

The Challenge of Powers in Yemen and the Drawing of Several Security-Political Scenarios

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ABSTRACT

In international relations studies, the security of the activists, especially in the regional arena, is considered as one of the most accepted principles in the foreign policy of the countries; in particular, political-security issues after the developments of the Islamic awakening in the region are a kind of interconnectedness among regional actors. This issue has added to the escalation of security concerns in the Middle East. For this reason, today, regional actors in the Middle East who have reciprocal interests have generally focused on regional security assemblies in order to maintain their survival. In this regard, one of the security concerns in the Middle East is the crisis in Yemen, which may extend the security of the crisis to other areas. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as an active actor and regional hegemony, has been trying to adopt a protective and security approach to the state-to-nation in Yemen in order to secure its regional security from the outbreak of the crisis in Yemen. Therefore, the focus of the discussion on the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been on issues such as efforts to maintain the axis of resistance, maintain its ideological and regional influence, as well as the geopolitical security of Yemen. At the same time, the main thesis of the current research is that: The positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the crisis in Yemen based on which approach in foreign policy can be analyzed? In order to give a logical answer to this question, the following hypothesis is put forward: The Islamic Republic of Iran has taken a security approach to this crisis, considering the strategic position of Yemen in the regional equations and in order to improve its security factor in the region.

Keywords: Iran, Yemen, security strategy, futures research scenario.

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is a regional anarchy system, often based on realistic rules of power politics. The inherent nature of this regional system has been instrumental in changing the behavior of actors on the security and interests of other members of the Middle East. Given the new regional and regional conditions and the realistic atmosphere governing the relations between the countries of the region, the Saudi military invasions of Yemen as well as the change in the structure of power and identity of that country have caused changes in the geopolitics of the region and the approaches of regional actors.

The crisis has a security and structural nature, and Yemeni political leaders are among the sets that played a role in the bipolar structure of Yemen. By using the political capabilities necessary to play a strategic role, these people managed to maintain their political position in


20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and a change in the structure of the global system. The Yemeni crisis is the cause of inefficient political structures and the lack of a fair distribution of power and resources at the social level and the interference of foreign powers, including Saudi Arabia and the United States.

On the other hand, since the fall of the Pahlavi regime in Iran and the reunification of Yemen, the conflict between the central government and the Houthi tribes has provided grounds for rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the expansion of influence in Yemen. Yemen has become a place for Iran and Saudi Arabia in the past years. In the course of the developments in Yemen, Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken contradictory positions based on their own goals and interests. Iran's support for the Yemeni revolutionaries and then the Ansarale Movement and, on the contrary, the support of Saudi Arabia and some of the members of the Gulf

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Cooperation Council for stabilizing the situation and consolidating the power of the former government's dependents has made the political developments of the country important for two spectrum (Buzan & Little, 2000: 43). Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran, by observing the developments in the Yemeni region, is trying to maintain its influence in the region, or to extend its engagement or regional and international actors, to prevent the escalation of the crisis in

Yemen. It should be noted that the research methodology in this research is analytical-descriptive; a descriptive method is used to explain the processes of Yemen's transformation. The analytical method emphasizes the effectiveness of each of the security components in the Yemeni crisis and the relative management of the crisis by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The type of research is also applicable and the information gathering tool is a library.



Map of Yemen

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

New security studies took place in 1983 at the height of the Cold War. In the same vein, Barry Buzan and colleagues introduced the concept of security, a concept that was conceptual in the field of security, and other innovations of the school are the level of analysis; the level of the 1980s, the traditional approach to "security" Realism has been widely criticized; although security analysis is not global in this way, it tends to focus more on regional analysis (Buzan, 2009: 116).

