

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Peter Eisenman - Michel Foucault - Friedrich Nietzsche: Anti-Humanist Architecture

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Abstract

How does a philosophical worldview flow into an architectural approach? If we assume that architecture is an expression of a given socio-political and economic reality, we can easily deduce the constant interaction between the two. The present study will delve into how Humanism, an approach to the world developed during the Renaissance, has been transformed over the centuries, influencing and infiltrating the various movements in architecture, focusing in particular on the forms it took in the 20th century and especially on the theoretical and realized early work of the American architect Peter Eisenman.

The aim of the exploration of the above is to attempt to document and highlight a course of Anti-Humanism in the context of 20th century's architectural compositions, a century of intense changes in all fields, and in particular in the work of Peter Eisenman. The architect was intensely fond of this theory, both in his textual and materialized work, and especially in his 'Houses' series, mainly due to his philosophical origins as a predominant Anti-humanist. But who is he influenced from with such a state of thought? We observe him making constant references to the two prominent anti-humanist milestones, the philosophical figures of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. This study will achieve to showcase the intersection of Eisenman and Anti-humanism through the aforementioned linear analysis: the historical context of the time, Eisenman's theoretical background on Nietzsche and Foucault, his personal approach, critique and final realization in his early work focusing on how the human subject has been displaced from and returned back to the center of interest, from the post-modern to the current days.

Keywords: Architecture, Philosophy, Anti-humanism, Eisenman, Foucault, Nietzsche, Houses.

1. Introduction -The Prelude to the Anti-Humanist Criticism

1.1 Functionalism: 'The Last Phase Of Humanism'

'Form follows function' (Sullivan 1896, 408). This radical phrase by Louis Sullivan in 1896 completes the move towards a mechanistic model and stirs the waters of architectural stagnation and historical revisionism of the first modernist years of the late 19th century. A characteristic feature of this movement, Functionalism, this phrase suggests the need for the form of the building to be an outgrowth and a consequence of its function. Its basic premise, an extreme Anthropocentrism, with elements of

positivist approaches to reality, theories founded in Enlightenment societies.

This humanist ethics will, however, receive an outcry from the amoralists. The basic argument of the anti-humanist approach is that Humanism is historically, ideologically and metaphysically influenced. Friedrich Nietzsche is highly critical of classical Humanism, translating it as a kind of religion. In his work 'The Antichrist' he launches a strong diatribe against Christianity, which he sees as a slave ethic, a theory aimed at subjugating the masses (Nietzsche 2007). He takes a similar approach towards Anthropocentrism, considering that the belief in moral values (similar, in his view, to those of Christianity) is also a kind of

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elevation of the weak. Half a century later, Michel Foucault argues that morality has become an aesthetic of existence (Foucault 2015).

The parallelism of Functionalism with humanist worldviews produces the ethics of architecture that would later shape the modern movement. It is well known, after all, that modernist works overflow with ethical propositions. However, the Anthropocentrism produced by the functionalist approach is not an attempt to innovate in relation to its classical counterpart, but functions as an imitative attitude towards it. According to Peter Eisenman, '[...] functionalism is really no more than a late phase of humanism, rather than an alternative to it.' (Eisenman 1976, 237). He argues that the humanist approach of Functionalism offered nothing beyond an unfortunate idealistic approach to reality.

1.2 The Modern Approach: Towards a Utopian Society

The First World War is a turning point for the architectural expression of the 20th century. The utopian society is the new vision of modernity. And the consolidation of new ethical values is essential to the pursuit of this dream. The organic expansion of old settlements is replaced by an organized, preplanned building by urban planners and architects based on their apparent needs, following modern rhetoric along with the vision of a society that borders on utopia. The utopian society of the moderns, however, is nothing more than a manifestation of the Renaissance thought. Ideal cities produce ideal societies and vice versa.

