

## THE CREATIVE WORK OF BERTRAND RUSSELL IN RUSSIA

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### ABSTRACT

*The article is devoted to problem of acquaintance of the Russian reader with the creativity of the thinker of the XX century Bertrand Russell in translations of his works and landmark publications Soviet and Russian researchers from the 1906 to the 60th years. Based on the chronology of the emergence of these editions, the peculiarities of his views on German social democracy, subject and method of mathematics are revealed, the essence of logicism and its connection with philosophy, knowledge of the outside world, justification of neorealism, reflection on the role of science and the future society, assessment of Bolshevism and Russia. The anti-war speeches of the thinker resulted in an organization together with associates of a number of committees and societies fighting for peace, participation in the resolution of the Cuban crisis and in the foundation of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Russell's work in bourgeois humanism and free-thinking has become a base in promoting secularistic ideas and practical morality in many countries.*

**Keywords:** *Bertrand Russell, social democracy, logicism and philosophy, neorealism, struggle for peace, free-thinking*

### INTRODUCTION

The creative work of the outstanding thinker of the twentieth century? Lord, Count, Nobel laureate, logic, mathematician, philosopher, Labor, feminist, pacifist, political activist, Nobel Prize in literature (1950) Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in Russia is quite famous. The presentation of his works is closely linked with his occupation first of logic and mathematics, then the theory of knowledge, the problems of natural science, freedom of thought, pedagogical ideas, the struggle for the rights of women and speeches against the war of 1914-1918. Further, his work on the problems of the philosophy of morality, the history of philosophy, the struggle for peace against the war in Vietnam, participation in the Cuban conflict. Most of his life conflicts are described by him in a number of journalistic works, in a huge number of letters, as well as in the monograph "My Philosophical Development" (1959) and "Autobiography" (vol. 1-1967, vol. 2-1968, vol. 3- 1969).

The first work to be translated into Russian was "Essays on the History of the German Social Democratic Workers' Party" [14]. The lectures were given by the author at the London School of Economic and Political Sciences in February

and March 1896. The publisher apparently focused on public opinion related to interest in social democracy, which was expressed in a number of publications on this topic in Russia, so the work did not cause any reaction. As for the work itself, the author proved himself to be a confident scientist to give assessments of this movement. Russell viewed social democracy both as a social movement based on economic theory and as a whole doctrine - the philosophy of peace and development of mankind, a religious and ethical system. At the same time, he states that "the goal of metaphysics was and is to glorify the existing system, to establish a view of the church and the state as the embodiment of an absolute idea." [14, c.2] Referring to Marx's theory, the English philosopher states that in the field of logic Marx is a "dialectical rationalist," and in metaphysics (ontology) is a "dogmatic materialist." This "ambivalence" explains the supposedly peculiarity of the theory of "economic materialism," which underlies social democratic doctrine. From the interpretation of the dialectic by Marx, it seems that "its revolutionary nature and inevitability, almost fatality of any development process," follows. Therefore, nothing can delay the intended course of events. This "fanaticism more than anything inspires

social democracy and informs it of faith and the power of religion" [14, p. 4-6]. Russell characterizes Marxism as a fatal doctrine based on "the moral ideals of the proletariat and on the need for their victory" [14, p. 134] His fatalism comes from the materialistic concept of Marx, whose philosophy "is a mixture of Hegel and the English economy." On the other hand, Russell acknowledges that "a materialistic view of history leaves no room for religion, as it considers all dogmas as a product of economic conditions" [14, c. 12, 77]. Even if this is not quite so, recognition is very valuable.