The level of global analysis more closely relates to the analysis of the performance and policies of the world powers, but at the regional level, the scope of regional domains and trends and powers is greater. Boozan also explains the "regional collection" theory in international relations studies. In his book, *People, States and Panic*, Barry Buzan presents a definition of a regional security suite, which is "a group of governments whose main perceptions and security concerns are so widespread that issues Their national security cannot reasonably be analyzed separately from each other. They see very similar intra-regional similarities, and believe that issues such as the interference of

ethnic, national, religious, religious, and international currents have quickly and easily brought the Middle East into a bloody strife. Buzan's recommendation in this regard is that the Western formula is meaningless and even exacerbated by the crisis in the Middle East. In the perspective of Bari Buzan, the future of the international system is a function of the way of power arrangement at the regional levels, so these are the regions that make up the power system (Collins, 2016: 84).

The Copenhagen School believes that regionalism has been strengthened in comparison to the Cold War era, and in addition, the importance of security assemblies has increased that in the definition of the region, common concerns, history, geography, culture, and most importantly the common identity, memories and fate of the peoples of that region should be considered. From this perspective, common concerns or shared Shiite identities between Iran and Yemen will reflect their shared understanding of regional security. Therefore, it is necessary to provide an adequate understanding of the nature and fate of security to the internal structure of the region and the characteristics of the countries. For Copenhagen scholars, "regional security" is a security system in which the countries in it

have, firstly, similar security concerns; secondly, historically, geographically and culturally, have a fairly similar memories or fate, and its constituent units are in terms of Concerns and the same understanding of threats, in order to secure and maintain themselves, identify the rules and mechanisms that are located in a particular area and suffer from similar security problems, attention, based on the definition, formation units The proponent of the resistance, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, along with Yemen, can be a cluster of logic Are considered as threats against them and their advancement opportunities to a large extent shared a common element in terms of historical, cultural and memories and destiny. From the viewpoint of the scholars of this school, each country is deployed in the form of a regional system network and has a common security issue with its neighboring countries (Buzan& Waever, 2003: 19).

In such a context, the security of any country cannot be analyzed alone in the global or national space, but what the intellect seems to be is to place a country in its regional code, and then its security or insecurity to be analyzed. Boozan acknowledges that security in the Middle East is a mystery. In his view, a subject is a mystery when it comes to tracking it or thinking about it. This suggests that in the Middle East, the friendship of an actor with another actor certainly involves hostility with the other actor, so that in the Middle East one cannot help a friend, without reinforcing his enemy. On this basis, they believe that the Middle East is, by some factors, intrinsically controversial, and a region of conflict and a permanent place of conflict between powers and hostile groups, and this conflict allows other powers, the battlefield Transfer to the area. Hence, the first formula for understanding conflicts and hostile hostilities in the Middle East is that in this adventurous area, every move involves an anti-security reflection (Hosseinpour, Mahdipour & Alishahi, A:2018) In the form of this formula, the reaction of the countries of the region to the strategic and strategic links between Iran and Yemen can be noted. In the following, the main components of the regional security set for the scholars of this approach are considered as follows:

Interdependence of Security

The purpose of security interdependence is that the security changes in each set of units cause a change in the position of other members of the collection. The reason for using the criterion of

"reciprocity" is the emphasis on the impact of security; that is, if one or more units of the security suite are not affected in cycles, then that set is no longer a security suite. In the regional security suite, the governments in that set affect and influence each other. Hence, their security concerns are interdependent. From Bosean's point of view, the security suite exists where a network of security interactions separates a group of countries from others, linking them together, so that the severity of the security interdependence among the members of the collection versus the units Out of set more. In fact, the fears and concerns of competitors are one of the requirements of regional security collections.

Requires At Least Two Effective Actors

According to this criterion, one cannot imagine a security suite without at least two powerful and effective regional actors. This criterion indicates that a number of poor countries from a region cannot form a regional security suite, but its formation is possible with the presence of at least two effective regional powers and several weak states.

Proximity

The third criterion for the existence of a regional security complex is the existence of a geographic proximity between the members of the collection. In security, proximity is important because short-range threats are far easier than long distances. Although the proximity and geographical proximity to form a regional security suite is necessary, however, this alone cannot be considered as an essential feature of the recognition of security assemblies.