In comparison, however, with Renaissance architecture and its hetero-referentiality, the corresponding modern one seeks, through the abstraction and honesty of the construction, because of its consistency with its function, to free itself from the representation of past forms, to function as an architecture that will not fall into the error of imitating the past. The modern approach emphasizes on the Idea, which takes precedence over the Human subject, an idealism. As for utopias, Foucault states that they are non-places, places without a real place, which hover on the edge of the imaginary due to the idealization of society (Foucault 2012, 255-70).

The coexistence of Marxist and Nietzschean origins in the expression of the moderns, dipoles in complete opposition to each other (rationalism-moral romanticism, idealism-positivism, social empathy-elitism), will constitute a system that will influence the approach later adopted by a sect of scientists, that of Structuralism.

1.3 On Structuralism

The end of the Second World War will leave behind a Europe that is badly injured. The period of doubt is beginning to spread its net. In the 1950s, a theory begins to take root in scientific circles, shifting its focus from the mechanistic model to that of language, the so-called Structuralism. According to Structuralism, the Human subject can only be perceived through a network of symbolic relations (Levi-Strauss 1963).

This inclination towards the linguistic model goes back to the research of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure examines language as a social construction, a convention, where meaning is perceived through binary relations and oppositions within a closed system (Duignan 2024). These conceptual structures are based on the signifier-signified duality, in which word-signs are perceived through other signs within the system. Michel Foucault in his work *'This is not a Pipe'* states that words, have substance through a system of interdependence, relations and contradictions, which is only perceived in this way, and not by virtue of any definite and established autonomy. Words, therefore, because of their arbitrary nature, do not reflect the truth, but through their dynamism (and not immobility), produce a meaning that reflects the social events of the time in question (Foucault 1983, 29-30). The humanist belief in the total liberation of the individual is contrasted with the objectivity of language. The Saussurean closed system of language places the subject at a distance, outside the system to which he is accountable. That is, human subjectivity has no say over the structural language systems and cannot intervene or impose on them - all he can do is appropriate and manage them as they are.

Rejecting the Saussurean version of linguistics, in his work *'Syntactic Structures'* Noam Chomsky emphasizes on syntax, arguing that it supersedes and defines semantics. As he says in the same work, we find important correlations quite naturally between syntactic structure and meaning (Chomsky 1991). Chomsky, however, shifts the focus from the internalization of language as a de facto system to the a priori existence of linguistic structures in the human mind. That is, the subject has a say over the structure of language and this itself contributes to its evolutionary course. He therefore distinguishes two categories of language: an internal one, *'linguistic competence'*, and an external one, *'linguistic performance'*, the former being the source of all linguistic science. Therefore, it is the way in which humans process language, rather than its communicative form, that is the object of worthy research. (Chomsky 1965).

The context, however, in which Structuralism is included does not depart far from the concept of 'structure', as defined by Modernists, a tendency to produce theories, that concern all humanity without exception. The time of a total fragmentation is yet to come.

1.4 The Postmodern: A Critique of the 'Grand Narrative' of the Modern

The rapid development of big cities, with conditions dubious for the people who experience it, will bring about a strong distrust towards the programmatic statements of the modern dialectics. The failure of the project of Modernity, to realize the utopian society it promoted, contributes to the development of a strong critique by the next generation of architects, those of postmodernists and deconstructionists. Gradually, the era of questioning acquires stronger foundations, with major theoretical works being published, aimed at propagating a new architecture. Due to its status as a critical architecture, Postmodernism does not follow a specific idea, a common train of thought, but many ideological approaches are identified.

The rejection of the universal values of Modernism comes in parallel with the return to a Nietzschean perspectivism, a subjective view of reality, rooted in Phenomenology. This discussion brings back individual practice, how each person experiences reality, and therefore the orthodoxy of Modernism and the Enlightenment is extinguished. The fragmentation of space, the fixed and consolidated until then mega-structures and the transition to micropractices suggest a return to individualism, to theories that are far from the enlightening and modern version of Humanism. Nietzsche's Antihumanism is being revisited (Terzoglou 2009, 321).

