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ABSTRACT

The study of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) uncovered the association of IGR functionality with political environment and looks at factors such as political patronage and instability as impacting on the service delivery environment (Tsako, 2018). This paper extends on these current findings and introduce the concept of factionalism as another aspect that affects service delivery. Further consideration is at how service delivery is affected by political instability, patronage and factionalism. A qualitative study was conducted in KZN district municipalities, which highlighted the impact that political instability and patronage has in achieving the objectives of IGR – that of ensuring cooperation on the delivery of services to the community. This articles' approach is exploratory and further describes the effect of these factors on the municipal environment, generally. Conclusions are drawn on four aspects, that whilst political environment is often perceived to be outside of management's control, making it difficult to define, predict, and align with objectives, political instability is characterised by intra-political fightings, that have a negative impact on service delivery. It could be summed up that in their efforts to secure political careers, people would seek support from party colleagues and patronage promises and this building minimum winning coalition inside parties – leading to predictable patterns of factionalism and this demonstrates linkages between factionalism and political patronage. The repercussions are that, all those who were in coalition to support would expect to be rewarded whether with senior positions or tenders. The association of political patronage with factionalism cannot be over-emphasised, as this results in killings, poor service delivery, burning of tyres and government buildings and barricaded roads. Recommendations highlights that the local government system of philosophy should depart from what matters the most – the objects of local government and be imparted by the role of those who are in leadership positions, whether it support or counter the required beliefs. Whilst political patronage in a form of cadre deployment is not discouraged, the fundamental issue - that of political education, could serve as an instrument to instil the required values, attitudes and behaviours and leading to improved service delivery amongst cadres (both political and administrative), however provision of the legislation should be strictly adhered to.

Key words: Political patronage, Political instability, Factionalism, intra-party politics.

INTRODUCTION

A study conducted by Mukwedeya (2016) regarded South Africa municipalities as beinga contested terrain. The study focuses on the everyday operation of the African National Congress (ANC) as a dominant party in postapartheid South Africa. It examines the scope of intraparty politics, particularly the trajectory of factionalism in ANC local structures after 1994. Divisions within (and between) political parties are said to be overflowing into the life of municipalities, rendering some of them dysfunctional. Factionalism, patronage politics, corruption, maladministration, cadre deployment, political interference and a conflation of the party and the state have all contributed to the erosion of democratic, accountable and effective local government in some municipalities, while it has hindered service delivery provision in others.

The study on IGR (Tsako, 2018) argues that factionalism increasingly is characterised by patronage as competing groups within the party sought to ring-fence their political power and the opportunities for upward mobility provided by the state. This was also compounded by deepening neoliberalism whose consequences of unemployment, poverty and inequality especially at the local level led to increased dependence on the

local state and the development of factionalism based on patronage politics

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

The Constitution of Republic of South Africa (1996) prescribes in section 152 the objects of local government as 1) to provide a democratic and accountable government for local communities; 2) provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 3) to ensure promotion of social and economic development; 4) to ensure safe and healthy environment; 5) to encourage involvement of communities and community organisations that matters in local government and that the municipalities should strive within their financial and administrative capacity to achieve these objects

Apart from that, the Municipal Systems Act (2000) is part of a series of legislation which aims to empower local government to fulfil its Constitutional objects. In 1998 the Republic of South Africa government issued Local Government White Paper, which outlined a policy framework for local government. Later that year government passed the Municipal Demarcation Act, which enabled the re-demarca-tion of municipal boundaries; and the Municipal Structures Act, which defined the structures of local government. The Municipal Systems Act complement these pieces of legislation, by regulating key municipal organisational, planning, participatory and service delivery systems. National government has also promulgated the Municipal Financial Management Act (2003), which regulates municipal financial matters. Together, these pieces of legislation provide a framework for a democratic, accountable and developmental local government system, as envisaged by the Constitution. However, of outmost importance is the manner in which those in positions of power in local government sphere utilise the indicated legislation to ensure such democratic, accountable and developmental local government and to provide services that meets the requirements of the local community.

The Municipal Structures Act (1998) defines a municipality as being made up of the structures, political office bearers and administration of the municipality; a geographic area; and the community of the municipality. In other words, a municipality consists of a municipal institution (political and administrative structures), and the people who live in the local area. Whilst, the municipal institution is an organ of state, and has a separate legal personality, the local community cannot be held liable for the actions of the municipal institution. Or putting this differently, whilst the municipality consists of municipal institutions (political and administrative), the people who live in the local areas cannot be held accountable for service delivery due to different roles and responsibilities. The objects of local government as stated in the RSA Constitution serves as the basis for the determination of roles and responsibilities/ powers and functions of municipalities.