Figure1. The main components of the regional security suite

IRAN-YEMEN: PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

The life of Iran-Yemen relations dates back to ancient times, and after the emergence of Islam, a common spiritual foundation emerged that gave this interaction greater depth and depth. In addition, among the factors linking the two countries, the interest and commitment of the family of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) has been a tendency towards the rationality of the Mu'tazilites and the existence of Zaid'yyah's governments throughout the history of Iran and Yemen. But this civilized and historical heritage has not prevented the effectiveness of political considerations in their relations; as during the years of the Pahlavi regime in Iran, we witness tensions and interactions between the two countries. During these years, cold and sometimes cold-weather relations between Iran and Iran were divergent because of the lack of coordination between the two countries. As Iran took part in its military force to defend the kingdom of Oman due to its gendarme's role as a gendarme. Against the Dhofar communists supported by Yemen, thus preventing the Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and the Persian Gulf (Hosseinpour; Mohammad Moradi; Alishahi & Mahdipour, 2019).

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, we are witnessing a shift in the direction of Yemen's foreign policy toward Iran. Of course, it should be noted that North Yemen was one of the first countries to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran on 25 Bahman. But with the onset of the imposed war, North Yemen led by Ali Abdullah Saleh alongside the Persian Gulf and South Yemen led by Ali Nasser Mohammad alongside Iran. On May 22, 1990, two Yemen united, and after that the alliance between Iran and Yemen was tumbling down. But the ups and downs of political relations between the two countries did not prevent the development of cultural relations and their growth. Therefore, after the unification of the two Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yemen signed and implemented various cultural, scientific and educational agreements, starting with the waves of the protest called Islamic Awakening in the Middle East Arab countries and the emission of radiation to Yemen, we see a widespread occurrence in the country, and it seems that the depth and breadth of the crisis, with the design and implementation of the scenario of Saudi invasion by the Saudis, has found more complex dimensions and entered a new phase in the position of the countries of the region

Transnistrian and transnational areas, including the adoption of security positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the sea It has been mentioned; furthermore, we will further analyze its angles (Forouzan & Alishahi, B: 2018).

YEMEN CRISIS: MILITARY CONFLICT SCENARIO

Yemen has become one of the most important security areas in the Middle East over the past few years, and the formation of an internal crisis and foreign invasion has deepened the crisis beyond the Houthi conflict and its rivals and its national borders. The crisis in Yemen stems more from the fragility and, ultimately, the bankruptcy of the state in this country. However, the first thing that sparked the emergence of the crisis in Yemen was that a man in Jazan, south of Saudi Arabia, was burning self-immolation and invitations to hold anti-government demonstrations appeared on Face book pages. However, these invitations never gave rise to mass demonstrations. But after the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and the start of two major uprisings in Bahrain and Libya, the Saudis invite wider publicity to hold the Day of Fear on March 11th. The government began to crush the uprising by accusing foreign agents (in their opinion, Iran!) of plotting and accusing the Shiites of Saudi Arabia of working with foreigners against national unity. Indeed, the Saudis have always been trying to justify the suppression of protesters in dealing with domestic protests and crises by adopting sectarian discourse. It was therefore natural for the Saudis to crack down on the financial power and loyalty purchasing power, as in the past, by adopting sectarian discourse. After the repression and distribution of resources among the people (bribing) and overcoming the internal crisis, the Saudis' eyes turned out to be outside the country (Al Zandani, 2015).

The beginning of the widespread Yemeni crisis that accompanied the fall of Mubarak in Egypt raises widespread concerns in Riyadh. The Saudis, who had just lost their largest Middle Eastern allies, faced another danger in southern Yemen, and the risk of a rush to the transformation. In addition, they faced a crisis of popular uprisings in Oman, Jordan, and in particular Bahrain. This delayed the Riyadh movement towards the Yemeni crisis, but after overcoming the internal protests and the crisis in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia again launched a Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to resolve the widespread crisis in Yemen. It seems that, given


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the impossibility of a healthy survival in power, the Saudis are seeking to advance a scenario in Yemen, based on which their allies in Yemen have come to power and control the transformations in this way (Serberov, 2018: 9).

