inequality between and among groups or regions as regards to the amount of resources each receives from the government in relation to its size.

Also, drawing from the work of Morrison, D.G. et al. (1972) and Foltz, W.J. (1974), societies with many regional groupings such as Nigeria have high probability and incidents of detachment, distancing and isolation especially when cultural differences exist between their regional groupings and populations. Morrison et al. has identified and distinguished among three typologies of violence:

Elite Instability

Where elite groups are bent on dethroning rulers through irregular means of which military coup de'tat is high on the list of means, especially in Africa. Communal Instability- characterized by extensive violence among ascriptive groups, such as groups based on religion, ethnicity, language and region

Turmoil

Which manifests in such strife events like labor strikes, demonstrations and riots.

Robert Douse (1969) presents the temporal thesis to shed more light on the phenomenon of instability. He postulated that the failure of political structures to balance, mediate and regulate factional and regional interests creates a variety of crises and tensions that precipitate breakdowns of, law, order and authority and therefore open the way for conflict events including military intervention.

Zolberg, Aristide R. (1968) agrees, maintaining that failure of many governments to fulfill their functional goals and objectives by confronting their political and economic challenges facing the nation, and peculiar to a heterogeneous society as characterized by either cultural or regional differentiations raises the stakes for military intervention. There are numerous domestic forces that provide the fertile ground that drives terrorism or at least make young Nigerians to become predisposed to terrorist tendencies. They are poverty and inequality driven by mismanagement and corruption and the urge to counterbalance or provide a countervailing force to offset other locally- grown ethnic and regional insurgency groups.

Inequality, Poverty and Corruption

In Nigeria specifically, high level of unemployment has been caused by historical factors such as economic stagnation during the time of decline in world oil prices, massive corruption and gender discrimination as well as recent factors such as the global economic downturn. According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics report of unemployment in Nigeria, unemployment rate increased to 7.50 percent in the first quarter of 2015 from 6.40 percent in the first quarter of 2015. This compares with average 11.93 percent from 2006 to 2015, reaching an- all-time high of 20.90 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011 and a record decline of 5.30 percent in the fourth quarter of 2006.

Furthermore, subsequent Nigerian Administrations have failed to reduce inequality through public policy instruments. In July 1986, the government of President Ibrahim Babangida introduced its economic recovery program. The program was dubbed Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).

According to Anyanwu, John C. (1992) the main objectives of SAP were:

- To restructure and diversify the productive base of the Nigerian Economy in order to reduce dependency on the oil sector and on imports

- To achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability over the period

- To lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary growth

- To reduce the dominance of unproductive investment in the public sector, improve the sector's efficiency and enhance the growth potential of the private sector

Some of the measures the Nigerian government adopted to realize the said objectives included: Stimulating domestic production; setting realistic exchange rate policy; restructuring the tariff regime; fostering reliance on market forces; adoption of appropriate pricing policies for public enterprises and Privatization of public sector enterprises

But according to Thorne, Laura (2010) SAP was a total failure in Nigeria. Its negative effects on improving the lot and standard of living of Nigeria were as a result of these unintended SAP consequences:

SAP resulted in the destruction of domestic manufacturing sector, causing the loss of gainful employment by laid-off workers, small producers due to the nature of trade and financial sector reforms. Agricultural, trade and mining reforms resulted in declining viability and incomes of small farms and poor rural communities including declining food security in rural areas.

SAP gave rise to the retrenchment of workers through privatizations and budget cuts and labor market flexibility measures resulting in less secure employment, lower wages, fewer benefits and erosion of worker rights and bargaining power.

SAP gave rise to increased poverty through privatization programs, leading to the application of user fees, budget cuts and adjustment measures that reduced the role of the state in providing

and guaranteeing affordable access to essential quality services.

While the standard of living of many Nigerians have declined partly because of skewed development strategies and patterns of development which tended to promote more investment in industry, transport and communication – capital intensive rather than labor intensive projects, a new class of capitalists and middlemen were cultivated. These people had embraced what Daniel J. Elezar identified as "individual-listic "political subculture. In other words, there was emphasis on politics as a means of promoting and advancing the social and economic interest of groups or individuals rather than that of the general public.