The Municipal Systems Act (2000) obliges municipal councils to consult the local community about municipal services. Communities should have a say in the way in which services are delivered (for example, by the municipal administration or through a service agreement); the level of services (for example, VIP latrines or waterborne sanitation); the quality of services (for example, how quickly the municipality processes planning applications); and the range of services which are provided (for example, whether the municipal council should provide recycling facilities).

Municipalities must fulfil these duties as far as possible, taking into account the budget and capacity they have available. For example, a municipality with a small budget may not be able to spend lot of money on media campaigns to promote environmental issues. However, that municipality could still fulfil their duty by ensuring that the way they deliver services is environmentally friendly.

The discharge of municipal powers and functions and specifically service delivery, have been seen by some scholars as being affected by political instability (Beresford (2015); Jakkie & Ciara (2016) political patronage (Kgatle,2016; Blok 1969; Van Eck 2013; Mamogale, 2015)and factionalism (Rose (1964); Hine (1982); Ceron (2014). Therefore, this article demonstrates a critical concern of how these factors (political instability, patronage and factionalism) in a municipal environment affect service delivery.

THE AIM

The aim of this paper is to create an understanding of the effects of political environment on the service delivery and with a specific focus on political instability, patronage and factionalism. Issues of political instability and patronage as highlighted in (Tsako, 2018) and the effect in achieving the Intergovernmental Relations objective – that of cooperation on the delivery of services to the community, provided the basis for more exploration of this topic.

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

In the recent past (2008-2013), the African National Congress (ANC) led government in South Africa has experienced an outcry from different communities around the country, concerning lack of provision of services. These conditions to a certain extent led to the outbreak. of what became known as the service delivery protests in South Africa. The basic services which were needed included the following: access to clean water: provision of sanitation: and the redress of housing backlogs. Raj (2014) undertook a study to investigate the theories around the origins of the service delivery protests and their socio-political impact on such communities. The study argues that the ability by the government to deliver services, particularly to those residents in the poor areas, is its basic function as part of social programmes in response to people's needs. Consequently, the study contends that the purported failure to respond to such needs, contributes to service delivery protests. Furthermore, it argues that the slow pace of providing services to the poor in South Africa has created socio-political problems. Examining the above arguments in the context of political transition, the study looks at different debates and political strategies, and the ways in which they draw on and shape socio-political discourses of power and rights. It concludes by indicating that meaningful address of service delivery protests by government requires a combined strategy with those affected.

Whilst political environment is defined in several forms, the approach of this article took into cognisance the elaboration by Raj (2014) where he regarded political environment as basically the system of politics and government in a country. It governs a complete set of rules, regulations, institutions, and attitudes. The main differentiator of political systems is each system's philosophy (viewpoint, attitude, beliefs) on the rights of the individual and the group as well as the role of government. Each political system's philosophy impacts the policies that govern the local economy and business environment. Talking of local government sphere, it is important to note that the local government system philosophy should depart from what matters the most - the objects of local government and imparted by the role of those who are in leadership positions, whether it support or counter the required beliefs.

Notwithstanding the above, the post-1994 democratic developmental South African state opted for a strong local government system which has been constitutionalised, in terms of Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The reviews of political trends and developments by Reddy (2016) highlighted some interesting scenarios as indicated below. It is Reddy's view point that politicisation of the local bureaucracy is inevitable as the ruling party seeks to ensure that the executive leadership of municipalities shared the same political ideology and vision to facilitate local development. This raises the question, where does politicisation commence and end, and what is the ideal local political interface for efficient and effective service delivery and, more importantly, to ensure good governance? These questions have to take cognisance of the fact that South Africa is a 'struggle democracy' and development has to take place in historically disadvantaged areas, where services have been poor or non-existent. The historically advantaged areas have to also be maintained and upgraded, as they are key to financial sustainability of the municipalities. The increasing service delivery protests is a matter for concern, if one has to take cognisance of the popular adage highlighted in official literature, 'if local government fails, South Africa fails'. Given that the struggles for a democratic South Africa were fought at the grassroots level, this has to translate to an improved quality of life for local communities. Consequently, sound political management is key to enhanced municipal service delivery and ultimately good local governance (Reddy, 2016)