In order to meet these objectives, the Saudi Army entered the Yemeni territory in 2009 in the province of Sa'ada, and several other provinces were also involved in the war. In order to justify this move, Saudi Arabia claimed that its military had entered the territory of Yemen to defend itself, and the Houthis had attacked a checkpoint in Saudi Arabia and killed a Saudi soldier. So, after decades of numerous disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, it was the first time that the Saudi army occupied the land and provided the country with a military invasion to provide its own interests and interests. Saudi Arabia officially launched an intervention in Yemen's internal power and military invasion in March 2015, and Saudi fighters repeatedly hit Yemen's soil repeatedly (Popp, 2015: 1).

Saudi Arabia began its air campaign against Ansarullah in Yemen, claiming support for President Mansour Hadi. Qatar, Kuwait, Emirates and Bahrain, formed Saudi allies and countries like Sudan, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, in the operation, which Saudi Arabia called the

"attack of decisiveness" during the first invasion of Yemen in the first month of the invasion of Yemen. In the delivery of military weapons, Riyadh collaborated. Saudi Arabia was seeking to unite other countries such as Pakistan as one of its allies in a military invasion of Yemen. Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to deny military intervention in Yemen's territorial integrity, announced that the military action of the coalition of Arab-led countries has been carried out in response to a request from the legitimate President of Yemen. America's support for Saudi Arabia and the promise of arms support to this coalition, facilitated the legitimacy that Saudi Arabia sought in the international arena. In addition, the consensus of the Arab states on the Security Council and their desire to boycott the weapons of the Ansarullah movement in Yemen was another victory over the international legitimacy of Riyadh military invasions. It is expected that the Saudis would end up following the clashes in northern Yemen after the country's territorial or ethnic divisions, since in this case, the Saudis could have two completely independent or federal governments in their neighborhood, consisting of the Sunni population Saudi and Shia supporters are involved in religious wars (Feierstein, 2019: 16).



Yemen Crisis Situation Report

THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF YEMEN IN THE SECURITY EQUATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Yemen has always been of strategic importance to the Islamic Republic of Iran to the extent that Iran assesses Yemen's developments as an Islamic awakening to reduce the influence of the West in the region. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran is pursuing Saudi Arabia's efforts to manage

the developments in Yemen and to power their affiliated streams, such as Takfiri terrorist attacks, with particular sensitivity, and calls for the role of all religious and political movements to be resolved and the peaceful season is a crisis in this country. With these interpretations, the most important goals that the Islamic Republic of Iran is pursuing beyond the end of the crisis are as follows, which will be detailed in the explanation and explanation of each of them.

To Maintain the Security of the Yemeni Shiite Religious Position and the Resistance Axis

The spread of the Shiite wave of protests and the rise of Shiites in the Arab countries of the Middle East after the formation of Islamic awakening by Shiites living in Saudi Arabia created a concern among Saudi leaders that Shiites may be exposed as government agents and seek to achieve rights. And their lost political-political liberties challenge the government because Shiites in Saudi Arabia have always been subjected to pressure and have not been deprived of their minimum legal rights; hence the following is how Saudi Arabia treats Shiites living in Yemen as a The main factor influencing the attack on Yemen and security positions We will pay tribute to the Shiites (Philips, 2011: 91-92). One of the most important religious groups in Yemen is the Al-Hawthis, which are also known as the Ansarullah movement. In 2000, they were a local protest movement that objected to the political and social discrimination against Zionist Shiites in Yemen, which comprised 45-35 percent of the country's population. Between 2010 and 2004, the movement turned into a radical and political movement during a number of wars with the central government (Popp, 2015: 2). The Houthi movement, like the al-Qaeda group, is a radical and militant group, and has carried out radical activities even on the borders of Saudi Arabia. This group has created a political challenge for Yemen, because it has increased the role of al-Qaeda and even merged its southern branch with al-Qaeda by carrying out terrorist activities (Day, 2010: 1). Today, Yemen is also divided between the Houthi movement that has its north and the anti-Houthis, the Western alliance and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Louise, 2015: 1).