Materialism and the parade of spoils of office became the rallying cry and the norm. Politics became rooted in group obligations and personal relationships (patronage), great profit was made by smuggling rice, flour, cloths and Jewelry which were banned in 1979. Even the new government regulations to control smuggling exacerbated the situation. The motivation to undermine government policies was not even far-fetched. According to Freund, Bill (1978), Nigerian businessmen entered into deals in such areas like commerce, real estate and transportation where turnover and profits remained relatively high; and shied away from manufacturing and agriculture where long term investments were imminent. Schatz, Sayre P. (1984) likened this type of economic and political evolution of Nigeria as a transition from "nurture to pirate capitalism." According to him, pirate capitalism was the consequence of the oil transition since the 1970s.

Government coffers have become a source for those who want to live above the minimum standard. But, for the moralists, the military, civil servants or politicians, the pursuit of productive and honest economic activity as a way of getting ahead or generating surplus was a myth. Thus, Schatz, Sayre P. (1984):

"Manipulation has taken the place of monopoly as the inimical alternative. Manipulation of government, the most attractive route to fortune has diverted efforts into unproductive channels. The predominance of such widespread manipulation signifies pirate capitalism, and is a major factor in the emergence of the inert economy"

Even, Barber, Karin (1982) documented a number of extreme corruption cases in government,

among which was the revelation that the then governor of Niger state, Ibrahim was found to be carrying 3 million Naira (about $30,000 U.S. dollars) on a visit to London. The Shagari regime was plagued by many other problems which undermined its long stability, sewed the seed of popular discontent and finally laid the foundation for its eventual overthrow. First, the regime was racked by prolonged labor disputes. In 1976, the military government froze all government wage increases. As increased wage demands continued, a strong protest movement was organized by the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) and its 42 affiliates.

Due to a decline in real wages, the NLC demanded minimum wage increases from 60 Naira to 300 Naira per month. AlthoughShehu Shagari's Administration initially rejected the demand, reported Rondos, Alex (1981), he did work out a compromise through the National Assembly to approve an increase to 125 Naira or about 150 Naira including allowance. This compromise did not lay to rest all outstanding labor disputes especially since a precedent had been established. In December 1980, the Senior Staff Association of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) walked out of their jobs demanding salary increases of 133% which eventually resulted in a total blackout in Nigerian major cities for several days. However, this threat to national security did not go unchecked. To undermine the solidarity of the Unions, the Nigerian government propped up a new union ideology.

Hence, it supported the emergence of a new labor federation as a competitor and backed changing union binding clause including "check off" law from choice of opting out to voluntary participation. Before this time, the cost of labor unrest to national unity and consolidation had become irreparable. The Shagari Administration was further dogged by a series of religious riots in Northern Nigeria. The most striking at the time occurred in December 1980 which appeared to be a struggle of authority between traditionalism and modernity.

Poverty in Nigeria is continually growing, thereby dashing the hopes of millions of Nigerians and making them vulnerable to recruitment by insurgency groups. According to World Bank Economic report (2013), poverty in Nigeria is extremely high, particularly in rural areas; with the growth rate (GDP) not keeping pace with poverty reduction. This is partly because the government is too corrupt. According to the

report, Nigeria's progress toward millennium Development Goals in Nigeria are disappointing with Nigeria ranked 153 of 186 countries in the 2013 UN Human Development Index; and unemployment rates steadily increasing among the youth who are desperately finding it difficult to find gainful employment. In terms of job creation, the report states that unemployment rate has steadily increased from 12% of the working age population in 2006 to 24% (doubled) in 2011 and more likely to continue. Further, poverty distribution indicates that Northern Nigeria is even worst hit. North Central records 67%, North West (71%) and North East region, the epicenter of Boko Haram activities has 72.2% unemployment rate. The disillusioned teeming unemployed youth population might be sworn to take up arms and fight against the state on the side of Boko Haram.

Ethnic Competition and Countervailing or Counteracting Force for Competing Home-Grown Insurgencies

Although international incidents such as the Arab Spring swept away corrupt regimes in the North Africa and the Middle East such as Libya, Egypt, Algeria and Yemen. Yet, the Boko Haram group appears to serve as Northern (Hausa-based) based insurgency group trying to counter-balance other ethnically and regionally based groups, such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the East and OPC in the Western part of Nigeria. The only main difference is that Boko Haram is much entrenched or entangled with religion; and has the potential to coalesce or partner with other Islamic terrorist groups spread across Africa. Even though Boko Haram appears more violent, its focus tends to converge with those of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB), Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC), MOSOP and MEND because they all slaughter innocent people, use fear and terrorist strategies to resist and fight against bad and corrupt government and other related political goals and objectives.