The second translated work was the article "The latest works on the principles of mathematics" (1901, translated in Russian. 1913) [15]. Next year his significant work "Problems of Philosophy" is published. [16]. To date, it has been translated into most important languages of the world in the world, and has survived 24 editions in English. Note that these works were left almost without the attention of researchers. The main work representing the philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Rössel) in sufficient completeness in Russia was "The History of Philosophy" (1918) by P. P. Blonsky [2]. By this time, the main positions of Russell were already clear, whom the author of the work characterized as "one of the most prominent modern English philosophers," whose concepts "are now enjoying great attention in the Anglo-Saxon countries," being popular in the "Romance countries (France, Italy)." [2, p. 200] It is very important to get acquainted with it, according to Blonsky, since Russell is "extremely peculiar" to solve the problem of knowing the outside world. "

According to the English thinker, one of the main questions of philosophy is the question of the method of philosophy. The trouble with philosophy is that it is strongly influenced by ethics and religion, neglecting the scientific method. The consequence of this is the existence of many erroneous concepts in philosophy. Among them is the concept of the "universe" as a relic of pre-Copernican astronomy: the visible unity of the world is simply the integrity of what an individual observer sees and what a separate mind perceives. Another example of error is the ethization of philosophy and the antithesis of good and evil. From this point of view, Russell criticizes evolutionism. Not to mention the fundamental inadmissibility of erecting empirical generalizations at the stage of a priori laws (this destroys their only basis - empirical),

Blonsky emphasizes that according to Russell, evolutionism is based on ethical concepts, because it is characterized by faith in progress, which is based on a negligible selection of facts, giving only "an infinitesimal fragment of space and time." "The belief that development is "moving forward" is a groundless assurance. It is just an anthropocentric attempt to give a natural force to our own desires, just a consequence of always inevitable subjective ethics.

Since philosophy should be used exclusively by the scientific method, its proposals should not be collective, but distributive and a priori. Philosophy should become a logic that is defined by Russell as "an inventory of possibilities, a list of hypotheses that can be abstractly supported." Thus, philosophical proposals are a priori analytical judgments, so resolutely rejected at one time for Kant's philosophy. Blonsky states that according to Russell, philosophy should be "ethically neutral," different from natural science, because its proposals relate to much more distracted entities. In view of the original content of philosophical judgments, it cannot have conflicts with natural science and morality, which will require the removal from philosophy of problems solved empirically. Russell refers to the imaginary philosophical problems of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The conclusion is: philosophy is logic, its proposals are a priori analytical, and its method is analysis.

P. Blonsky believes that Russell's logic is "very original," for the thinker "is one of the leaders" of logistics, which seeks to reduce philosophy and mathematics to logic. Since Blonsky's work aims to familiarize readers with the new philosophy, he makes available the essence of logistics, which arose from mathematics, is related to the works of Cantor and Hilbert. Cantor's doctrine of super-final numbers, of transfinite numbers, led him to the conclusion that ordinary integers are one of the insignificant classes of these numbers. In this case, you can derive all arithmetic and algebra in a purely logical way. Hilbert gives an exceptionally formal character and geometry, independent of spatial intuitions. All geometry is derived purely analytically from the minimum number of basic axioms that have only a conditional character. On the basis of such mathematics, logistics appeared, Russell, Couture, Peano, Whitehead, Frege and Wittgenstein called it representatives of Blonsky. Blonsky writes that Couture cited a

summary of the results of logistics and found that Russell and Peano wrote mathematical treatises in a symbolic language without a single word of the usual language and related intuitions, which finally refuted Kant's doctrine of synthetic a priori judgments. The conclusion is natural: mathematics is pure logic.

Why is Russell here at the forefront of the logistics founders? Russell builds his logic with the logic of sentences (and not classes, like Aristotle's), and his hypothetical is the main syllogism. At the same time, in his logic of proposals, he studies the laws of combining unions "and" and "or" (and not "if" and "but," as in previous logic), when "and" are logical multiplication, and "or" are logical addition (because these unions have the properties of displacement, combination and distribution). Such logic is richer than traditional logic, since it allows for unlimited combinations. According to Blonsky, Russell is inclined to deny the logic of classes. This new logic should be a powerful tool of "scientific" philosophy. The field of action for the scientific method in philosophy is our knowledge of the outside world. To make the problem of the outside world a logical-mathematical problem, Russell declares physical objects to be functions of sensual data. In other words, it is worth not "deriving" the existence of things of common sense, atoms, space and time, but "constructing" all this hypothetically, mentally or logically. The new logic gives the gigantic possibilities of logical forms, the expanse of the logical imagination and the material for a huge number of logical constructions regarding empirical facts. The conclusion is: wherever possible, it is worth replacing physically entities with logical constructs.

