RESEARCH ARTICLE

On the Emotional Dimension of Williams' Internal Reasons

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Abstract

Based on Hume's psychological model of desire and belief, Williams develops and proposes the model of internal reasons. The model of internal reasons holds that agents start from subjective motivational set and arrive at reasons for action through reasonable practical deliberation, with imagination also participating in the process of deliberation. However, the model of internal reasons faces unexplained issues concerning the definition of its core concept—the subjective motivational set, the manner in which imagination participates in deliberation, and the possibility of conversion between internal and external reasons. It has also been criticized for its lack of normativity. To better explain and resolve these problems, it is necessary to understand internal reasons within the framework of Williams' later practical deliberation model centered on wishes. This can clarify the fundamental and central position of emotions in practical deliberation, as well as the emotional dimension within the model of internal reasons. Emotional attitudes, as part of an overall emotional state, direct towards a certain goal, which initiates the process of practical deliberation. The emotional state influences the practical deliberation process, particularly affecting how imagination functions. Emotions also provide possibility for the transformation between internal and external reasons. By clarifying the emotional status in Williams' model of internal reasons, this paper proposes a potential direction for the development of the normativity of the theory of internal reasons.

Keywords: Williams, Internal Reasons, Practical Reason, Emotions.

1. Introduction

In *Internal and External Reasons*, Bernard Williams puts forward the claim that 'the only real claims about reasons for action will be internal claims'.[1] This conclusion sounds quite radical and has been questioned by many scholars. However, Williams' theory of internal reasons still leaves room for external reasons. Nevertheless, there remain ambiguities in his exposition of internal reasons that need to be resolved, primarily manifesting in the vagueness in defining the core concept of the subjective motivational set, the vagueness regarding how imagination participates in deliberation, and the vagueness concerning the possibility of conversion between internal and external reasons. Currently, academic discussions on Williams' internal reasons predominantly focus on his early articles. To address the aforementioned issues, it

is essential to draw connections with Williams' later work, *Truth and Truthfulness*, in which he proposes a practical deliberation model centered on wishes. There exists an intrinsic link between these two practical deliberation models. Faced with the argument criticizing the internal reasons model for its lack of normativity, this paper, based on Williams' theoretical resources, attempts to explore the normative power of the internal reasons theory through discussion. To this end, this paper will be structured as follows: The first section will elaborate on Williams' model of internal reasons; the second section will discuss McDowell's criticisms of Williams and Williams' responses to them; the third section will expound on Williams' later practical deliberation model centered on wishes[2]; building on this, the fourth section will

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[1] Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 111.

[2] *Williams' later practical deliberation model expounded in his Truth and Truthfulness will be denoted as WBD model for simplicity hereafter. W represents for wish, B for belief and D for desire. These three elements consist of the model.*

explore the intrinsic connections between these two practical deliberation models and point out the relevant grounds for understanding the internal reasons model within the framework of the WBD model.

2. The Model of Internal Reasons

Williams' model of internal reasons is built upon Hume's psychological model, the core tenet of which lies in treating desire as a necessary condition for an individual's motivations for action. However, Williams revised Hume's psychological model in two significant aspects. Compared to Hume, Williams not only supports the concept of a broad subjective motivational set[3] but also advocates for a more expansive notion of deliberation.[4]

Firstly, Williams' understanding of motivation is broader, which he refers to as S. In addition to desires, 'S can also contain such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent'.[5] Similar to Hume, Williams maintains that any reason capable of motivating an individual to act must be connected to their S. An agent performs an action to satisfy an element within their S or because the action has a deliberative basis within their S.[6]

The internality of reasons for action seems to suggest that Williams' model of internal reasons exhibits a certain relativity—the relativity of reason statements to the individual. After attributing all reasons for action to elements at the individual's subjective level, it appears that we cannot evaluate the normativity of actions from a third-person perspective. Does the model of internal reasons truly have no bearing on normative evaluation? Williams denies this, proposing the concept of a sound deliberative route. We can understand this through an example provided by Williams himself. Individual A believes that he has a reason to drink the liquid in the cup on the table because he thinks it is a blend of quinine water and cocktail, when in fact it is gasoline. Based on his belief (that it is a drink) and desire (to drink something), he believes he has a reason to drink the liquid. However, it is evident that no rational person would consider him to have a reason to drink it. Nevertheless, this does not imply that he is irrational because, relative to his belief that 'it is a drink', he is indeed rational. The issue lies in the falsity of his belief content;

what he should do is to correct his false belief. For instance, others inform him that it is gasoline used for experiments, or he discovers through smelling that it is gasoline. Therefore, 'the claim that somebody can get to the conclusion that he should φ(or, the conclusion to φ) by a sound deliberative route involves, in my view, at least correcting any errors of fact and reasoning involved in the agent's view of the matter'.[7] This is because any rational deliberating individual has a general interest within their S, namely, to obtain accurate information that aligns with facts and rationality and to avoid failure due to erroneous information.[8] The restrictive conditions proposed by the sound deliberative route can be articulated as the following three points:[9]

(1) If the existence of a certain element within an agent's S is determined by a false belief, or if the agent holds a false belief regarding the relevance between that action and the satisfaction of that element, then that element will not provide the agent with a reason for action.