2. The 3 Deaths

Moving on to Eisenman's thought, we will make a temporal parenthesis to look for his personal origins in Nietzsche and Foucault in terms of his anti-humanist position, which, through the sequence of their ideas as precursors, influenced the position of the Human subject in his design.

2.1 'The Death of God': Relativism and Amoralism in Nietzsche

The 19th century posed a new value system on the Western European soil. Individualism comes to the fore again, through a complete deconstruction of reality into phenomena, into perspectives. Impressionism dominates pre-modern thought, until it is overthrown by the objectivity of Modernism.

Within this framework, Nietzsche defines his own perspectivism, simultaneously with the removal of the absolute, a multifaceted relativism. The death of God, as the ultimate instigator, the driving force of the universe, and as a metaphysical figure to the philosophers of previous centuries of the Enlightenment, implies the removal of the existing approach to space as a philosophical concept. The condemnation of Newton's absolute space as a stable reservoir in which objects and subjects exist comes as a result of Nietzsche's relativism, a nihilistic view that claims organization in the world is absent, that space does not exist. There is therefore a disorientation of the individual, as the absolute principle of God is no longer present, with concepts such as forward-backward, right-left having no definite point of reference (Terzoglou 2009, 145-50).

This view results in the conflict with the established meritocratic system, through a vigorous attack on idealism and rationalism. For Nietzsche there is no universal objective truth. Through God's death there are no more universal values. All that will remain of the present form of society is the desire to exceed its capabilities, to mutate (Nietzsche, 2008).

Intense perspectivism, relativism towards what was previously taken for granted, sensualism, amoralism with regard to fixed value systems, place Nietzsche at the center of the anti-humanist philosophy. Through the rejection of the absolute, he focuses on the subject, an individualistic gaze, which is also reflected in his spatial concepts. The perception of space is subjective, apparent, a consequence of the senses, a private space, juxtaposed with the open public space of Boullée and the Enlightenment. A heterogeneous, infinite, relative space that is perceived differently by each person and is similar to the phenomenological aspect of reality.

2.2 'The Death of the Author': The Subject in Foucault

Nietzsche's rejection of the absolute and his fragmentation influences Foucault's approach to power, which removes the one and only authority of a man, an institution, etc., and divides the whole into individual parts, power relations between subjects, a network of power (Foucault 2011). People are subjugated, paternalised by norms and power relations between them, and adopt an identity that is limited to boundaries within language.

A transgression of these boundaries is for Foucault the way of challenging the established order and introduces us to the thinking of the 'outside'. In

Blanchot's literature, Foucault locates the thought of the 'outside': the death of God as the collapse of the previously existing space, the violation of the boundary of the God-dominated space, as defined by Nietzsche. Language on the outside is freed from the boundaries of written and spoken language, it is a system of infinite signs. Thus, the author's position, who narrates as a third person outside the events, alludes to the thought of the 'outside'. Here we find a Nietzschean perspectivism—'fiction', the way in which events are narrated leads to the fusion of many different narratives, from many different realities (Foucault 1954-84, 137-170). It is the temperament of the subject that determines the final result.

In his essay 'What is an author?', Foucault deals with the subject-writer as a result of social practices. The process of subjectivization of Man is an important point in Foucault's philosophical inquiry into how he, as an object, becomes an a posteriori subject (Foucault 1954-84, 205-22). Based on Samuel Beckett's phrase 'What does it matter who speaks?', he communicates how in contemporary writing the subject-writer is in second place compared to the final result - text. The author disappears, extracting himself from the closed system of language, which, as an external agent, he now uses. The author is nothing but a condition in the equation of writing. The almighty writer falls from the pedestal of absolutism, following the Nietzschean death of God. Reasoning shifts from the text, as a product of the subject, to the subject, as a product of the text, thus deconstructing the humanist theory that places Man at the center of negotiations. The author's ability to incorporate associations into the context surrounding him is likened to Chomsky's semiotics. Therefore, the author, as a signifier, differs from his signifieds, which are either the subject himself, or his works, or other elements, which have the Saussurean arbitrary connection with each other.