Blonsky draws attention to the fact that Russell, using the principle of abstraction, seeks to determine, under the least number of assumptions, the relationship between the world of sensual data and the world of physics, which are logical functions of sensual data. Since any logical function of real sensual data must logically exist, it is not worth doubting the existence of space, time and matter as logical functions. It turns out that Russell "builds his doctrine of the outside world on the basis of his own sensual data." [2, p. 203] Thus, the sensual data of each person builds his private world, and there are relationships between similar sensual data in various similar worlds. The thing in this case is defined as the class of all similar sensual data in all private worlds. Based on this

definition of things, we establish a common space and time in which things exist and their changes. This common space and time is constructed, and the private world is considered a point in the new space. So possible private worlds are introduced into the common world. Each of us lives in our own separate world, which has its own spaces (tangible, visual, etc.), but in addition to them there is a space in which any private world is present as a point, or spatial unit. The general space of points of view allows us to consider the private world as a phenomenon represented by the universe from a certain point of view ("perspective space").

For the work of the proposed world design apparatus, Russell includes sensitization. These are objects that have a similar "metaphysical and physical status as facts of sensation, but are not necessarily facts of any individual consciousness." The correlation of sensitization perspectives gives sensitizations, which are called "phenomena of a thing," and the collection of sensitization in various perspectives is a thing. The psychologist is interested in the "place from which" and sensitization seems subjective to him and where there is a perceiver. Physics is more interested in "the place in which, and for it, sensitization is external and physical." In a similar way, Russell constructs a general time order for the state of things, events, and their relationships. "Are the objects of our perception real and independent of the perceiver" - none of the terms are defined and the answer is not feasible. According to Russell, objects of perception are not in an unchanged state at a time when they are not perceived. But we must remember that the objects of perception are the only empirical cognizable part of physical matter and can themselves be called empirical. Physical laws determine the nature and duration of objects of perception without any relation to the fact of their perception. When establishing these laws, the proposals of physics do not imply either psychological proposals or the existence of a mind. This is Russell's "realism," states P. Blonsky.

The presented point of view of the English philosopher is supported by a reference to Russell's article "Relations of Sensual Data to Physics" (1914) [28, p.1-27]. In this article, Russell notes that physics considers sensual data to be functions of physical objects, but it is also possible for physical objects to be considered functions of sensual data. Therefore, we can formulate sensual data in terms of physical

objects, or physical objects in terms of sensual data. "This is a very interesting logical and mathematical problem," summarizes P. Blonsky. Since "thing" cannot be identified with any of its singular phenomena, so far as you can think about something different from phenomena. According to the principle of "Occam razors" ("entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity"), if a class of phenomena performs the tasks for which a thing was invented, then economy requires that we identify the thing with a class of phenomena. In such a case, there is no need to use entities such as substrate or substance

So, what's Blonsky's conclusion. He is convinced that Russell is an extreme a priorist and formalist, completely reducing philosophy to formal logic. In this sense, he can be considered an idealist. On the other hand, his reasoning about objects of perception, as the only empirically recognizable part of physical matter, and the recognition of the relation of similarity (and not the identity between objects of perception and non-perceived real objects), is an opportunity to talk about Russell's very peculiar "realism." "Russell's teaching is, as it were, a new kind of transition from idealism to transcendental realism." [2, page 205].

Representatives of realism Blonsky considers Riehl, Külpe, Russell, Lipps (who warned of the danger of recognizing that things are complexes of sensations), Dilthey, Trendelenburg with his criticism of the transcendental aesthetics of Kant, Siegwart and Zeller.

Then he refers to the realists as all materialists, energy scientists and biologists, i.e. representatives of "metaphysical scientific philosophy." Of the representatives of scientific critical philosophy, Avenarius and Poincaré are approaching realism. Even the inherent philosophy in the person of Shuppe approaches naive realism, like Mach.