(2) An element within the agent's S will not provide him with a reason for action unless he holds all relevant true beliefs.

(3) If the agent has not deliberated correctly, then an element within their S will not provide them with a reason for action.[10]

The 'deliberate correctly' mentioned in (3) does not refer to there being one and only one right deliberative process or path. Instead, it emphasizes the avoidance of certain cognitive deficiencies, such as being influenced by coercion, drug addiction, emotional distress, and other factors that may impair deliberation.

Of course, exceptions are not ruled out beyond the aforementioned constraints. For instance, a police officer infiltrating a criminal gang may need to adopt the false belief that 'he is a member of the gang' to deceive other members and safely complete

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[3]The subjective motivational set will be denoted as S for simplicity hereafter.
[4]Cf. Mark P. Jenkins, Bernard Williams, Acumen, 2006, pp. 95.
[5]Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 105.
[6]Cf. Xu Xiangdong, Reason and Morality, Peking University Press, 2019, pp. 5.

[7]Bernard Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame", Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 36.
[8]Cf. Bernard Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame", Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 36; Bernard Williams, "Values, Reasons and the Theory of Persuasion", Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 111.
[9]Cf. Xu Xiangdong, Reason and Morality, Peking University Press, 2019, pp. 33-34; Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1995, (55), pp. 112
[10]However, in addition to the aforementioned three constraints, perhaps an additional one (4)—moderate prudence—could be added. This is because if an agent is completely indifferent to the consequences of their actions for themselves, they may also be unable to comprehend the concept of a sound deliberative route. Cf. Bernard Williams, "Values, Reasons, and the Theory of Persuasion", Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, edited by A. W. Moore, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 111.

his mission. Alternatively, someone may have an extremely poor relationship with reality and need to believe in falsehoods to survive. For example, a father who has been in a coma for a long time and just wakes up should not be informed of his daughter's being murdered, so his relatives and friends conceal this fact from him, making him believe that his daughter is still alive.

Therefore, the model of internal reasons also pertains to normativity, as it requires individuals to engage in correct practical deliberation based on accurate information that aligns with facts and rationality, thereby forming motivations and acting accordingly. In short, it emphasizes the rationality of beliefs and the correctness of reasoning. Then, is 'accurate information that aligns with facts and rationality' a sufficient and necessary condition for reasons for action? While external reasons theorists argue that it is both sufficient and necessary, Williams contends that it can only be a necessary condition, as a complete reason for action is expressed as 'S + accurate beliefs that align with facts and rationality'. Williams' example of Owen enlisting in the military aptly illustrates this point. Owen comes from a family with a military tradition; all male ancestors in his family were soldiers, and his family's glorious tradition requires him to enlist as well. Owen is capable of recognizing all factual information regarding his family's military tradition, yet he has no desire to join the military and detests everything related to military life. Meanwhile, excluding situations where he is deceived by sweet talk or brainwashed, Williams also acknowledges that Owen might ultimately choose to enlist in the military because he genuinely believes in his family's military honor tradition.

The question arises: if Owen detests everything related to the military so intensely, how is such a transformation possible? Williams' response is that practical reasoning itself is inherently ambiguous. 'There is indeed a vagueness about 'A has reason to φ' in the internal sense, insofar as the deliberative processes which could lead from A's present S to his being motivated to φ may be more or less ambitiously conceived'.[11] To this end, Williams advocates for a broader concept of deliberation. The types of practical deliberation include not only means-end reasoning but also, for example, organizing elements within S in a temporal sequence, comparing conflicting elements within S, or seeking constitutive solutions, such as determining what activities could make

for an enjoyable evening. Thus, S is not static; the deliberative process can add or subtract elements from S, and imagination also plays a role in this process. 'Practical reasoning is a heuristic process, and an imaginative one, and there are no fixed boundaries on the continuum from rational thought to inspiration and conversion'.[12] Although this response offers some insight, it remains somewhat unclear. We can continue to ask: How exactly does imagination influence the deliberative process? Additionally, there is another significant issue. Williams' S includes 'dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent'. The terms listed here are not entirely consistent, especially since evaluative dispositions and patterns of emotional response are clearly distinct from various plans. Plans refer to specific content, whereas the former two seem to represent second-order responses to certain content. Therefore, the extended question is whether these different terms listed can be substituted for one another or, in other words, what elements are involved in the agent's commitments. Answering these questions requires examining Williams' later proposed WBD model of practical deliberation. However, before that, it is necessary to first examine McDowell's rebuttal to Williams' internal reasons and Williams' response to it. This will also help us gain a deeper understanding of the role of emotions in practical deliberation.