Contrary to this, not only that the political environment poses direct risks to firms, but politics is also component of other external risks. Ibeto (2011) posit that regulatory changes have the potential to promote or inhibit market competition, social risks often have political bases and responses, and political mismanagement can turn natural or human-made events into catastrophes. Moreover, Auster and Choo (1993) painted another picture in that, the political environment is often perceived to be outside of management's control, making it difficult to define, predict, and align with objectives. Given the complexity of these issues, it is no wonder that corporations often fail to address issues of political environment in a systematic way (Auster & Choo, 1993).

Secondly, the political instability and mood in a country affect the actions a government will take and actions that may have an important impact on the viability of doing business in the country. A political movement may change prevailing attitudes toward foreign corporations and result in new regulations (Auster & Choo, 1993).

The number of political parties also influence the level of political stability. A one-party regime does not exist outside the communist country. Most countries have a number of large and small political parties representing different views and value systems of their population. In a singleparty-dominant country, government policies tend to be stable and predictable over time.

Political issues can influence the delivery of services and other goals, such as environmental sustainability, within municipalities. However, the influence of political factors on the institutionalization of environmental issues within municipalities has not been examined. Pasquini and Shearing (2014) investigated these issues using a case study of a South African municipality that has made considerable progress in institutionalizing environmental issues (particularly climate change related) in the last decade, despite a change in political leadership. The presence of the following factors promoted the institutionalization of environmental governance: (a) political champions; (b) networks between the municipality and other organizations and dense networks within the municipality; and (c) benefits for the municipality from environmental actions. Political issues can enable the process of institutionalization (e.g., by stimulating innovation through political party competition) and also hinder it through political instability (which disrupts patterns in champions and networks) and clientelism (which can cause environmental projects to be discontinued).

Phillip (2016) examined political education in the context of the notion of good governance, in order to situate certain aspects related to experienced social reality associated with practical public service protests, maladministration, corruption and fraud (unethical conduct). The author concluded that, there is no insinuation that all challenges and problems of local communities in South Africa derive from the dearth of political education. But note was further made that good governance is associated with the governing party's disciplined knowledge and understanding of the societal values of responsiveness, accountability, professionalism and ethical conduct. The author acknowledges that political deployment of cadres, based on loyalty and patronage alone, reflects adversely on governing party discipline, which is itself a function of political education. The political deployment of cadres has evidently been interconnected to laxity in service delivery as a result of unused funds, lack of capacity, improper planning and absence of community participation. The recommendation was pointed to a need for critical rethinking of cadre deployment, which could be configured for good governance through political education that instils governing party discipline (Phillip, 2016).

In the analysis of the above, Phillip (2016) doesn't discourage cadre deployment, however the author suggests a fundamental issue of political education, that could serve as an instrument to instil the required values, attitudes and behaviours – leading to improved service delivery.

FACTIONALISM – HOW DOES IT AFFECTS SERVICE DELIVERY

A fairly neutral explanation is offered by *Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1996: 359) which supplies two meanings for the word 'faction':

"A group or combination acting together within and usually against the larger body (as in a state, political party, or church); OR

Dissension within a group (Latin *factio* 'act of making, faction', from *facere* 'to make, do'''.

The above-mentioned definition of faction does not relate to the structures and functions of intra-party groupings. Well-known attempts to differentiate between different types of intraparty groups have been presented by Rose (1964) and Hine (1982). Both see factions as an expression of deeply-rooted or institutionalized differentiation within parties. In comparison, factions are characterized by a higher degree of organization, a shared identity and a binding agreement on common goals. Furthermore, Hine (1982) argues that factions are disciplined groups with a solid organization who are conscious of their own existence and possess some stable personnel. This author further argued that the general characteristics of a party system can also affect the formation of factions. Both a high degree of polarization between parties and a low number of competing parties in a given party system have been said to increase the

available room for intra-party conflict about ideological issues.

Accordingly, the term 'factionalism' gives rise to different interpretations, ranging from a neutral assessment of different power blocks within a party or organisation to a value-laden interpretation that associates factions with patronage, self-interest and often self-enrichment (Isandla Institute 2011). Because you agree to associate yourself with a certain faction, some benefits might be derived. Local government environment in South Africa gained some dominance of patronage especially cadre deployment as a results of association with certain faction.