2.3 'The Death of the Architect': The Designer's Power in Eisenman

'Displaying his disdain for individual style in the arts,

Eisenman regularly threw Michel Foucault's question "what is an author?" into debates on architecture.' (Gleiter 2014, 228). Through the elimination of the figure of the author, in this case the architect, Eisenman criticizes logic and epistemology, similar to Foucault.

With his text 'Oppositions 6', Eisenman proposes a meta-criticism: he uses modern vocabulary, but with a critical attitude, where form no longer arises as a result of the function of the building. An objectivity of modern vocabulary, which takes the interest away from the architect as a genius and exists as an architectural ensemble in its own right. He tries to produce architecture in terms that already exist within the closed system of structural relations. Eisenman's post-functional definition functions as a modernist dialectic (Eisenman, 1976).

Eisenman, therefore, attempts to liberate architecture from the metaphysics of human scale, anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism (Chatzisavva 2023, 151), and identifies architectural creation with the closed self-sufficient system of language, distancing himself from the creator and the context in which the architecture is inscribed. Architectural autonomy implies the sequence of pure mental processes, without the intervention of the architect through personal parables. The user and the architect are figures outside the closed system of architectural creation, with the former being considered as a 'transgressor' in the smoothness and self-completion of the composition, the latter renouncing the status of himself as a creator God, as was considered during the Enlightenment (Gleiter 2014, 231).

The result of this is the redefinition of architecture through the death of the author, a geometric automatism based on mathematical and linguistic rules, leading to the final result, without taking into account personal aesthetics or subjectivity. Man is now a secondary factor in the process of architectural composition.




Figure 1. Diagram of the author-conceptual connections of Nietzsche-Foucault-Eisenman

3. Towards an Anti-Humanist Architecture

3.1 'The end of the Classical': The Fiction of the Simulation in Eisenman

In his text '*The end of the classical: the end of the beginning, the end of the end*', Eisenman, in order to counter the dominant architecture from Renaissance to Postmodernism, criticises it, arguing that, within it, three fictions prevail:

The fiction of Representation: he argues that the fiction of representation leads to architectural monuments, which function as simulacra of other, earlier architectures, enclosing their own value system within them.

The fiction of Reason: the fiction of reason is nothing but a simulation of the meaning of truth through the message of science. The reduction of truth to science for Eisenman is but a replacement of the origins of architecture - truth is therefore transformed through the historical periods and has no absolute substance, it is an illusion, as Nietzsche and Foucault also identified.

The fiction of Truth: Eisenman goes on to argue that architecture possesses the inevitability of expressing its time, with the result that Classicism and Modernism fit into this timeline, despite their attempts to exclude themselves from their Zeitgeist (the spirit of the time) and achieve a timeless architecture. Truth and meaning, therefore, are also part of this trajectory and depend on the reality at hand (Eisenman 1985, 154-73).

3.2 The Futility of Heterochrony: the Present-Past Rupture

Renaissance's classicist architecture, in an attempt to reduce its value system to that of Greek classicism, blurs the boundaries between illusion and reality. In the '*society of simulacrum*', as Baudrillard approached it, and in contrast to the simulacrum in Plato's allegory of the cave, simulacra have replaced reality through signs, a hyperreality where the authentic has been lost (Baudrillard 2019). An architecture, unifying the three fictions of representation, reason and history, is subservient to historicism, seeking origins in heterotemporal places. The failure to transfer past values to the architecture of the present suggests, for Eisenman, the futility of patterns. His goal: an independent, self-referential architecture.