3. The Debate between McDowell and Williams

In the preceding discussion, Williams focuses on the reasons for action. Therefore, he would not deny the fact that even if some individuals have not yet recognized or are unlikely to recognize certain reasons as their reasons for action, these reasons may still exist, albeit not as motivators for their actions.[13] With a more appropriate understanding, Williams would likely acknowledge the existence of external reasons in an ontological sense but would deny the existence of external reasons that can motivate an individual to act without being connected to that individual's S. In other words, reasons for action must be internal and must be linked to S. This naturally leads to the conclusion that if an individual's S lacks moral-related elements or foundations, they have no reason to act in accordance with moral norms. External reasons theorists, particularly Kantian scholars like Korsgaard

[11]Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 110.

[12]Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 110.

[13]Cf. Xu Xiangdong, Reason and Morality, Peking University Press, 2019, pp. 4.

and Nagel,[14] reject this conclusion. They argue that reason can motivate an agent without involving their subjective motivational set, imposing an excessively high demand on the agent's rationality. If reasons fail to motivate the agent, they even blame the agent for being insufficiently rational. In contrast, McDowell's defense of external reasons aligns more closely with human psychology and is more nuanced. Therefore, this article will discuss McDowell's rebuttal to Williams as an example.

McDowell's critiques of Williams' model internal reasons mainly focus on two points. First, Williams' model of internal reasons is overly psychologistic and fails to leave sufficient room for normativity. Second, we can generate new motivations without relying on pre-existing motivations, and the emergence of new motivations does not necessarily have to occur as Williams presupposes—that is, through the influence of reason. We will see that these two points are internally connected.

In McDowell's view, Williams' internal reasons do not provide us with everything we want, particularly in terms of normativity, because deliberation relies too heavily on an individual's psychology. Consequently, the concept of 'seeing things correctly' becomes hollow, especially in the moral realm, as individuals considering issues solely from their own S undermines the objectivity of values. An appropriate theory should strike a balance between psychologism and apsychologism, meaning that we should consider both individuals' actual psychology and the objective external reasons that transcend their actual psychology. Then, how can a person whose S lacks moral-related elements or foundations acquire or accept moral norms? McDowell argues that practical deliberation does not necessarily have to start from existing motivations; it is entirely possible for a person to suddenly perceive the truth of an external reason, believe in it, and thereby engage in correct deliberation. The question then arises: how can such a sudden transformation occur? McDowell responds that 'the transition to being so motivated is a transition *to* deliberating correctly, not one effected *by* deliberating correctly; effecting the transition may need some non-rational alteration like conversion'.[15] However, this response still fails to help us understand how the transformation is accomplished, or why a person can suddenly and rationally believe in an external

reason that they previously did not hold. McDowell's response is intended to refute Williams by emphasizing that 'practical deliberation does not necessarily have to start from existing motivations'. To this end, he envisions the Aristotelian *phronimos* (a person of practical wisdom). Through ethical upbringing and growth, such an individual has habitualized appropriate behavioral patterns and acquired relevant modes of thinking through instruction, enabling them to automatically respond appropriately to relevant situations. McDowell correctly recognizes that practical wisdom cannot be reduced to rules, but he mistakenly assumes that individuals with practical wisdom do not engage in deliberation or involve their existing motivations in their actions.[16] 'A person's desire to do something need not explicitly appear on the 'foreground' of deliberation, but it must be present in the background'.[17]

McDowell believes that Williams' characterization relies too heavily on an individual's S, rendering the force of reasons solely dependent on the agent's subjective motivations. On the contrary, although Williams acknowledges that his account of reasons is psychologistic, he does not concur with the criticism of being 'overly psychologistic'. In his view, statements about a person's reasons partly consist in statements about that person's psychology, and a reason should not *a priori* be considered a reason for someone's action. Consider the following two propositions put forward by Williams:

(G) A correct deliberator (i.e., a *phronimos)* would be motivated in these circumstances to Φ.

(C) if A were a correct deliberator, A would be motivated in these circumstances to Φ.

According to McDowell's exposition, proposition (G) represents the force of external reasons, suggesting that a person of practical wisdom (a *phronimos*) will do what the situation demands in corresponding circumstances. Adopting this interpretation, the statement 'A has a reason to do Φ' links a certain type of action with a certain type of situation, transforming the original statement about A's reasons into 'In situation X, there is a reason to do Φ'. In this formulation, the individual A disappears, and there is nothing specifically about A in the statement. The force of proposition (C) derives from proposition (G); in other words, to some extent, proponents of external reasons assume that everyone is, or at least could have been, a *phronimos*. This assumption is closely tied to

[14]*Christine M. Korsgaard calls herself internalist, but she is externalist on Williams' standpoint. Here the paper treats Korsgaard as an externalist.*

[15]*John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?", in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, eds. J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 78.*

[16]*Cf. Xu Xiangdong, Reason and Morality, Peking University Press, 2019, pp. 16-23..*