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has always pursued a policy of supporting Sunni religious groups that can not easily resist Shiite elements such as Zaidi (Burke, 2012: 10). In other words, Saudi Arabia supports Salafist fundamentalists on the Yemeni soil, which is very important in the emergence of the Houthi movement (Popp, 2015: 2). In recent decades, an ideological stream called Zaidia, which is not unique to Yemen, was created in opposition to ideology and hobbis in southern Arabia. Hence, Saudi radical Salafists in Yemen are in the wake of the destruction of the Shiite movement called Zaidi (Salisbury, 2015: 3-4).

Further analysis by the experts suggests that Saudi Arabia cannot push the presence of

Shiites at its borders, as a minority of Shiites in the seven Imams living in the Najran area bordered with Yemen. Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia cannot, in principle, tolerate Shi'ite thought; so powerful Wahhabi lobbies have come into the Saudi government's structure to persuade Sanaa's government to attack Shiites. According to credible reports, in addition to Saudi Arabia willing to pay the costs of the war, it also participates in military operations and equipment belonging to the Saudi army has been discovered by Yemeni fighters because, from the viewpoint of the Saudis, the power of the Shiite groups In Yemen, and the decline of the role of Sunni groups in the political structure, this created the perception of Saudi leaders that Yemen is weakening the link with the Arab world. Also, the creation of a Shiite-dominated state close to Iran has created the notion for Saudi leaders that this has created areas for regional equilibrium to the detriment of Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis believe that Iran is using the Shiite coalition in Yemen and the movement Hawthisi support (Burke, 2015).

The presence of Zaidi Shiites within the Yemeni community, which accounts for roughly one-third of the population of the country's 25 million people, is one of the most strategic opportunities for the national interests of Iran, as recent developments suggest that the position The group, which is the largest minority in Yemen, will become more prominent in future political equations in the country. For this reason, the participation and presence of Zaidi in the Yemeni political structure can change the orientation of Yemen's foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and ultimately lead to a strategic relationship. Moreover, most of the Yemeni citizens belong to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the general support of Ansarullah and Shiite Houthi movements has also added to their interest in Iran, although Tehran's support has always been a spiritual aspect. For example, before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, there was no hideaway for the Shiites in Yemen, but in recent years, a number of Hosseiniyah have been built in different parts of Yemen and expanded Shiites, mosques, and special places. Hence, a group visit on behalf of the Yemeni government to Iran, including some deputies of ministries and government institutions in Tehran headed by Saleh al-Salad, head of the Ansarullah political council, suggests the continuation of the same trend.

On the other hand, it can be inferred that the repression of the Yemeni Shi'a from both the

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domestic opposition groups and their killing by Saudi Arabia's invasion of Yemen could lead to serious ideological and geopolitical threats for the Islamic Republic of Iran, because if Iran is a Shiite Yemen, in fact, will face a serious geopolitical vacuum that could be a serious blow to the core of the resistance for the Islamic

Republic of Iran; therefore, the existence of a Shiite and lasting state in Yemen is in line with Iran's full strategic goals Yemeni card, leaves the winners in Iran for Hawaii Protection of the axis of resistance and the Shia. So Iran is looking to use it.



Figure 2. The charts of different countries in the Yemeni crisis are divided into three spectrum of opponents, supporters and contributors (Alishahi; Forouzan & Masoudnia, 2017: 55)


Security of the Ideological Influence of Iran in the Region

With the advent of the Islamic awakening wave, the revolutionary uprising of the Yemeni Shiites, and the pursuit of Ayatollah Khomeini's school and the irreproachable movement of the Islamic Revolution, Iran as a pioneer of the Islamic world as a model for its revolutionaries. So, in Sana'a, the capital of this country is decorated with banners and posters confirming Hezbollah and images of Imam Khomeini, accompanied by slogans such as "Death to America, Death to Israel, Damnation to Jews and victory of Islam"; therefore, this issue can bring Iran superiority in the regional equations. On the other hand, Shiite domination of Yemen has led Saudi Arabia to be politically sidelined, because it will have to accept the new reality of the country. So the political geopolitical change paved the way for the Iranian ally to consolidate its influence in Yemen and have leaflets to influence the region.