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

MEND is a militant environmental justice group active in the Niger Delta. It fights against exploitation and operation of the people against environmental pollution and destruction caused by multinational oil companies. It has used terrorist tactics such as sabotage of oil pipelines

and facilities/ refineries, theft and destruction of oil equipment, kidnapping and guerrilla warfare. In 2009, the Nigerian government instituted an amnesty program designed to help quell the situation. Under this program up to 26,000 militants, youth and gang members from the oil producing Niger Delta region surrendered their weapons in exchange for the amnesty and monthly cash stipends, helping reduce attacks on oil facilities in the area by teaming unemployed college and university graduates. It has been reported that the cost of the amnesty program for Nigeria is in the range of $400 million dollars annually.

Despite these endeavors, the government has not been able to make a dent in addressing the region's underlying causes of violence and discontent – namely poverty, public sector corruption, environmental pollution and degradation resulting from massive and frequent oil spills from such companies as Shell, AGIP and other multinational corporations, youth unemployment, political violence and extrajudicial killings. The Nigerian government's announcement that 2015 would be the termination year for the amnesty program and its acknowledgment that it has failed to secure jobs for the trained ex-militants poses more dangers in the future as the victims of this program may take up arms again and rejoin the violent groups against the national economic interest of the Nigerian government.

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)

MOSOP was led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who launched a nonviolent campaign in 1990 against the government and Royal Dutch/Shell to protest environmental degradation and the area's economic neglect. The group's efforts led Shell to the cessation of production in Ogoni in 1993. Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members, the "Ogoni Nine," were executed by the military regime in 1995. The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB): This is a militant secessionist group operating in the East. It is led by Ralph Uwazurike, who has been behind the struggle for the reinstatement of the defunct Republic of Biafra in 1970.

Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC): This is an insurgency based in Yoruba land (South-West). Its goal is to actualize the annulled mandate of Late Chief Moshood Abiola, who won the Presidential Election of June 12, 1993 but was barred from taking office and jailed by General Sani Abacha.

COLONIAL HISTORY

There have been intensified ethnic and community rivalries in Africa. The arbitrary creation of colonial boundaries by the Berlin Act of 1885 divided homogeneous ethnic groups and lumped them into other geographic entities. This sewed the seed of ethnic group conflict in each end of the divide as it heightened the desire of each ethnic group to annex territories that are populated by people of their ethnic and cultural stock or group. These types of projects known as "irrendentist" movements can lead to interethnic wars and conflicts. An example in Africa is the war of 1977 over the Ogaden between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia under President Siad Barre fought Ethiopia in an attempt to annex the Ogaden region of Ethiopia which was populated mainly by ethnic Somalis. In the Nigerian context, however, ethnic Nigerians in each part of the contiguous states – Niger, Chad and Cameroon in an attempt to maintain their homogeneity pursued cross-border integrations and contacts through trade/ goods smuggling, travels, and visits thereby creating porous border networks, which the Boko Haram insurgents took advantage of for their recruitment of soldiers, hideouts, food and weapons supplies and storage.

REGIONAL MARGINALIZATION, LOSS OF POLITICAL POWER AND THE DECLINE OF ETHNIC PRIVILEGES

In the current Nigerian political arrangement, resources are fast depleting and ethnic and regional privileges becoming a thing of the past. There has been ethnic suspicion and competition for power since the January 15 1966 coup in Nigeria when Major Kaduna Nzeogwu led coup (southerner) that installed Major General Aguiyi Ironsi (Southerner) resulted in the death of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Ahmadu Bello, then Premier of Northern Nigeria and the Saduana of Sokoto both northern politicians. The Saduana of Sokota was heir to the Sokoto Caliphate (descendant of Usman Dan Fodio). The fallout of this coup led to events that resulted in the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970). Since then, the Nigerian ruling military elites have steadily controlled Nigerian politics. Most leadership changes during the era have been a change from one Hausa military general to Another (Murtala Muhammed, Muhammadu Buhari, Sani Abacha, Abrahim Babangida etc.) Hence, the military became the symbol of ascendancy, power and control among the Northern youths. Control of political power came with it

the spoils of office and other favors, such as creation of states, siting of universities and airports and other vital infrastructures, cabinet position appointments etc.