[17]*Xu Xiangdong, Reason and Morality, Peking University Press, 2019, pp. 42...*

their rationalist perspective. However, the envisaged *phronimos* is, after all, merely an ideal type, and the reasons for action of one such individual are not always the reasons for action of another.[18] 'Internalism in some form is the only view that plausibly represents a statement about A's reasons as a distinctive kind of statement about, distinctively, A.'[19] This distinctively about A's distinctive statement is not merely about A's situation in a circumstance; if it were limited to this level, A's predicament could be substituted by any individual. Rather, it is more about A's actual psychological state, and it is the statement about the actual psychological state that is distinctively an expression about A.[20] It is in this sense that Williams argues that practical deliberation should start from an individual's existing motivations, and an individual's reasons for action must be connected with their *S*. Only in this way can a statement about reasons be **distinctively** about A.

Up to this point, we can observe that external reason theorists, represented by McDowell, seek to regulate human behavior by delineating objective external reasons that do not necessarily connect with individuals' subjective motivations. In contrast, Williams starts from an individual's *S*, thereby avoiding the issue of separating reasons from subjective motivations. However, as McDowell criticizes, this approach may lead to insufficient normativity. So, how can we address this dilemma? If external reasons cannot be linked to people's attitudes, they cannot be connected to actions. Perhaps the key is not to propose an objective external reason but to find ways to make it a reason for action that people are willing

to accept.[21] The question then arises: how can we make people willing to accept reasons they did not previously hold? What are the possible avenues for achieving this?

4. WBD Practical Deliberation Model

Plato divides the human soul into three parts: desire, passion, and reason, which are in constant conflict with one another. If reason fails to assume a dominant position, the individual is deemed irrational. Williams regards Plato's theoretical model as 'a quarrelsome council',[22] pointing out an easily overlooked issue with it: within this model, an individual's inner self harbors several distinct and conflicting voices, all capable of influencing the individual. However, the reality is more likely that an individual's inner state lacks a definite focus—that is, the inner voices are uncertain about what to express or may point to different things at different times and under varying conditions. Such an individual's inner self is not so organized as Plato suggests. Therefore, Williams rejects Plato's theoretical model and instead adopts Diderot's description of the soul: an individual is awash with numerous images and excitements. In response to these, a person's mental state transitions from being unfocussed or lacking a stable focal point to integrating these matters and ultimately reaching a state where the soul can focus on something specific, and the individual's inner voice becomes discernible and clear. What is the process involved in this transition from being out of focus to achieving focus?

Firstly, Williams distinguishes between desires and wishes. 'If one knows that one cannot possibly bring about or affect a certain thing, then that thing can be matter only for a wish'.[23] The possibility here pertains to realistic possibility rather than logical possibility. For instance, as a university student, I may wish to travel in space in a space shuttle. While this is logically possible, it is virtually unattainable in reality, thus I relegate it to the realm of wishes. It is also worth mentioning that Williams says that "states of mind that have neither been definitely advanced as candidates for satisfaction nor definitely dismissed, and these too can be called 'wishes'".[24] In contrast, desires are ideas that can be realized in terms of realistic possibility. Therefore, Williams argues that

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[18] *Williams takes the examples of ancient Greek slaves and women to point out that Aristotle believed these two groups lacked specific capacities, and thus could not become phronimos, Consequently, they would have no reason to deliberate in the same way as those with practical wisdom, and the reasons that motivate the phronimos would not serve as reasons for their actions. Cf. Bernard Williams, "Replies", in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, edited by J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 192. Michael Smith's example of a tennis player also illustrates this point. A tennis player who is prone to be into a fit of rage after losing a match may refuse to shake hands with and congratulate his opponent, as he is likely to get into a physical altercation. To avoid such conflicts, he has no reason to act in the same way as a person of practical wisdom would. Cf. Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1995, (55), p.111. In addition, Williams specifically discusses the impact of moral incapacity on practical deliberation, noting that moral incapacity itself is an expression of one's moral life. The implication is that not everyone can become a person of practical wisdom, and an individual's moral incapacity constitutes the reason for their choosing different internal reasons. Cf. Bernard Williams, "Moral Incapacity", Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 46-55..*

[19] *Bernard Williams, "Replies", in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, edited by J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 194..*

[20] *Cf. Joshua Gert, "Williams on Reasons and Rationality", in Reading Bernard Williams, edited by Daniel Callcut, Routledge, 2009, pp. 75.*

[21] *Yang Song, "Normative Reasons: Internal Reasons or External Reasons?", World Philosophy, 2020 (4), pp. 80.*

[22] *Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 195.*

[23] *Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 195.*

[24] *Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 196.*

desires involve commitment—an individual commits to successfully realizing the content of the desire—whereas wishes do not entail such commitment. For example, if I engage in physical training, enlist in the air force, and eventually pass the assessments to become a candidate astronaut, then traveling in a space shuttle ceases to be a wish and becomes a desire, as it now possesses a certain degree of realistic possibility and I am attempting to fulfill this desire. The concept of realistic possibility is more nuanced; in terms of an individual's capabilities, some tasks may be effortless for them, yet they may still perceive them as impossible. This is because what an individual can do is constrained by their other goals, commitments, and lifestyle. For instance, when someone claims they cannot take a winter sports vacation in January, they are not suggesting that natural laws or circumstances prevent them from doing so, nor are they implying their helplessness. Rather, they mean that to take such a vacation, they would have to quit their job, leave their family, and overhaul their life plans, rendering the vacation ultimately meaningless.