In his essay, '*Misreading*', Eisenman highlights architecture's inability to explore new methods, resulting in a conventionality. The rejection of

classical models as simulation and the acceptance of the paradoxical, the meaningless, leads to an '*anti-simulation*', as he defines it: by accepting the gap between reality and illusion, architecture no longer seeks to imitate the real, through simulation, but to highlight it. The '*non-classical*', then, is not an antithesis of classical architecture, but an other, different situation, embracing its role as endogenous. It goes along with its Zeitgeist, that is, architecture is now paralleled to a text to be read. With the non-classical, architecture is freed from the need to address a priori projections into the divine, nature, humanity; it can take as its starting point the '*arbitrary*', a starting point without value, which is merely a point in time and which does not follow the universal rules of the classical (Eisenman 1984, 165-69). Arbitrary architecture is self-referential, it is not a simulation of some previous one and, due to the fluidity of its point of departure, it is an endless process of transformation, it has no definite beginning and therefore no definite end.

The pursuit of a utopian society on the part of the moderns set the architects the goal of the ideal end, an end characterized by a universal self-integration, the zenith of progress. The crisis of Modernist values, however, put an end to this futurism, with the utopian being interpreted as overtly fictional. The temporal, on the basis of the Zeitgeist, begins to gain ground in favour of the eternal and the timeless. The '*end of the beginning*' and the '*end of the end*' gave freedom to architecture to be a derivative of an internal process and to produce '[...] a timeless space in the present without a determining relation to an ideal future or to an idealized past'. (Eisenman 1984, 172)

3.3 Diagrammatic Architecture as a Syntax

The linguistic approach of Structuralism and the work of Chomsky contributed to this attempt to find a new way of realising textual and non-classical architecture, in which the figure of the architect would be 'absent'. Chomsky distinguishes between two syntactics: the surface, perceptual structure, the physical substance of architecture for Eisenman, and the conceptual, deep structure, i.e. the syntactic. In his rejection of architectural representation is embodied in the designer's attempt to cut off the architectural process and its result from semantics, which he reduces to deep structure. Eisenman's aim is to shift to an autonomy of the architectural form, where the final result is an outgrowth of the closed system of architectural syntax that he uses, its deep structure.

To produce this closed, self-referential architecture, he uses the diagrammatic process, as he assumes that it contains existing syntactic structures of the architecture. We would not be exaggerating if we likened the architectural process that he follows to an algorithm in which the architect does not intervene, except to draw up the individual parameters that will lead to the final result. The vocabulary he uses for his design goes back to geometric transformations, based on an automated process, where scaling, rotation, compression, extension are key concepts. Eisenman makes these transformations visible in the generated

architectural object, through the transparency of successive layers of processing, and lists them as a montage, the so-called ‘*superposition*’ (Eisenman 1999, 208).

Thus, Eisenman’s ‘*Houses*’ are the result of algorithmic combinations, a parametric ‘logic’ where the various transformations contribute to the final result through their correlations - an experimentation based on the objectivity of the Cartesian system, perceptions of form as a sign, which are capable of providing a variety of formal information.




Figure 2. Diagram of the author- the methodology of this essay

4. On the Conflation of Anti-Humanist Practices

4.1 The Commonplace of Rationality and Irrationality: The Case of ‘Houses’

The Houses series is a valid example of Eisenman’s anti-humanistic approach. Their realisation began in 1967 and lasted until 1983, in the greater American region, with the architect initially putting the function-form dualism and the interiority of architecture in relation to the structured form under discussion through diagrammatic assistance. Each house is listed chronologically, in ascending order, with each one focusing on a particular anti-compositional process,

and proposing new practices so that it is not a copy of its temporal predecessor. Their basic principle: the use of a syntax that, as we have seen, goes back to Chomsky’s structuralist ‘logic’; a vocabulary of architecture, where it can define itself by its three basic properties: volume, surface, line and the relations between them, which function as the deep structure of his architecture and fall under ‘*cardboard architecture*’. (Eisenman 1975, 15)

By using a predominantly rational tool, language, he arrives at irrational results, a conflation of Apollonian orderliness with Dionysian chaos, as the Nietzschean reading suggested.