The North in away, has developed a cavalier attitude of being "exceptional" or being ordained and privilege to rule Nigeria at all cost. But, since after the return of Civilian Rule under Olusegun Obasanjo, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the ruling party has now instituted a zoning approach - a "rotational presidency" model as a way of resolving political disputes of "who governs between northern (Muslim/ Hausa) and Southern (Ibo/ Yoruba) elites. However, with this contemporary political arrangement, the northern regional elites believe the North is being marginalized. Its native son and late President Yaradua died before completing his 1st Term. Olusegun Obasanjo's elected presidency ended with a handover to a Southerner President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan who is defying a "gentleman's agreement from Obasanjo to rule for one term only. As part of the scheme to make Nigeria an Islamic Caliphate is one way by the Northern elites to show disdain and frustration for the Nigerian system of "rotational presidency" in which the north is not even guaranteed to produce a president in the near future. The current Northern-born President General Buhari has contested more than twice and failed.

In reinforcing this thesis, Abdullahi (2013), relying on what he called the "political feud" perspective argued that Nigerian Boko Haram insurgency might have been orchestrated by disgruntled northern power elite bent on bringing down the Presidency of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Christian southerner, because of their anger over the death of Musa Yar'aduah in 2010 and the subsequent power shift to his successor. This incident, maintained the author, reminded them of the failure of the "rotational presidency" arrangement once under a strong consideration by the Constitutional Drafting Commission which put forth a new framework for Nigerian federation. However, under President Jonathan, the amendments died on arrival and thus were never implemented, even under the current Muhammadu Buhari Regime.

MILITARY SUCCESSES AND CHANGE OF TACTICS

The current attacks and military successes by Boko Haram on the ground, that is, on the battle field against Nigerian forces signaled a change in strategy as the group became emboldened and

more committed and predisposed to capture more territory at least in Bornu state, its stronghold, and in the liking of ISIS in Iraq in order to create an Islamic rule or caliphate. In order to carve out a chunk of territory under its control, Boko Haram would have to enlarge its followers and fighters for control and consolidation of the caliphate.

As a consequence, Boko Haram has increased its attacks, sources through which it would kidnap many children and men whom they train and absorb as recruits to swell the number and strength of its fighting force. Further it has mounted and concentrated its attacks in areas holding a lot of prisoners, most of who are accused and imprisoned Boko Haram suspects. These prison takeovers, such as the September 2010 Bauchi jail break not only help replenish its dwindling numbers, it helps the insurgency to replenish its dead, hold and consolidate its liberated zones called "Islamic Caliphate". The following successes once again reinforce its slogan that it would be victorious because "Allah is with the movement":

- October 2014 capture and seizure of the township later renamed "Madinatui Islam"

- December 2014 capture of the strategic towns of Gwoza , Adamawa and Yobe in Borno State

- December 13, 2014 overrun of the town of Gumsuri in Bornu State, killing 30 and kidnapping over 100 women and children

- September 2, 2014 fall of the town of Bama, 45 miles from the Bornu state capital Maiduguri

Although Boko Haram has shifted its focus to Jihad by virtue of its dramatic increase in the frequency and lethality of its attacks, in the past, the organization had relied more heavily on conscription for recruitment while also seizing and trying to hold territory. According to Aghedo, Iro (2015) With its increased attempt to engage the Nigerian state through hit and run tactics, Boko Harm has still managed to make some headway because of:

- Its ability to retreat and regroup in imaginary border territories (buffer zones) between Nigeria and its contiguous neighbors – Chad, Cameroon etc.

- Mass recruitment from its members who are mainly uneducated, unemployed and wretched, particularly the "Almajirai" who are easily brainwashed and ready to pick

battle (take the fight to the state) for a little amount of money

- Availability of sophisticated weapons which insurgents smuggle into Nigeria through porous borders with Cameroon, Benin and Niger

- Exploitation of the low morale, lack of equipment, poor training, low nationalism, mutiny and desertion of compromised Nigerian troops

- Maintenance of material and financial flow through criminal activities such as kidnapping of expatriates for ransom, hostage taking, looting of banks and robberies and

- Enhancement of its intelligence gathering capacity through infiltration of Nigerian security organizations – Army and police

THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Nigerian government response to the Boko Haram threat has been inadequate and abysmal. First, it has been in denial, and in some instances exaggerating its defeat by Boko Haram fighters in the war front. For example, it took the Nigerian Government weeks to acknowledge the kidnapping of the Chibok girls. The President first denied it. Later the President's wife Patience Jonathan blamed political opponents of her husband for manufacturing the false news. It was after foreign news wires showed the pictures of the missing girls and after the Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau took credit for the kidnapping and proving with video that the government gave up. Even many months after the Chibok incident, President Jonathan declined to visit Chibok where the school girls were snatched, claiming that on the advice of his handlers, the insurgency might kill him if he ever dared. Hence, this optic alone tells the story of the incompetence on the Nigerian national government side to respond to the threat posed by Boko Haram to the life, property and security of Nigeria. This bold move by Boko Haram to abduct 260 Chibok school girls in April 2014 not only sparked a global campaign tagged : "Bring back our girls', it also sent a clear message making the point against the education of women and girls for which the group believes in. Furthermore, it used the girls for "sex", as weapons carriers; killing and suicide missions, while relieving and allowing its male soldiers to concentrate on training and indoctrination functions and frontline fighting. It should be noted that women have been an unsuspecting gender in wars since they could easily fake

exposure and suicide belts for pregnancy to unsuspecting opponents.

Other factors contributing to Nigerian failure in this regard include:

- Shortage of military hardware – armored vehicles, radios and equipment

- Low moral due to embezzlement by top official diverting military budgets for personal use. It is said that out of about $5.8 billion Nigerian Security Budget, only 10% is allocated to capital spending. Most of the remaining budgets for weapons are skimmed by top military brass.

- Low nationalism and lack of commitment on the part of soldiers and their families. For fear of Boko Haram insurgent activities many soldiers deserted the military

Poor training, inferior weaponry and poor working condition triggered demonstrations by military spouses against deployment of their mates or spouses, resulting in many fleeing to neighboring Cameroon, disobeying command or orders to fight, laying down their weapons and surrendering to Boko Haram insurgents. In the end, some the soldiers who escaped to Cameroon were handed over to Nigerian military authorities who sentenced some to death by firing squad after being found guilty by a military tribunal.

The scale of desertion, intelligence gathering and disappearance of weapons destined for Nigerian fighting forces but captured by the Boko Haram fighters fueled wide spread perception that the Nigerian Army had been compromised and thus a danger to its fighting forces.

CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Boko Haram in character, scope and intensity of atrocity has quickly emerged as a major threat to the Nigerian State as well as its contiguous neighbors. The Boko Haram expansion was further driven or encouraged by failing internal factors, dynamics and conditions in Nigeria, such as poverty, inequality, corruption, interethnic competition, human rights violation, poor governance, materialism, class privileges, excessive consumerism and regional marginalization. The bubbling of these societal ills to the surface in fact reinforced and magnified Boko Haram's narratives thereby helping it to recruit and expand to other regions and states of North-Eastern Nigeria in particular.

The best methods and approaches for fighting Boko Haram movement and ideology will involve the restoration of good governance; fighting against official corruption; stopping human rights violations, and creating jobs to employ the unemployed restless and teeming youth population in Nigeria through investment in infrastructure. The negative effects of Boko Haram will be ameliorated through a number of critical actions that include but not limited to the following actions and strategies:

- The Nigerian government should beef up its intelligence and training as well as equipping the Nigerian security/ military forces and other counter-terrorism prevention strategies in order to improve their effectiveness in fighting Boko Haram

- Address the legitimate grievances of neglect, human rights violations, rule of law issues, official corruption, regional marginalization; and other grievances advanced by Boko Harm for its war against the Nigerian state. These grievances can be addressed by restoring economic empowerment and creating jobs for teaming unemployed college graduates and youths

- Halt human rights violations by stopping unnecessary and illegal mass arrests and torture of Muslim youths in disguise of fighting Boko Haram and restoring the rule of law

- Restore good governance, institution of meritocracy, and zero tolerance for bribery and corruption in government

- Pursue increased investment in human capital development and improvement in infra structure – roads, railways, electricity, water systems, broadband, schools and hospitals that improve the standards of living of average Nigerians, while at the same time providing jobs for teeming "shovel ready" youth

- Reform Nigerian security agencies in terms of improving their training, morale, equipment and intelligence; choke off sources of terrorist funding; and come up with strong international anti-terrorist convention. The Nigerian army in recent years has been characterized by low morale, lack of training, low discipline and poorly equipped

By thorough, full, unrelenting and uncompromising commitment and implementation of these recommendations by Nigeria, the danger posed by the activities of Boko Haram will be drastically degraded and diminished.

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