In a recent news publication (January, 2019), factionalism and patronage has been viewed by the current President of South Africa as having diminished ANC's ability to lead transformation process. The article below which was extracted from News24.com reflects on this view and demonstrate the RSA President statement of 12 January 2019.

Factionalism and patronage have diminished ANC's ability to lead transformation process (News24.com 12 January 2019)



ANC PRESIDENT CYRIL RAMAPHOSA (JANUARY, 2019)

"Factionalism and patronage have diminished the ability of the ANC to lead the process of trans-formation and fulfil its mandate to the people"

The President of RSA was delivering the party's election manifesto at the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban. He further reiterated that;

"As the ANC, we admit our shortcomings, we accept the criticism of the people and we are hard at work to correct our mistakes," he said to thousands of ANC supporters who filled up the stadium.

Whilst the president acknowledged the view that the last 25 years have demonstrated the "enormity and complexity" of the task of redressing the injustices of the past and advancing fundamental change. "However, he also highlighted the fact that the last 25 years have also shown the great power of a nation working as one to achieve a common goal. The last 25 years have shown the South African people to be resourceful, resilient and determined," he said

As this is a contentious issue, Benton's earlier comments on this issue referred to a gametheoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. The author argued that, ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the support of party colleagues with patronage promises and policy appeals. In Latin America, where state resources dominate policy goods when building support, maximizing patronage requires politicians to build minimum-winning coalitions inside parties, leading to predictable patterns of factionalism. The model also shows how the effect of state largesse on factional disputes is moderated in some contexts, particularly where

the relative strength of politicians is weak. Weak politicians prefer to cooperate, even if this means reduced private rewards (Benton, 2007). From this, it could be summed up that, in their efforts to secure political careers, people would speak in support of party colleagues and patronage promises and this building minimum winning coalition within parties and leading to predictable patterns of factualism. This demonstrates the linkages between political patronage and factionalism.

Aleyomi (2013) in his study of intraparty politics observed that the parochial idea of the party stalwarts in the People Democratic Party (Zimbabwe) is highly defective. The study then maintains that there should be transparency in party financial administration and the imposition of candidates into any elective position should be abolished, among other ways. It then concludes that unless intra-party democracy is embraced solution to intra-party conflicts and total political violence in Nigeria will be a mirage.

Another study by Ceron (2014) reveals the effects of inter-factional conflicts and government formation and with specific focus on how factional conflict and intra-party organization affect a party's likelihood of being involved in a ruling coalition. The study focus on Italian parties (between 1946 and 2013) and estimating their internal heterogeneity through quantitative text analysis of policy documents presented by factions during party congresses. The impact of inter-factional conflict has been investigated in interaction with intra-party rules showing that when the party leader is autonomous and can rely on powerful whipping resources to impose discipline, the party will credibly sticks to the coalition agreement, thereby reducing the negative effect of factional heterogeneity in coalition bargaining.

The following articles demonstrate the role of factionalism on governance and the manner in which factionalism affects service delivery and thus leading to protests.

Table1. ANC factionalism in North West – Kagisano Molopo Local municipality (www.politicsweb.gov.za – 9 October 2018)

ANC's factionalism destroying governance in North West – Joe McGluwa: Kagisano Molopo Local					
MunicipalityJoe McGluwa 09 October 2018					
The ongoing factional battles in the failing ANC at Kagkisano Molopo Local Municipality is destroying the					
last semblance of governance in the North West Province and is bringing the already erratic delivery of basic					
service delivery to a complete halt.					
Recent reports indicate that the Kagisano-Molopo Local Municipality will be taking the North West Provincial					
Government (NWPG) to court for not following procedures when placing the municipality under Section 139					
(1b) and Section 137 MFMA administration interventions.					
This is equivalent to an ANC local government taking the ANC provincial government to court and the DA is					
of the strong view that this is directly related to the factional battles playing out within the ANC. And once					
again it is ordinary people who are negatively affected by poor service delivery.					
The ripple effects of the failing ANC's factionalism have spread from provincial level down to local					
municipalities leaving residents without service delivery and creating an environment where corruption flourishes.					
Areas such as Ventersdorp, Kgetlengrivier, Tswaing and many others have been continuously affected by					
service delivery protests. Many areas do not have proper infrastructure, roads are dilapidated and filled with					
potholes, communities spend weeks without access to clean and sustained water supply					
In Tswaing the failing ANC caucus is too busy bringing motions of no confidence against each other while					
people here have to live without water and electricity supply, there is no refuse removal taking place and the					
infrastructure in the town is old and dilapidated.					
In the JB Marks area services have been brought to a halt as the ailing municipality continues to fail to pay service					
providers and employees, just last week employees from the Department of Infrastructure held municipal trucks					
hostage demanding to be paid.					