Figure 3. Diagram of the author- the conceptual tools of the ‘Houses’ series

4.1.1 House II: The gap between signifier and signified

In initiating the design process of the ‘*Houses*’ series, Eisenman’s main aim is to renegotiate the compatibility of the substance of the static system of

a structure, by examining the relationship between form and the internal structure of the architecture. Here Eisenman designs a cantilever with two load-bearing systems, one with columns and one with load-bearing walls, each with the capacity to individually

support the structure. The duplication of the static system leads the reader to confused interpretations, as this redundancy is contrasted with the autonomy of the single static system of the modernist practice. This duality leads to the conclusion that one of the two systems can function as a sign; the function of each system contains the very lack of its function (Eisenman 1987) That is, the signifier of one of the two systems is distanced from its signified, which has been historically determined by its static function. Their dual character as both static system and sign puts Chomsky's deep structure into practice.

In the diagrammatic procedure, which was produced for the needs of House II, such a self-referential point defines the difference between a virtual and a marker point. This sign in this particular case relinquishes its ability to function as a virtual one, but acts as an indicative one, more symbolic than metaphorical (Eisenman 1984, 165-59). We can thus observe an attempt to separate and impose the syntactic structure of architectural language (conceptual space) in favour of semantic (iconography). For Eisenman, these

indicative signs define the interiority of architecture and through the self-referentiality of the construction, i.e. the gap between the signifier and its signified, their iconic state is eliminated. The choice of the exposed planes or volumes is intended to highlight this implied deep structure, which will act as an informant in the real space (Eisenman 1975, 172).

The deep structure, however, is not only limited to the exaggeration of the static system, but also to the performance of the conceptual cartographic architecture. Here, Eisenman tends towards a blurring of the boundaries between the prefabricated and the final architecture. The house, constructed with plywood, veneer and paint, deliberately refers to the model that preceded it, and is more reminiscent of a 1:1 model, as the necessary functional parts of the whole are not involved. Thus, it presupposes an anti-materiality, trying to remove human thought from any recollection, inner emotion or associations, so that the work promotes its self-referentiality.





Figure 4. Eisenman Peter | 1969 | Houses of Cards | House II | New York | Oxford University Press

4.1.2 House VI: Architecture as Montage

While House I-IV and especially House II, as we have examined, are the result of a diagrammatic process that does not aim at a final result, but at an intermediate state, House VI (1972-75, Connecticut, America) combines two states: that of a complete architecture and that of the production process. House VI is not a momentary phase of the compositional process, but a continuous condition through which all the layers of processing are visible. Each new transformation is depicted as a series of film frames

compressed in space and time (Eisenman 1971, 38-40). This duality of the house reinforces Eisenman's anti-teleological argument, the 'end of the end', as his mechanistic approach, by eliminating the design subject, presupposes an absence of a desired final project.

A conceptual diagonal axis runs through the house, connecting the northeast and southwest corners, in the middle of which is its topological centre, suggesting Eisenman's purely objective approach through geometry, rather than through the function of certain

spaces. This centre is the fixed point around which the geometric transformations in question take place. The form of House VI is organized around two grids of unequal size formulated by a unity. They are locked together by a double cross defined by transverse planes. The arms of the cross are modified from their formal configuration, resulting in a transparency effect (Eisenman 1999, 27). Eisenman characterizes this harmonious coexistence between the different transformations as the superposition he has defined. At the same time as the superposition, he uses other mechanisms, in the geometric range, as the basis on which to inscribe the foreign object, the next step, which will then undergo the appropriate transformations. The arbitrariness of the transformative processes in terms of producing possible desirable qualities of space for man, goes back to the arbitrariness of the

principle, as Eisenman defined it in *'the end of the classical'*. The starting point is, therefore, absent, with the architectural object being an outgrowth of successive superimpositions and escalations.