Williams also takes into account more complex scenarios, where the process of an individual's deliberation itself determines what counts as a wish and what counts as a desire, and changes in the deliberative process can lead to mutual transformations between desires and wishes. For instance, when I first enlist in the air force and contemplate traveling through space in a space shuttle, knowing during my deliberation that this is impossible for me at present, I treat it as a wish in my deliberation. However, as time passes and I discover that I can become a candidate astronaut, I then reclassify it as a desire. Of course, when we say that the deliberative process leads to transformations between desires and wishes, it does not mean that the conditions for such transformations depend solely on pure personal subjectivity. On the contrary, an individual may discover through external exploration that their desires cannot be realized, leading them to abandon them or reclassify them as wishes, or vice versa. The primary two reasons for such transformations, in Williams's words, are 'in reflection or by further investigation.'[25]

After making these distinctions, Williams proceeds to discuss the emotional attitudes involved in deliberation. Firstly, since this is practical deliberation rather than theoretical deliberation, individuals will hold certain attitudes towards the process and outcomes of practical actions. These attitudes are part of their emotional states and are inherent in desires and wishes, changing along with them. Williams primarily focuses on fear and hope. For example, if I have the desire to graduate on time with a doctoral degree, I will feel fear towards events that might prevent me from graduating or cause delays. If my attitude changes and I come to accept the possibility of delayed graduation, then my emotional response will also shift, and I will only feel fear towards the prospect of not graduating at all.

However, Williams points out that there exists a more fundamental scenario: when a state of affairs, process, or outcome presents itself before an individual's mind, awaiting examination or simply flashing by momentarily, once this presented content enters the individual's deliberative scope, it inherently carries with it the individual's emotional attitude towards it. For instance, there are some hardcore American movie buffs who are solely concerned with watching movies and engaging in movie-related activities, ignoring everything else. They have no emotional attitudes towards other matters, and even if they retain some interest in activities like eating, it is only because these activities facilitate their movie-related pursuits. It is precisely because the individual has a certain emotional attitude towards a state of affairs, outcome, or process that they can incorporate it into their deliberative scope. After the individual deliberates on the relevant process or outcome, emotional states continue to play a role, influencing their views on the deliberated process or outcome. For example, a head coach may believe that, given the current level of the team, qualifying for the World Cup is impossible. However, if the coach strongly desires to lead the team to the World Cup, this intense emotion may cause them to disbelieve the previously deliberated impossibility, leading them to make erroneous commitments to the content of their wish and fall into wishful thinking. Therefore, in this sense, emotional states, exemplified by hope and fear, inherently guide the process of practical deliberation. Just as an optimistic person and a pessimistic person may deliberate on the same state of affairs, outcome, or process in completely opposite directions.

If an individual exhibits preliminary emotional attitudes akin to approval or disapproval towards the content presented before his mind, then this content cannot be entirely divorced from a wish, as it has neither been explicitly developed as a candidate for satisfaction nor explicitly discarded at this point. The content within the scope of deliberation does not yet involve the individual's commitment. Therefore, in

[25]Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 196.

a complete deliberative process, deliberation always commences with a wish. As deliberation progresses, 'it is not yet either a belief or a desire. *But it may be on the way to becoming either*. As a result of one kind of process, this picture may come to embody a belief of the agent's about an outcome, for instance, that it is genuinely possible; as a result of another, it will come to express a desire that the outcome should occur'.[26] 'There are two routes, leading respectively to committed belief, supported by evidence, and to clear-headed desire, articulated with reasons.'[27] It is necessary to point out that the belief mentioned here refers to a belief *about* the process or outcome, meaning the individual believes or disbelieves that the process or outcome will occur. Distinct from beliefs *about* the process or outcome within the deliberative process, there also exists a belief *in* external facts, which essentially represents 'the belief in accurate information that aligns with facts and rationality' in the internal reasons model. This is something Williams consistently upholds, applicable to both the internal reasons model and the WBD model.[28]

Up to this point, the WBD model outlined by Williams for us can be roughly and simply summarized as follows. Firstly, individuals are awash with numerous images and excitements, from which they must select and shape their own inner voice. Certain content is presented before their mind, and then, driven by their emotional attitudes, they incorporate specific content into the scope of their practical deliberation. At this juncture, this content can be termed as wishes, marking the beginning of all complete processes of practical deliberation. The subsequent development of wishes, including deliberation over the process or outcome, is influenced by certain emotional states. Deliberation, accompanied by reflection or investigation, gives rise to various scenarios:

(1) Individuals gradually come to recognize the feasibility of their wishes in a practical sense, thereby generating a desire to achieve the outcomes and a belief in the attainability of the process or results, which subsequently leads to action.