Source: www.politicsweb.gov.za

This view was further emphasised by Motsohi on the Thought Leader (2015), a reflection on how factional politics destroy ANC from within and as follows:

"The challenge facing the ANC is deeper than that. Some say the recent service-delivery protests were instigated by competing factions in the party to undermine the legitimacy and efforts of the current leaders with the clear intent of replacing them in the next round of elections. Naturally those in power will not voluntarily vacate their positions as a gesture of goodwill, power will be captured by force or other insidious means! This is the ugly side of factionalism that is destroying the noble value of selfless service and leadership central to the ethos of the ANC as we knew it"

"In many small municipalities, projects and programmes that were designed to improve the local economies had allegedly either been delayed or abandoned because of competing factions that wanted to benefit through tenders. What has been lacking is decisive action to root out these practices"

"In the current climate of high unemployment and slow economic growth, it's not surprising that local government positions have become attractive, they are perceived to provide personal enrichment through tenders and patronage. The networks arising out this practice are deep and vigorously defended to the extent of using violence" (*Motsohi*, 2015)

In conclusion, the other critical issue to contend with is that all those who were in your faction, and were critical to the success of your election, will be expecting to be rewarded with senior appointments. This is the power of patronage. Under these circumstances, competencies give way to loyalty. Our experience with the underperforming local government provides ample proof of the corrosive effect of this structural weakness in our political system. It naturally leads to the collapse of governance and an emergence of a culture of impunity.

The display of brazen and callous materialism by elected officials and "tenderpreneurs" is a direct manifestation of this growing sense of impunity. Abraham Lincoln captured this paradox of perceived power in a crucible when he stated that "nearly all men can stand the test of adversity, but if you really want to test a man's character, give him power".



Figure 1.1. The link between political factionalism and community protests

Grant (2014)

The above figure 1.1 is an indication of the linkages between community protests and factionalism. This is based on the research conducted by Laura Grant in 2014 and with specific reference to Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. In this research, Grant (2014) concludes that that there exist linkages between community protests and factionalism.

This is regardless of some causes of violent protests which are regarded as being due to; for example, Gumede (2013) says that the many public protests and confrontations between the police officers and the people are symptomatic of the challenge epitomised by skewed state-capital relations. Kruidenier (2015) lists extensive poverty, prolonged periods of unemployment and income inequality, gender inequality, patriarchal notions of masculinity, exposure to abuse in childhood and compromised parenting, access to firearms, pervasive alcohol misuse and fragilities in law enforcement as amongst the many factors inherent to the social dynamics of violence. A dominant feature of violence in South Africa, according to Seedat et al. (2009), is the disproportionate role of young men as perpetrators and victims

In another study by Kgatle, 2016, public protests were associated with political patronage and factionalism amongst others. According to the study, the fact that South Africa is experiencing a series of public protests was emphasized. The common element is that violence is becoming evident in these protests. This article uses the

June 2016 protests in the city of Tshwane as an example to address the root causes of such protests. On 20 June 2016, the African National Congress (ANC) announced that the city of Tshwane mayoral candidate for the 3 August 2016 municipal elections in South Africa is the former Public Works Minister and ANC National Executive Committee member. Thoko Didiza. Consequently, public protests in the city of Tshwane emerged immediately after this announcement. These public protests were very violent, such as protesters killed one another, burned buses, looted shops and barricaded roads. The root causes of these violent protests are identified as factionalism, tribalism, sexism, economic exclusion and patronage politics

The Political Instability and Uncertainty

Since the degree of political instability in a country is not directly observable, it has proven a challenge for many scholars. to define the concept. As a result, many definitions exist, of which the following are prime examples.

Morrison and Stevenson (1971) defines political instability as "a condition in political system in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down, but add that 'the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by political violence.

However, Sanders (1981) defines political instability as the extent to which the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes in and challenges to government, regime or community. deviates from the previous system specific 'normal' 'pattern'

In support of Sanders definitions, Alesina, Osler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) regards political instability as the propensity of change in the executive power, either by constitutional or unconstitutional means.