Spatially, Eisenman in House VI uses a topological space, which operates on a conceptual level, as opposed to the perceptual Euclidean space of the house. This, topological, space alludes to Nietzsche's relational space, as it is perceived through the relationships between objects, a fluid space. The use of conceptual binary practice, as a mental construction, contributes to this relativistic approach, where the relationships between elements and forms produce a new meaning than that which the element in question would produce in isolation. Thus, concepts such as inside-outside, top-down are subverted and confused, referring us to the heterogeneity of the Nietzschean space.




Figure 5. Eisenman Peter | 1975 | House VI | Houses of Cards | Diagram | New York | Oxford University Press | p 86

4.1.3 Fin d'Ou T Hou S: Self-referentiality as the Centripetal of Design

The aim of the last example in the Houses series, Fin d'Ou T Hou S (1983, unconstructed), completing the theoretical circle proposed by Eisenman in his early work, is to refute the absoluteness of heteroreference.

As he defined in *'the end of the classical'*, the value of an architectural object lies in its self-referentiality, when it is possible to define itself through its own substance alone. The introspection of Fin d'Ou T Hou S precludes any meta-interpretation that reduces it to past concepts.




Figure 6. Eisenman Peter | 1983 | Fin d'Ou T Hou S | Diagram | Ownership of 'Peter Eisenman Architects'

Fin d'Ou T Hou S is just as much a moment in its evolutionary course as House VI, an infinite process

of design, where the stages are visible in the built architectural object, through a montage, a layering.

This coexistence, however, of the individual stages does not produce a semantics that allows the viewer to interpret it in a certain way. The self-integration, that the architect seeks in his work, indicates the futility of any attempt to interject the subject, even in an attempt to interpret and understand the built product. Here, Eisenman advocates the need for a new reader who will be *'willing to suspend previous ways of understanding architecture and shift to an attitude of accepting inquiry.'* (Eisenman 1975, 15).

4.2 The Absence of the Human in the 'Houses' Series

Eisenman's structuralist approach in designing the 'Houses' series shifts the focus to the mental realm. In this first phase of Eisenman, the architect makes strong use of axonometry to support his work. This use of axonometric drawing places the viewer at a distance from the architecture. He perceives it not from a real point of view with the appropriate perspective, a vis-à-vis relationship, but as an external factor. This enables the designer to provide a holistic view of the work to the user, without integrating him into it, thus creating the belief that he himself is an unnecessary and aggressive element in space. As early as House I, the aim is to remove the author, the subject, the user from the compositional process.

The objectivity of the Cartesian grid system in the diagrams he uses, the 'logical' methods, the geometric transformations place the designer in a remote position, who as a programmer composes the individual parameters. The Renaissance anthropocentric concept, according to which the designer imposes himself as an authority on architecture, through a process of arbitrary choices and modifications, subjectivism and personal origins, is now irreversibly gone. Eisenman characteristically points out: *'I have always been interested in control, not power.'* (Eisenman 1973, 24). The society of control, as Foucault put it, is not part of his structuralist design.

Thus, a new relationship is created between the human subject and home, which, as an institutionalized signifier, due to the imposition of human scale – a mannerism of modern architecture – has over time acquired defined characteristics and has set specific requirements. These positions in Eisenman's work are overturned.

5. Conclusion

This early architecture of Eisenman served as an important field of action for various concepts, which founded the anti-humanist paradigm in the

postmodern era. The decline of the human subject was followed by a period of thought, where relativism, fragmentation, irrationality, parody, suspicion prevail in philosophical and at the same time architectural thought. The grand narrative of Modernist design and its futurism is shattered and interest shifts to the present and the ephemeral. Nietzsche's great hammer destroys society from the ground up, which has now completely rotten.

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