(2) The wishes do not further develop into desires,

or, being based upon the scenario in (1), insurmountable difficulties are encountered during the pursuit of these desires, causing them to revert back to mere wishes.

(3) Influenced by intense emotional states, such as an overwhelming hope or fear for something to occur, an individual's wishes, driven by these emotions, lead the individual to believe in processes or outcomes that he should not believe in. They hold erroneous beliefs in external facts, commit to the content of their wishes in the wrong way, and forcibly elevate their wishes into desires, causing them to fall into wishful thinking.

5. Emotions and the Practical Deliberation

It is evident that both models proposed by Williams are practical deliberation models, as they both depict the internal mental structure concerning individual actions and practical deliberation. So, what is the relationship between these two models? I will attempt to argue and explain that the internal reasons model should be understood within the framework of the WBD model. By adopting this interpretive approach, we will see that the WBD model more clearly illustrates the role of emotions in practical deliberation, it also better addresses several key issues within the internal reasons model.

Firstly, regarding the structure of the internal reasons model, we can glean some clues from Williams' discussions. It is a misunderstanding of one-person practical reasoning to think of it in terms of a set of formed and committed desires adjudicated in the light of formed and committed beliefs. Rather, the process of arriving at a practical conclusion typically involves a shifting and indeterminate set of wishes, hopes, and fears, in addition to the more clearly defined architecture of desire and belief.[29] This reveals two points: firstly, it is incorrect to conceive of practical reasoning solely in terms of formed and explicit structures of desires and beliefs, as practical reasoning also encompasses the process by which desires and beliefs evolve from being unformed to formed; secondly, conceiving of practical reasoning in terms of explicitly defined structures of desires and beliefs is not necessarily contradictory to conceiving of it in terms of fluctuating wishes as the core structure; they may apply to different stages. As previously mentioned, the internal reasons model has a structure of '*S* + correct beliefs that align with facts and rationality', which can also be roughly described as a structure of 'desire +

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[26] *Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 197.*

[27] *Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 197.*

[28] *Apart from in articles directly related to internal reasons, Williams has also discussed relevant content in multiple other instances. There is no reason to believe that the notion of "belief in accurate information that aligns with facts and rationality" does not apply to the WBD model. Cf. Bernard Williams, "Values, Reasons, and the Theory of Persuasion", Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, edited by A. W. Moore, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 110-111; Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, Chapter 6, p. 123-148.*

[29] *Cf. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 198.*

belief'. In contrast, the WBD model starts from wishes and can culminate in desires or remain at the level of wishes and wishful thinking. Moreover, as previously discussed, 'accurate beliefs that align with facts and rationality' still occupy a place within this structure. Although a complete process of practical deliberation begins with wishes, this is not always necessarily the case. As individuals, after accumulating many experiences, may no longer need to vacillate among many different contents; they may essentially know what they want, and thus practical deliberation may already or be able to commence directly from desires. The complete structure of the internal reasons model remains intact within the WBD model; structurally speaking, the internal reasons model is a part of the WBD model.

Secondly, concerning the conceptual content of the internal reasons model. Williams defines S as encompassing dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent. The items listed here are diverse and complex. As previously mentioned, dispositions of evaluation and patterns of emotional reaction are clearly distinct from various projects. Projects refer to specific contents, whereas the former two seem to pertain to second-order reactions to specific contents. Their relationship does not appear to be a simple equivalence, and even when placed under the concept of S, their internal relationships still require discussion. If we interpret them within the framework of the WBD model, it becomes clearer that various projects and the like advance under the guidance of patterns of emotional reaction, dispositions of evaluation, and so on. The evaluative dispositions, patterns of emotional reaction, loyalties, and commitments included in S all exhibit a certain intentionality; that is, they are all directed towards certain object(s) and can be explained using the structure of 'focus + stance'.[30] This explanatory approach implies that a stance is directed towards a focus, such as a specific person or content, with a certain emotional attitude underlying the focus. For instance, Peter loves watching football but dislikes basketball. Here, football and basketball are the focus, with love being the attitude behind football, while basketball may not evoke a specific attitude, which makes it more like indifference. It is precisely because Peter loves watching football that watching the World Cup enters the realm of his practical deliberation. If Peter had no attitude towards watching football, he would probably not watch the World Cup. The word 'probably' means that Peter might watch the World Cup for other reasons, such as his friends enjoying it and Peter wanting to accompany them. However, in this case, the focus shifts to friends, and the attitude becomes love for friends. The key point here is that emotional attitudes play a foundational role in guiding specific contents into the scope of practical deliberation.