The "philosophy of values" in the person of Münsterberg also comes to realism. Realism in philosophy is defended in the name of naive realism in order to save the "natural worldview," but most often it is defended in the form of critical realism in order to somehow keep the "metaphysical" or transcendent. "In philosophy,gnoseological realism is often, but not always, associated with metaphysics, serving either as a preparation for it, or even an introduction to it." That is why with some stretch Blonsky combines a number of critical realists turning to metaphysics. [2, p. 207]

The bibliography submitted on Russell's philosophy says that the author is familiar with "The principles of mathematics", "Philosophy problems", "Philosophical essays", "A scientific method in philosophy", "Our knowledge of the outside world", with a number of articles in "Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society", with analysis of "Principia Mathematica" of Couture, "Tractatus of logic" at Poincare, to the critic of logicians at Kassirer in article in "Kantstudien" (1907). The questions for consolidating this theory are impressive: Russell's method and subject of philosophy, reform of logic, Russell's doctrine of proposition and "propositional function," knowledge by acquaintance and description, Russell's private and general space, sensual data and things, the problems of traditional metaphysics in Russell's solution, in which Russell sees the error of absolute idealism. [2, p. 210]

Of course, in comparison with the short essay on the philosophy of B. Russell (1918) by Philip Jourdain (1879-1919), Blonsky's text does not touch on many problems that the British philosopher had already mastered by this time. [29] Russell's statement that the essence of philosophy is logic was substantiated in the special chapter "Our Knowledge of the Outside World" (1914) [30]. But Russell emphasized that this logic has nothing to do with the outside world, because "the knowledge of logical forms is something completely different from the knowledge of existing things" [30, p. 52]. Russell's work "Problems of Philosophy" (1912) [16] gained great fame, in which a distinction was made between supposedly objective sensory data and sensations of sensual data that are inherent in the subject. In the article "The Relation of Sensual Data to Physics" (1914), the term sensibilia appears, i.e. "insensitive data," this difference is confused, and in the book "Analysis of Consciousness" (1921) it disappears altogether. Sensual data are the same sensations, but reproduced in memory [31, p. 298].

Everyone knows that Russell thought his logicism was in conflict with Kant's philosophy of mathematics. But the fact is that Russell's early logicism is dual, leading to a better understanding of the place of Russell and Whitehead's Foundations of Mathematics in the history of basic research. Russell's logicism corresponded to a conflict with the Kantian statement that mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori; to reduce mathematics to logic strive to create analytical and

mathematical statements. It was definitely Frege's position on arithmetic, but not Russell's. Before the collision with Wittgenstein, Russell thought that the axioms of mathematics (and indeed the axioms of logic) were synthetic a priori, which he noted in Leibniz's Philosophy (1900): "judgments of arithmetic are, as Kant discovered, all synthetic without exception" [32, p. 21]. In "Principles of Mathematics" (1903), he observed that "Kant never doubted for a moment that the judgments of logic are analytic, since he rightly realized that one hundred judgments of mathematics are synthetic. Since then, it follows that logic is only synthetic like all other varieties of truth" [33, p. 457]. In The Problems of Philosophy, he confirms: "Kant is undoubtedly trustworthy... realizing that we have a priori knowledge that is not purely "analytical" [27, p. 82], for he "realized that... all judgments of arithmetic and geometry are synthetic, i.e. not analytical" [27, p.83-84].

Is there a conflict in Russell's views between logicism and Kant's philosophy? Logicism as a doctrine states that mathematics is reduced to logic. Standard version of logicism - each mathematical theorem can be formulated in terms of purely logical concepts and tested on the basis of purely logical assumptions and inference rules. There is, however, a radically excellent version of the thesis that mathematics is logic that implies referring to all mathematics, and not only to arithmetic. This version is described by Russell and approved in the first part of the Principles of Mathematics (1903): "all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts defined in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that all these propositions are deduced from the smallest number of fundamental logical principles" [33, p. XV].