Broadly speaking and having regard to the above definitions, political instability reflects changes in or challenges to the political system. Abu, Karim and Aziz (2015) regards political instability as having contributed to the high rate of corruption and underdevelopment in ECOWAS countries. However, researchers have confirmed that generally, corruption increases with political instability (see Lederman, Loayza & Soares (2005); Leite & Weidmann, 1999 and Park (2003). Likewise, other proxies of political instability have also been found to be correlated with corruption. (Borner, Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Lederman et al., 2005).

Political systems, when applied to patterns of power and authority, expose the unequal relationship between the governors and the governed and can help to understand the impact of intra-political infighting on service delivery.

The findings show that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery. When internal squabbles take precedence, services take a back seat; time spent trying to resolve squabbles results in delays in providing services (Dlamini, 2017).

Of importance in this study, is the notion of environmental uncertainty as imposed by the political environment, which the literature provides that it requires proper planning and forecasting. Whilst it is impossible to plan and forecast in a political unstable environment, conclusively the municipal environment always cannot be static, it is dynamic and forever will be. The uncertainty of the organisational environment will not come to an end till the end of the world and may be forever. As the organisations operates in the changing environment, the society always change with it (Madinda, 2014).

The Cost of Political Instability

According to Beresford (2015), it has far reaching implications in that political leaders who occupy positions of authority in the party or public service act as gatekeepers by regulating access to the resources and opportunities that they control. The provisions of the Constitution (1998) in relation to cooperation amongst the spheres of government on the provision of service to the community is further ignored. Within the South African government, volatile politics of inclusion and exclusion might emerge and provoke bitter factional struggles within the ANC as rival elites compete for power. Whilst effective and efficient service delivery is expected, Alesina, Alberto, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) in their view on political instability, indicated that the uncertainty associated with an unstable political environment may reduce investment and the speed of economic development, whilst on the other hand, poor economic performance may lead to government collapse and further political unrest. In relation to this study, the political instability has far reaching implications in that, it affects the coherent provision of services to the community by all spheres of government and lead to poor provision of such services/

Jakkie & Ciara (2016) comments on the cost of political instability reflects that, whilst service

delivery is compromised, political assassinations and factional violence within the ANC are also on an upward trend, as the ruling party struggles to cope with a host of challenges ranging from corruption, allegations of state capture, leadership and ethical issues. In essence, these two views contributes to political instability, which results in the inability to implement service delivery.

Federke & Lui (1997) found out that rising income and property rights lower political instability, and that rising crime levels are positively related to political instability. In their view, inference is that political instability in South Africa may not represent uncertainty directly, since it is systematically related to a set of determinants. Instead, uncertainty would have to be understood as being related to a broader institutional nexus that in concert may generate uncertainty for investors.

Madumo (2016) explored and discussed the impact of politics in administration, and with the aim of investigating whether de-politicisation of the delivery of the public services will encourage efficiency and development in local government. Critical to note was his concern that, the local government and administration exist in a dynamic environment that is vulnerable to politics, social matters, economics and technology, and any change to the environment attributes a potential danger to the functioning of such a system. Madumo encapsulated a clear understanding of the concept of politicisation and the rationale for its existence in administration, the roles and functions of local government were also highlighted in the discussion and the crucial challenges associated with politicisation in local government were elaborated.

Accordingly, he concluded that politicisation of local government and administration promotes the political interference and this negatively affects municipalities from effectively providing services to their communities. As a probable solution, the author suggested some administrative reform, through an introduction of the depoliticisation of local government. Meaning, depoliticisation could be an answer to the problem of ineffective and inefficient service delivery.

Political stability plays a crucial role in economic development, integration of economic modes and in maintaining natural development in the national economy. An unstable political environment can be detrimental to the speed of economic development for any country of the world. Any kinds of lingering inactivity can be barrier to international or domestic trade. That can cause an obstruction for commercial organizations that import or export perishable goods. Though it has been found that firms reoptimize in response to political strikes, they became able to substitute among factors inputs. mostly by decreasing costs on wages and capital consumptions. Obviously small firms suffer the most due to hartal because it is harder for them to re-optimize those factors to reduce the expenditures in the short-run. Another disappointing fact that hartal imposes a large cost on the whole economy. It has the negative impacts on GDP, revenue collection and some other crucial economic factors. These findings suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability are more complex than is widely presumed (Chawdhury, 2016).