Thirdly, regarding the features of practical deliberation in the internal reasons model. When discussing internal reasons, Williams states that practical deliberation is a dynamic process that can increase or decrease desires or reasons. The WBD model more vividly depicts this dynamic process, namely the transformation between wishes and desires. As practical deliberation unfolds, the conversion of wishes into desires corresponds to an augmentation of elements within S, whereas the retraction of desires back into wishes corresponds to a reduction of elements within S. Additionally, there is the issue of how imagination functions in practical deliberation.[31] It is certainly impossible to provide an exhaustive explanation of this issue here, as imagination itself is an exceedingly complex topic; we can only touch upon it briefly within the context of this article. 'The imagination can create new possibilities and new desires.'[32] We can further inquire what kinds of possibilities and desires imagination generates. In practical deliberation, we rely on imagination to perceive and envisage the relevant contents involved in an action. The key point about imagination here is that it operates between the realms of complete reality and complete unreality. In practical deliberation, imagination cannot be entirely realistic because deliberation has not yet commenced actual action; instead, individuals use imagination to simulate the various effects that action would produce in reality. Simultaneously, imagination cannot be entirely unrealistic because the outcomes of deliberation must be grounded in action; if an individual's imagination deviates from reality in *all* aspects, they would be unable to execute the deliberated actions. It is difficult to argue that imagination operating under the influence

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[30]Peter Goldie, "Thick Concepts and Emotion", in Reading Bernard Williams, edited by Daniel Callcut, Routledge, 2009, pp. 105.

[31]It should be noted that although Williams does not mention the issue of imagination when discussing the WBD model, it would be too hasty to conclude that imagination does not apply to the WBD model. This is because Williams, when discussing practical deliberation, believes that imagination plays a role in it. Since the WBD model is also a practical deliberation model, we can consistently argue that imagination is applicable here as well, particularly evident in how wishful thinking can overturn reality. When individuals disregard external realities and forcibly elevate wishes that lack practical feasibility into desires that are deemed feasible, this phenomenon can likely only be explained by recourse to imagination—that is, individuals, through their imagination, mistakenly believe they have compensated for the lack of practical feasibility.

[32]Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 105.

of hope and imagination operating under the influence of fear would yield identical deliberative results. Therefore, when individuals employ imagination to deliberate on the process or outcome of an action and examine new desires while in different emotional states, the effects produced may deviate from reality to varying degrees due to the influence of these distinct emotional states.[33] Consequently, situations may arise where, for instance, overly intense emotions guide imagination to shape images, processes, or outcomes that deviate excessively from reality, accompanied by a forced elevation of wishes into desires, ultimately leading individuals to fall into wishful thinking regarding the relevant matters.

Up to this point, the feasibility of interpreting the internal reasons model within the framework of the WBD model has been demonstrated from three aspects: its structure, conceptual definition, and characteristics. Next, the benefits of this interpretive approach will be discussed.

Fourthly, regarding the possibility of transformation between internal and external reasons. Taking Owen's enlistment as an example, Williams does not deny that Owen might ultimately join the military out of a sincere belief that it is his duty to uphold his family's military tradition. However, where does the possibility of such a transformation lie? The internal reasons model fails to elucidate this point. According to the WBD model, emotional attitudes play a foundational role in the process of deliberation. For the option of enlisting to become part of Owen's practical deliberation, it must be possible to shift Owen's emotional attitude towards enlistment, turning his hatred into a more favorable stance. 'Williams intended it, however, to exclude any alleged reason that purports to be a reason for anyone whatsoever in this or that type of situation. My reasons must be peculiarly mine, reasons grounded in my psychological history. They need not be and often will not be in the least self-interested. They must be expressions of this or that particular self.'[34] If Owen's long-standing psychological journey has been characterized by hatred for the military, what can possibly reverse his emotional attitude? This will be discussed further below. However, the earlier question, 'How can we make people willing to accept reasons they did not originally hold?' now has a potential avenue. The possible path for transforming external reasons into internal ones may lie in the

transformation itself being accompanied by a shift in original emotional attitudes or the implantation of new ones. Emotions themselves are intentional; different individuals may share the same emotion, but their intentionality may point to entirely different things or events. Similarly, faced with the same thing or event, different individuals may experience entirely different emotions. In other words, in the same situation, when presented with a reason statement that includes specific target objects or events, the current situation, and an individual's perception of the current situation and specific objects or events, the emotional state constitutes a crucial factor in this perception. Neither the current situation nor the specific objects or events can particularly express the individual themselves; it may be the individual's long-formed emotional state that distinctively expresses who they are.

Fifthly, concerning the sound deliberative route. Williams introduced this concept to argue that internal reasons encompass normativity, but the existence of a sound deliberative route does not guarantee that the agent can follow it.[35] Nevertheless, agents can be guided onto the sound deliberative route by a helpful deliberative assistants.[36] What qualifies as helpful? Two conditions must be met: first, the assistant will be truthful, in the sense both of telling the truth this is that the assistant will be truthful about his own procedures and motives, with the result that these can be transparent to the agent; the assistant has no hidden agenda in his dealings with the agent; second, the assistant will try to make the best sense of the agent's S, and, in particular, if there is a conflict between the assistant's and the agent's interpretations of the agent's S, the assistant will have some suitable explanation of the agent's misinterpretation. (This condition is not circular: it does not say that the assistant has to make the best sense of what the agent's reasons are.)[37] What role does the assistant

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[33]The distinctions here can refer to both qualitative distinctions in emotional states themselves, such as fear versus hope, and variations in intensity within the same type of emotional state, such as fear versus intense fear.