The second meaning of logicism, or conditional logicism, states that logic is sufficient to formulate and prove all judgments of pure mathematics, and later requires, *modus ponens* and a deductive theorem equal to the statement that logic is sufficient to draw conclusions from the premises of mathematical arguments all conclusions that give the right to infer. Of course, there are contradictions between the standard and conditional concept of logicism. Russell houses both doctrines at the same time, although in the Principles of Mathematics he focuses exclusively on the standard version. In early philosophy, these two doctrines played additional roles: by appealing to both logicism, Russell, unlike Frege, could adapt within the

theory that all mathematics is logic. Russell's standard logicism was designed to refute the Cantonese thesis regarding the synthetic nature of mathematics. The conflict with Kant should be Russell's conditional logicism. He was satisfied with the recognition that "pure physics" (he calls it "radical dynamics") is a "branch of pure mathematics" [33, p. XXXVII, see also pp.112, 497), therefore logic. But also pure economics, geography and any axiomatized theory (first order) reduced to logic. If these logicism are appropriate, then Russell's kantianism included much doubtful. This is why Russell could impressively convince that all mathematical concepts were probably defined without an appeal to Kantian sensuality.

Since 1908, Russell became a member of the Fabian Society, and since 1914 - a member of the Labor Party. And as an activist of the left, he goes to Russia with a delegation of English trade unions and members of the Workers' Party. He met with Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Sverdlov and Gorky, spoke at rallies in Petrograd and Moscow. The delegation was greeted with orchestras, parades and banquets, "like the Prince of Wales." In his book "The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism" (1920) [17], he writes about Asian Russia, suffering from the religion of Bolshevism. The theme of religion is almost the main line in the narrative, because the provisions of dialectical materialism are compared with the covenants of the Bible, the proletariat with the "chosen people," Marx with Jesus, the party with the church., revolution with the coming of the Messiah. He compared the Soviet republic with the Republic of Plato, the Red Army likened the Cromwell Army of Saints. The characteristics of peasants are ignorant, intellectuals are unconscious, the country is not ready for progress, etc. Russell's acquaintance with the ideas of social democracy and guild socialism did not give a chance to really evaluate Russia's steps towards a new society.

In 1926, the joint work of D.B. Haldane and B. Rössel was published in Russian. "Daedalus and Icarus (The Future of Science)." [25] Haldane, John Burdon Sanderson (1892-1964) previously published the book Daedalus, or Science and the Future (1923) [26]. John came from an old Scottish family, which gave the country and the world many outstanding figures in science, culture, politics, military art. At Eton College (1905-1911), he showed outstanding abilities in the field of mathematics, classical languages and natural sciences. During his studies at Eton,

he was awarded prizes for the best knowledge of physics, biology and chemistry, and in the competition in mathematics in 1908 he won the Bertrand Russell Prize. An early synthetic approach to solving scientific problems, a correct assessment of the importance of science and technology in the progress of human society allowed him to become a co-author at the age of thirty with the world famous scientist Bertrand Russell. This book was built in the form of dialogue and is one of the first attempts at forecasting future lines of development of certain fields of science and technology and to assess the impact of scientific and technological progress on the development of society.

Haldane wrote that "the inventor in the field of chemistry or physics is always a kind of Prometheus. There is no such great discovery, from fire to aviation. Which would not be seen as an insult to any deity. "[25, p. 35] Russell is more categorical. "I cannot help but express my fears that the new science will serve to strengthen the power of the dominant parties rather than increase human well-being. The mythical Icarus, who learned to fly from his father Daedalus, died due to his own recklessness. I fear that such a fate will not befall the nations that modern science has taught to fly. " [25, page 65].

This book was Haldane's first philosophical manifesto. As a participant in the First World War, he is concerned about the future, but with optimism he tried to talk about the future. When asked whether a person has generated such forces that can rebel against himself and throw him into the abyss of misadventures, Haldane replies that it is impossible to delay the development of scientific and technological progress, and it is worth trusting a mind that will prevail over the madness of destruction. Humanity has created from the bowels of matter a kind of Demogorgon, which is already beginning to rebel against man himself and is trying to overthrow him into the abyss.