It should also mention the widespread spiritual influence of Iran among Zaidi Shiites, in particular the Houthi Movement, which has raised concerns in Saudi Arabia and the United States. The influence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on the Yemeni Shiites, in particular the Houthi movement, is deep and emphasizes the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, such as the struggle against Zionism and arrogance. On the other hand, it is part of the Islamic Republic of Iran's approach to the Yemeni crisis in support

of popular movements and revolutions in the country (Redaelli, 2008: 155). Accordingly, Iran wants to expand its political influence to pursue its goals through soft power with minimal investment, since in general, most Hawthitis tend to have ties to Iran.

Finally, the ideological and active role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Yemeni crisis creates the necessary grounds for the functioning of the country's secretive identity. Therefore, Yemen should be considered as one of the countries that, due to the existence of shared religious and beliefs with the Islamic Republic of Iran, its historical and cultural ties, as well as the geopolitics of Islamic awakening, are of significant importance for maintaining Iran's influence in Iran. Region and the continuation of the values of the Islamic Revolution. On the other hand, the only effective axis to counter the regional order created by the United States is the "Islamic Resistance" axis, and this statement has also been repeatedly emphasized by the authorities in Iran and Yemen. More importantly, the concern raised by the existence of a "common enemy" provided the proximity of the two sides, especially in terms of security and defense. The two countries' cooperation can be seen as an effective and effective instrument for the creation and development of deterrence against Saudi Arabian expansionism and the expansion of the ideological influence in the Gulf region and the Oman Sea (Lackner, 2018: 257-258).



Preserving Iran's Relative Security

The growing expansion of Saudi Arabia is among the common security threats facing both Iran and Yemen, which has also paved the way for increased cooperation between the two countries. In addition, the Strategic Alliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yemen can be used to counter the threat posed by Israel's influence in the region and US hegemony. In this regard, one of the common tasks of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yemen to counteract the influence of intervening actors and also the expansion of regional cooperation in the Middle East can be emphasized on the establishment of an indigenous regional security structure (Chubin, 2012: 3) Therefore, from the point of view of Iranian statesmen, insecurity in the region means insecurity for Iran and, conversely, insecurity for Iran means insecurity for the region. It is turning to such an importance and place that can be considered as an effective role for Iran in the regional level, including the Yemeni crisis, as one of the most likely scenarios in the process of security and security of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the same vein, the former deputy foreign minister of Iran stated that "we consider Yemen's security as the security of the region and Iran," he said. "We will not allow others to play our common regional security with adventure actions. He also said about the developments in Yemen, stating that the silence of some countries against the continuation of Saudi aggression in Yemen and the continued human siege of the oppressed people of the country is unacceptable," he stated. "Saudi concentration on the war on Yemen is merely a contribution to the strengthening of the Zionist regime and Terrorist groups; Tehran supports a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue in a place agreed upon by all the domestic groups and denies any foreign intervention in this country

and will not allow others to secure the common area with actions Adventurous to play and the time for these actions is over and everyone should be safe Think about the role of a constructive role "(Nunlist,2015: 3).

Maintaining the Geostrategic Position of the Bab Almandeb Strait for Iran

Yemen has always played a key role in foreign policy and in the strategic calculations of the officials and politicians of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, the geopolitics of Yemen, and in particular the special position of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, which crosses the route of oil shipment (Milani, 2015: 1), has created a lot of security concerns for Iran, as a large percentage of Iranian tanker vessels crossing the Suez Canal They also cross the Strait of Bab Al Hamdb. According to the latest statistics, 25,000 ships and tankers are transported annually from the Strait, with an average of 3.3 million barrels of oil per day being exported to world markets, which accounts for 30 percent of the world's oil. And the share of Iranian tanker ships is significant (Ryan, 2015: 1).