[34]Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 156.

[35]Cf. Joshua Gert, "Williams on Reasons and Rationality", in Reading Bernard Williams, edited by Daniel Callcut, Routledge, 2009, pp. 77; John Skorupski, "Internal Reasons and the Scope of Blame", in Bernard Williams, edited by Alan Thomas, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 77-78.

[36]Sometimes Williams uses adviser to represent for the helpful deliberative assistants. cf. Bernard Williams, "Values, Reasons, and the Theory of Persuasion", Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, edited by A. W. Moore, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 115-118; In Williams' other writings, the similar concepts or also appear, such as informed advisor. cf. Bernard Williams, "Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons", in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, edited by Elijah Millgram, The MIT Press, 2001, p. 92; in Truth and Truthfulness, Williams discussed how, within an interactive structure, individuals mutually assist each other in maintaining a sense of reality in their practical deliberation, such as by preventing certain wishes from becoming desires and thus avoiding falling into wishful thinking. cf. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, 2002, Chapter 8, p. 172-205.

[37]Bernard Williams, "Values, Reasons, and the Theory of Persuasion", Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, edited by A. W. Moore, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 115-116.

play in deliberation? The assistant plays an important role in explaining the relationship between the agent's *S* and their decisions. If the deliberative procedure is overly constrained, such as resorting to procedural rationality or rational decision-making theories, it cannot explain how new deliberative content is incorporated into the agent's deliberation. When resorting to procedural rationality fails to make the agent accept what they should reasonably accept, it also leads to the inference that the agent is not rational enough. The internal reasons model rejects highly constrained deliberative procedures and accepts a loose but sound deliberative route. It is in this sense that the deliberative assistant can precisely provide the agent with new motivations through persuasion, which can be achieved through emotional effects. This may involve capturing the agent's imagination or expressing a force for other purposes.[38] For example, the same reasonable statement, when expressed with a reproachful tone versus an accepting and inclusive tone in the same situation and to the same agent, produces different emotional effects, leading to differences in the agent's acceptance of the statement. This aspect is completely overlooked in theories that solely rely on procedural rationality or rationality. In summary, the agent's discovery of new reasons to do something is interconnected with the presence of a helpful deliberative assistant. Therefore, the agent can better understand their own *S* and follow a sound deliberative route under the assistant's persuasion with emotional effects. If the agent fails to or cannot follow a sound deliberative route, it may not be due to a rationality issue but rather due to problems with their relevant emotional states. From this, we can see that, to some extent, McDowell and Williams actually share a common argument: agents can be guided onto a sound deliberative route under the influence of certain non-rational factors (if we simply consider emotional influences as non-rational).

6. Conclusion

This paper primarily draws on Williams' theoretical resources, attempting to deepen the understanding of Williams himself and of internal reasons theory as a whole from an emotional perspective. The argumentative approach of this paper is as follows: under the unified concept of practical reason or practical deliberation, by analyzing and comparing the structures, contents, and characteristics of the internal reasons model and the WBD model, it points out the inherent problems within the internal

reasons model that it cannot resolve on its own, the essential similarities between the two models, and the inclusiveness of the WBD model towards the internal reasons model. This is done to demonstrate that emotional factors occupy a fundamental and central position in understanding Williams' internal reasons.

If this paper's interpretation is credible and feasible, in response to criticisms regarding the insufficient normativity of internal reasons, what internal reasons theory may need to do is to attempt to develop theories concerning emotions and explore normativity within emotions, using the power inherent in emotions to regulate the motives for action. Just as empathy and response to emotions in psychological counseling can gradually change a person's cognitive patterns, this naturalistic tendency that emphasizes emotions may prove more feasible than claiming that reason alone can lead to normative action.

Actually, many moral sentimentalism theories discuss the normativity under the appropriateness of emotions, being called fittingness assessment. For example, Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson's Rational Neo-Sentimentalism theory and Christine Tappolet's Representational Neo-Sentimentalism theory both resort to the objective value to guarantee the appropriateness of emotions. Williams proposes an emotivism theory on the level of speech-act thesis and puts forward that an emotion towards an object may be inappropriate. Such an inappropriate emotion is an irrational emotion. While unlike Justin D'Arms, Daniel Jacobson and Christine Tappolet resorting to global objective value, Williams may not hold such a view for he rejects such a global objective value in ethical theory. To expound Williams' emotional theory in detail, we need another paper to talk about his emotional theory and thick concepts, which cannot be fulfilled in this paper.

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