Of course, neither Russell nor Haldane has yet seen genuine ways and concrete forces to save humanity from destruction. Haldane highly appreciates biology in those years: "I am sure that the center of gravity of scientific interest is transferred to biology" [26, p. 16].

Russell asks, "Is science a blessing or a curse to the human race?" It can affect a person's life either "without changing the general nature of human passions," it can increase the possibility of their satisfaction, or it can affect creative

fantasy and theories "put into practice by energetic, strong people" [25, p. 66]. Russell is limited to considering the possibilities that science has provided "in satisfying our passions." He divides the sciences into three groups: physical, biological and anthropological. He refers to the first group of chemistry and all science relating to the properties of matter, as such. The anthropological group includes all sciences related exclusively to man: human psychology and physiology (between which there is no sharp border, according to Russell), anthropology, history, sociology and economics. As for biological science, according to Russell, "Darwinism and the theory of evolution affected human nature; from them came argumentation protecting freedom of competition, as well as nationalism "[25, p. 66].

Science, according to Russell, has developed a person's ability to control nature and can increase his well-being and happiness, but the rapid changes brought to life by science (especially physical) "disturb the balance between our instincts and the conditions around us." Militancy, instincts of domination and rivalry (although it serves as a more powerful incentive than love and money) must be artificially suppressed "so that industrial progress can properly carry out its work" [25, p. 69, 79]. Thanks to science, the productivity of labor has increased, which has allowed to increase population, increase life comfort, and devote the greatest energy to the cause of war [25, p. 73]. Improvement of the organization contributed to the development of nationalism [25, p. 76]. The intensity of the organization is influenced by the "percentage of the oligarchic, democratic or monarchical element in this organization" [25, p. 78] Russell is sure that as long as the sources of economic power remain in private hands, freedom will exist only for those who hold them in their hands [25, p. 80]. That is why "such liberal ideals as freedom of trade, freedom of the press, free education and education belong, in fact, to the past" [25p81-82].

What's the way out? After a "long combat period," it is advisable to establish a "single world organization." Although life will seem unpleasant, "after all, tolerant." Russell is convinced that "world government" can be established "only by force." "At first it will be cruel and oppressive, but still I recognize it as necessary in order to create a scientific civilization, the realization of which will open up new prospects for a tolerant existence" [25, pp. 83-84]. The world government must regulate

population growth, although it is limited to war and famine. "A person acting out of pure selfishness causes less harm than a person driven by the" spirit of the public "[25, p. 85-86]. White races limit fertility, and civilized races, thanks to white science, will grow. "This state of affairs will lead to the trend already observed among the French - to use more prolific races as hired soldiers." In the future, Russell suggests, removal from prejudice will lead to the fact that governments will acquire the right to sterilize persons who are unwanted as parents. "[25, p. 87] Russell precedes eugenics and fascism. Science contributes to the realization of the goals of people in power, but if people were to act consciously and thoughtfully, "science could create a paradise on earth. But people are guided by passions that distort their original intentions. "25, p. 92] Therefore, according to Russell, it is necessary to strengthen good impulses. And it will help in this matter "the establishment of a single world domination of one social group, a kind of World United States." The sad fate of the Roman Empire comes to mind, so that "the fall of our civilization would perhaps be the most desirable way out of this dilemma" [25, p. 93]. So disappointingly ends this book of the bourgeois humanist. He will return to this topic in the 50-60s of the twentieth century, and will receive a worthy rebuke.

His idea was picked up by the Roman Club (1968). Russell later occasionally mentions the project of the "world government," about which the British spoke a lot after the First World War. Fabian Leonard Wolf devoted a book to this topic, although then the British meant the British Commonwealth by the "world government."