Also, the position of the expansion of the influence of the Ansarullah and Shi'a'an al-Houthi movements in Yemen and further dominance over the strategic strait of Bhalbamand, as one of the most important routes for the transfer of energy in the world and the vital vessel of the Suez Canal, along with the domination of the harbor of al-Hadidah, can strengthen the sovereignty of the regional allies of Iran. And seawater transport from the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, which is an alarming landscape for regional and transatlantic sides that are concerned about Iran's growing influence in the region. From this angle, a calm Yemen, in line with the Islamic Republic of Iran, can play a significant role in securing the security of Iranian oil ships.

Any insecurity and instability in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait through the control of takfiri and terrorist groups could have devastating consequences on the safety of the oil tankers of the Islamic Republic of Iran. By contrast, the emergence of a government in alignment with Iran in Yemen and its role as a component of the resistance can jeopardize Israel's security, as part of this policy through the domination of the Bab-el-Mandeb is being realized, which is of particular importance to Iran (Marwah&Clark, 2018: 15).

IRAN AND YEMEN'S SECURITY CRISIS: FUTURE SCENARIOS

Following the political developments in Yemen in 2011 and the ensuing Saudi airborne invasion of Iraq, Yemen has become an important player in the political and security developments in the Middle East. In this regard, many analyzes have been made on this crisis, and the importance of the status and level of effective actors in the future of Yemeni political developments has become more important. This is important because, after the power vacuum created by the internal crisis in Yemen (after 2011), in practice, movements have emerged in the political power of the country, whose removal from the realm of politics and the governance of the Yemeni state seems somewhat impossible. Regarding this, considering the future developments of Yemen and its relationship with the regional security of the Islamic Republic of Iran, four scenarios can be explored, which will be briefly discussed below.

The Scenario of Foreign Intervention and Yemen's Fragmentation

At the start of the first phase of the Houthi protests, the Saudi government threatened to suppress the revolutionaries if necessary through military intervention. The widespread occurrence of the Hawthorids revolution made it possible for Saudi Arabia to enter Yemen again. In fact, at the time of Ali Abdullah Saleh's dictatorship, the Yemeni government launched four wars against the Houthis, and in all of them, Saudi Arabia had the upper hand in a military strike against Yemen. At the same time, Yemen's Shiite threats once again have aggravated the possibility of Saudi Arabia and other major foreign powers to enter the country. The most important reason for Saudi officials and foreign powers to do this is to fear the power of the Yemeni Shiites and the spread of this to their eastern provinces, because Shiites in eastern Arabia during the past few years held a rally to

alarm Al-Saud's tyranny have sounded. The entry of large foreign powers such as the United States, Britain and Germany into humanitarian pretexts will make these powers, by leveraging their military assets and their logistical support to the Saudis, intensify the scope of the crisis in Yemen and increase the complexity of the dimensions This has contributed to the Yemeni deconstruction scenario among the opposition groups of the state and the Shiites in this country. The occurrence of this scenario creates a new wave of threats against the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Considering the gravity of regional imbalances to the benefit of Iran, the possibility of a rival rival struggle for new crises and efforts to weaken the regional coalition, known as the resistance axis, is predictable.

Scenario of Moving Internal Groups towards Creation of State-Nation by Ansarullah

One of Yemen's progressive scenarios is planning to establish a state. One of the ways in which this scenario is based on Ansarullah's movement is the Declaration of the Order or the Constitution issued in February (2013). According to this declaration, the committee of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of Yemen was formed, its chairmanship was determined and the legislature was dissolved. Based on this scenario, Ansarullah would have to form a government, appoint the president and run the elections. But on the path to this scenario, there are many barriers to domestic and transnational levels. The realization of this scenario will increase the participation and presence of Zaidi in the political structure of Yemen and modify the former view of Yemen's foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and, ultimately, moderate. In addition, most of the Yemeni citizens are interested in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and public support for the Ansarullah and Shi'a'an al-Houthi movements also implies the issuance of the Islamic revolution to this geopolitical area, although Tehran's support has always been a spiritual aspect.