This concludes that, spheres of government have to work together in mitigate the propensity of change in the political environment, which happens either by "constitutional" or "unconstitutional" means.

POLITICAL PATRONAGE

Patronage is basically a relationship in which, as a special favour, a patron provides for his client access to scarce resources that are not universally accessible (Moxnes. 1991). Patron client relations are social relationships between individuals based on a strong element of inequality and difference in power. The basic structure of the relationship is an exchange of different and very unequal resources. A patron has access to social, economic and political resources that are needed by a client. In return, a client can give expression of loyalty and honour that are useful for the patron (Blok, 1969 and Van Eck, 2013). Political patronage is an exchange relationship in which a variety of goods and services are traded between the principal and the agent (Mamogale, 2015).

Whilst Mamogale (2015) regard the rise of gatekeeper politics within the South African context as undermining both the organisational integrity of the ANC and its capacity to deliver on its electoral mandate, this relates very well to political patronage as indicated in this research's findings. Kimani (year) examined the role legal and policy reforms have played in streamlining the management of public procurement sector; determines how ethnicity and nepotism affect legal and institutional frameworks in the sector; establishes how corruption affects public procurement; and the extent to which the New Constitutional principles of good governance

will help to address political patronage-related challenges facing the sector in Kenya. Literature is reviewed on legal reforms and challenges in Public Procurement sector; ethnicity and nepotism in Public Service; and corruption and its effects on Public Procurement sector in Kenya.

The study found out that adequate legal and institutional structures have been established to streamline public procurement sector in Kenya. Further, it was established that the executive appoints chief officers such as Permanent Secretaries who in turn appoints heads of various departments and other senior officers found to use their appointing authority to employ cronies, kin, friends, and members of their tribes to head crucial departments like public procurement to maintain indirect control. Such appointees are then used to perpetuate tender corruption through undue influence of procurement process, coercion, price inflations, supply mismanagement and theft. This provides a link through which the executive maintains control in public procurement and hinders effective operation of Public Procurement Law in Kenva. This study concludes that the principles of good governance as contained in Chapter 6 of the New Constitution of Kenva on Leadership and Integrity, if properly implemented, will help to address political patronage-related challenges facing public procurement sector in Kenya.

Likewise, the view of Mamogale (2015) associates political instability with political patronage that occurs via state jobs, where consideration is given to the cadres' political affiliation while overlooking qualifications, credentials and integrity. Whilst this has implications for service delivery, Aisenand Veiga (2013) further states that appointment of government officials on the basis of political patronage rather than merit leads to challenges of poor planning and capacity and compromised financial management and provision of services to the community. It also creates institutional instability and loss of institutional memory as evident in the increased number of prolonged acting roles as a result of the suspension of more senior state agents by their political principals, as well as ongoing high staff turnover. One cannot overlook the correlation between lack of capacity as evidenced in this research and political involvement with regard to the deployment of senior officials and such involvement as required by the legislation (Local Government Municipal Systems Act Regulations, 2014). The Regulations require that the Municipal Council appoints a selection panel to make

recommendations for the appointment of senior managers within the municipality. A further requirement is that the Mayor and the councillor designated by the municipal council should be part of the selection panel.

In relation to this, Mamogale (2015) concludes that powerful and stronger institutions of regulation like legislatures are essential in enforcing the culture that encourages excellence within the public service.

It is the view of Ennser-Jedenastik (2014) that patronage trends vary with some changes in the partisan composition of the executive, therefore the applicability and relevancy of this study may be greater than the actual results. The findings presented in this report are specific to the municipalities studied, but it is nonetheless conceivable that the benefits of studying the municipal political environment and the associated factors across the lens of political patronage theory apply to different and most cases, thus providing a valuable framework to understand gaps in patronage patterns and the associated costs, not only between but also within municipalities.

Research Methodology

In this article, a qualitative approach was implemented based on the findings that involves three district municipalities in KwaZulu Natal Province, which are Ugu, Harry Gwala and Uthungulu. In the study of IGR, primary methods of data collection such as interviews, focus groupsand document analysis were implemented in order to achieve the research objectives and maximise validity as much as possible. Data collected was analysed using cross case analysis method in relation to the three cases and specifically categorical aggregation which has been used to seek the collection of instances from data. look for relevant meaning and establish patterns or correspondence. Given the qualitative nature of the study, the researcher chose to focus on basic interpretive qualitative approach, which according to Merriam (2002) exemplifies the researcher's interest in understanding how participants make meaning of the situation or phenomenon.