The time of the appearance of translations of Russell's works was such that his theories, in addition to logic and mathematics, were almost unknown. Only in 1936, Ernst Kohlmann (1892-1979) in his work "The Subject and Method of Modern Mathematics" [8] criticizes Russell's logicism and positivism from Marxist positions. In the tenth chapter, "Mathematics and Philosophy," he writes about the crisis of the foundations of mathematics and examines seven trends in the philosophy of mathematics. Logistics, according to Colman, considers its statements not to be displays of reality, but to be unconditional truths that do not need to be reinforced by experience and cannot be refuted by them. This point of view is reflected in the paradoxical definition of mathematics given by

Russell: "Mathematics is a science in which they do not know what they say, or whether what they say is true." Logistics produces the provability of its correctness through a symbolic record of logical concepts and conclusions. Mathematics forms its concepts purely logically and purely by logical methods builds its evidence. This goes back to Leibniz (1671), who "dreamed of creating universal symbolism, of mechanizing thinking." But only at the end of the 19th century during the period of Dedekind (1888), Frege (1893), Peano (1895), logical symbolism was developed so much that it was possible to give a logical analysis of the concept of a number and show the sufficiency of five axioms to substantiate the arithmetic of natural numbers. Later, Russell (1903), and then with him Whitehead (1910) outlined logistics in voluminous works as a completed discipline. [8, page 258]

At this time, a critical revision of views takes place among logists, as can be seen from the work of Weil (1918), who soon switched to the position of intuitionists, Chwistek (1923) and especially Wittgenstein (1922). The means of logistics is its symbolism, having built the calculus of sentences, then logical functions and logical classes, logists go on to build axiom systems for natural numbers. Each of the logists - Peano, Padoa, Couture, Burali-Forti, Russell - use their own symbolism. The very attempt to create an algebra of logic does not mean even a break from reality, nor the transformation of truths into something amorphous and incomprehensible. Only due to the fact that logicians tried to reduce arithmetic to logic, and understood logic metaphysically, only thanks to their idealistic methodology did the work of logists fail. "The roots of their position are ultimately in the class nature of mathematics." This is the conclusion! Therefore, logistics is untenable in its very basis, it has not coped with its problems. True, she managed, according to Colman, to create accurate logical symbolism as an important tool of scientific research and with its help to identify the logical structure of mathematical concepts and mathematical proofs. E. Colman concludes the book with a statement: "Like all science, mathematics has a class character in class society, the course of its development through economics, technology, natural science and philosophy ultimately determines class struggle." [8, p. 297] The USSR noted the thinker's statements in 1948 about maintaining the US nuclear monopoly, demands for the USSR to stop developing its own nuclear

weapons, and even his proposals - in case of refusal - to drop a nuclear bomb on Moscow. On the other hand, as an ideologist and organizer of the British anti-war movement, he acted as one of the organizers of the Pugwash conferences of scientists around the world in the struggle for peace, which the beginning of which in 1955 was laid by the famous Manifesto Einstein - Russell, published on July 9, 1955. In 1957-58. he enters into correspondence with the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev and US Secretary of State J. F. Dalles, whose goal was to convince both politicians that their common interests are much more important than their differences. Throughout the Caribbean crisis, he opposed the embargo against Cuba from anti-American positions.

Only in the late fifties of the twentieth century began to appear works reflecting the true situation in the field of logic and mathematics, as well as the role of Russell in solving paradoxes and problems. [5, page 369-384; 7b p. 189-217] A great help in evaluating the work of Bertrand Russell was the publication in Russian of his two works "Human Knowledge. Its Spheres and Boundaries" (1957) [18] and "History of Western Philosophy" (1959) [21]. In 1958, L. Wittgenstein's "Logical and Philosophical Treatise" was published with the introduction of B. Russell, which did not satisfy the author of the treatise [6]. There are constantly brief reports about Russell's new works in the critical bibliographic bulletin "New Books Abroad on Social Sciences." In the country of "victorious atheism." his "Why Am I a Non-Christian" (1958) [19], and "Has Religion Made a Useful Contribution to Civilization?" (1959) [20]. Which prompted several publications on this topic? The magazines, following the atheistic reading of the thinker, publish his stories: "Satan in the Suburbs" (1963) [22], "The Theologian's Nightmare" (1966) [23]. The collection "From Erasmus of Rotterdam to Bertrand Russell" (1969) [13] included a number of topics based on Erasmus of Rotterdam's Praise of Stupidity.