Scenario for the Peaceful Resolution of the Yemeni Crisis and the Consolidation of Power

Another scenario of the Yemeni crisis is the peaceful settlement of the disputes between the crisis-struck groups and the Sana'a government, as well as the end of the Saudi invasion by the mediation of regional powers such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. If the Yemeni authorities meet the demands of the people, the al-Hawthis claims that the sit-in and the strike will end and any confrontation between the parties to the

conflict will be resolved. The realization of this requires that the type of look at the Hawthys be changed as the most effective group in the crisis and share the political process according to their population. The Yemeni president, with the dismissal of the government, made the first move in this direction, but the Houthis interpreted this as an attempt to circumvent the demands of the people, but on the other hand, it should be emphasized that Saudi Arabia has always tried to influence the Yemeni tribes keep their presence in Yemen. Its policies towards its southern neighbor have always been dominated by color. Objectives of achieving the Indian Ocean through the fragmentation of parts of southern Yemen, including Hadramaut and its addition to Saudi Arabia, also illustrate the kind of al-Saud's view of the territorial integrity of Yemen. Hence, it can be concluded that ending the hostility of the Saudis depends on the efforts and pressure of the powers of the region, such as Iran, Russia, and the set of member states that form the axis of resistance to the coalition of Saudi Arabia.

Thus, the consolidation of the power of the Yemeni government leads to the deterioration of Saudi Arabia's position and role in the regional dimension and the change in the general attitude of the Yemeni people towards the conservative and supportive policies of Al Saud and its regional and transnational allies, With the arrival of groups outside the former pyramid, power, including Ansarullah, will be strengthened. Indeed, the realization of this scenario is the consolidation of the Yemeni government and the consolidation of the Yemeni government for the regional interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and with the proper utilization of these conditions, it is hoped that Tehran's position in

Tehran's Middle East and North Africa could be strengthened, Existing scenarios can be realized in the long term.

The Scenario of the Continuation of the Destabilizing Process and the Formation of a New Government

The final scenario is that the process of unrest and instability as well as the military conflict of the Saudi alliance will continue and the current government in Yemen will collapse and deny the entry of Shiite Ansarullah into the executive power, but as an adversary In the channels of power, as it was already done by Ansarullah in the course of the developments in Yemen, through the appointment of two advisers to the incumbent president, Saleh and Sesmaat. Following this scenario will reduce Ansarullah's position to the point of adversity and reduce the impact of Yemen's decision-making processes. However, this scenario does not seem to work well in the long run and in the medium term.

More importantly, the realization of this scenario is causing a security vacuum in the environment around Iran, because the rise of the Arab world, with the collapse of authoritarian political regimes in some countries of the region, creates a level of instability and emptiness in the region, and new leaders are also set to stabilize And the consolidation of the new political system requires a transition period. Therefore, any continuity of instability caused by the escalation of sectarian and tribal tensions, the possibility of civil war in the crisis countries and the use of Salafist extremist groups, especially ISIS, from the power vacuum in the periphery of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be national security Affect regional actors.




Figure3. Iran and Yemen's security crisis: future scenarios

CONCLUSION

What can be cited as the outcome of this study is that in the view of the Copenhagen School, governments are seeking to achieve levels of strength to ensure their regional security. Based on this, since the beginning of the uprisings and popular uprisings, especially the crisis in Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the framework of the principles of its independent foreign policy and as an active actor in the field of international relations and regional affairs, has tried to Preventing the deepening of the crisis in Yemen and, with its logistical support in the region, prevented the government from falling, especially the killing of innocent people and Shiites in the country. From this perspective, Iran's contribution to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Yemen is in fact an attempt to safeguard Iran's national and regional interests. The preservation of Yemen is in fact helping to preserve Iran's survival; although the Islamic Republic of Iran has focused on the geopolitical axis of resistance in the area of regional conflicts (including Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon), but the removal of new security challenges and Using the opportunities provided requires the Islamic Republic of Iran to have an active and effective presence in the regional developments and the Yemen crisis. Clearly, in light of the realization of the peaceful resolution of the Yemeni crisis and the consolidation of power in this country, we can expect the relative security of Iran to increase, because preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Yemen helps to preserve the national and regional interests of Iran.

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