Documents analysed provides the background to the district municipality, an overview of IGR within the district municipality and in relation to the available structures. Given the outcomes of IGR study, more literature was reviewed and building up from the existing literature on political environment, patronate and factionalism.

Quality criterion	Possible provision used by the researcher			
Credibility	Adoption of appropriate, well recognised research methods			
	Development of early familiarity with culture of participating organisations			
	Triangulation via use of different methods, different types of informants and different sites			
	Description of background, qualifications and experience of the researcher			
	Member checks of data collected and interpretations/theories formed			
Transferability	Provision of background data to establish context of study and detailed description of			
	phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made			
Dependability	Employment of "overlapping methods"			
	In-depth methodological description to allow study to be repeated			
Conformability	Recognition of shortcomings in study's methods and their potential effects			
	In-depth methodological description to allowintegrity of research results to be scrutinized			
	Audit trail			

Table2.	Criterion of	trustworthy	as provided by	y the research

Source: Shenton (2003)

Table 2 above represent some of the provisions made by the researcher in dealing with issues of validity. The above indicated criterions were approached on the basis of relevancy and applicability. Given the comparison made in table 2, it is the researcher's view that ensuring validity and reliability is necessary, hence the choice of validity tools as discussed below.


Giving effect to this, the researcher developed early familiarity with culture of participating organisations through having awareness sessions with the participants, triangulation via use of different methods (interviews, focus groups and documents analysis), different types of informants (municipal managers, IGR officials, mayors) and different sites (Ugu, Uthungulu and Harry Gwala municipalities); Triangulation to reduce effect of investigator bias, an in-depth methodological description to allow integrity of research results to be scrutinised and audit trail.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Political Environment

The findings reveal that the municipalities associated with this study operate within a political environment and face challenges of instability, uncertainty and political patronage. It is the researcher's view, having considered the results of this study, that factors associated with political instability and patronage have effects on the effective implementation of policies and delivery of services. Whilst the literature indicates that task environment could be managed through proper forecasting and planning, the prospects of success in managing the unstable political environment are poor due to unavoided political changes within these institutions, as informed by local government elections. Within these municipalities, the political environment is dominated by high levels of political instability, the culture within adjust with the changes in the political environment lead to damaging effects on service delivery

Figure 1 below indicate the political environmental factors associated with the service edelivery.



Source: Own (2017)

IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON SERVICE DELIVERY

The need for the rolling back of political interference, regular review of legislation to keep abreast with the changing environment and international standards and improved institutional communication are but some of the observations and arguments that the rarticle has established from a careful reading of data gathered. The enabling policies, laws and regulations that are in place remain largely good on paper, but still limited in their practical application.. It is the view of the present research that if the policies, regulations,

laws and goals that govern the service delivery towards the delivery of sustainable services are to achieve maximum fruition, there is a need for vigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that will ensure that budgets are efficiently used, that standing decisions are implemented and that partisan politics and corruption and opportunistic tendencies are eliminated as these hinder performance and delivery (Senoamadi, 2014).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions are drawn on four aspects, that whilst political environment is often perceived to be outside of management's control, making it difficult to define, predict, and align with objectives, political instability is characterised by intra-political fighting's, that have a negative impact on service delivery. It could be summed up that in their efforts to secure political careers, people would seek support from party colleagues and patronage promises and this building minimum winning coalition inside parties and leading to predictable patterns of factionalism and this demonstrates linkages between factionalism and political patronage. The repercussions are that, all those who were in coalition to support would expect to be rewarded whether with senior positions or tenders. The association of political patronage with factionalism cannot be over-emphasised, as this results in killings, poor service delivery, burning of tyres and government buildings and barricaded roads. Recommendations highlights that the local government system of philosophy should depart from what matters the most, i.e. the objects of local government and be imparted by the role of those who are in leadership positions, whether it support or counter the required beliefs. Whilst political patronage in a form of cadre deployment is not discouraged, the fundamental issue, that of political education, could serve as an instrument to instil the required values, attitudes and behaviours - leading to improved service delivery amongst cadres (both political and administrative), however provision of the legislation should be strictly adhered to.

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