At first, an overview of the ideological positions and principles of international organizations of free-thinking and humanists was given. Through the legacy of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the formation of the ideological phenomenon of free thought is revealed. Bertrand Russell, elected at the Duisburg Congress (1963) as honorary chairman of the organization, took an active part in the activities

of the union. With his participation, a resolution of this congress was also developed, which directly continued the decisions and resolution of the 1945 manifesto. The resolution emphasized the urgent task of our time - the struggle for peace. In 1966, Congress paid extraordinary attention to the Vietnam War [1]. Russell addressed a passionate call to American soldiers to refuse to fight in this country. In the promotion of secularist ideas and in practical activities, the union proceeded from the works of B. Russell on the problems of ethics and practical morality. A large article was devoted to the International Humanistic and Ethical Union, the views of P.T. de Chardin, the atheism of the lost and non-hijacked (atheism of J.-P. Sartre) and the atheism of Bertrand Russell [13, p. 268-302] B.E. Bykhovsky and B.V. Meerovsky.

An article by logic A.D. Getmanova "On the views of Bertrand Russell on the relationship of mathematics and logic" (Bulletin of Moscow State University. 1959. No. 11) from Marxist attitudes determines that "In the struggle of materialism against idealism, which unfolded around the subject of mathematics, the most important role was played by the question of the attitude of mathematics to logic. Since the time of Leibniz, idealistic philosophy has tried to prove that mathematical truths are essentially truths of a universal human nature that say nothing about things or about the relationships of things in the world around us. These attempts of Leibniz were resumed in our time in the philosophical school of logicism, the leader of which was B. Russell "[c.104] Principia Mathematica, as one of the sources of the development of modern mathematical logic, has philosophical generalizations, which is used to prove the possibility of reducing mathematics to logic, which refers to the field of idealistic conclusions.

The history of this information begins with Leibniz, then contributed to G. Frege in the work "Calculus of the Concept" (1879). But he reduced only a significant part of arithmetic to logic through the mathematics of logic. Russell in 1900 discovered the inconsistency of his system and in the RM made attempts to correct the Frege system using "type theory." Getmanova, in line with Marxism, describes Russell's actions on the field of logic ("Russell sought to define science and logic as in no way related to the real world in which we live. He supports Leibniz, who considered logic a priori science, the truths of which are true in all



possible worlds "). [page 105]. Mathematics, according to this logic, is also a priori. Russell identifies mathematics and logic. "Pure mathematics is a set of formal conclusions independent of any content. This is an almost idealistic technique of absolute separation of form from content." This is "the desire to see in mathematical truths - the truths of the mind that are not related to the sensual perception of the world" [5, c.109]. However, history has refuted Russell's idealistic conclusions. Gödel's theorem showed that the reduction of mathematics to logic is natural, and not a random solution: "the definition of mathematical concepts in terms of" logic "only reveals the connections of these concepts with logic, by no means depriving them of a specifically mathematical character" [c.122]. "Mathematics has its own special, specific content, its own subject - the study of spatial forms and quantitative relations of the real world." In 1962, I.S. Narsky published a lecture on the philosophy of Bertrand Russell [11].

This small work represented the thinker as a positivist. The positivist trace of the thinker is reflected in the works of A.I. Korneeva [9; 10]. Analytical work on this subject began to appear. In 1960, V.V. Sokolov wrote a large article in "Questions of Philosophy" "Russell as a Historian of Philosophy" [24], I.S. Narsky and E.V. Help - "Bertrand Russell - philosopher and humanist" [12]. In the work of A.S. Bogomolov on Anglo-American neorealism (1962) [3] and his textbook "English bourgeois philosophy of the twentieth century" (1973) [4], a detailed description is given to the thinker. In 1978 in the publishing house was published «Free - thinking of Bertrand Russell" by A.S. Kolesnikov. Soon, Russell's books will leave the special guard, and the general public will already be able to read them freely. Significantly more translations, studies and comments.

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