

An Appraisal of Security Restructuring in Nigeria emerging Debate on State Police and Indigenous Vigilantes Group (A Case Study of Civilian Joint Task Force in the Fight against Terrorism in the North-East 2009-2018)

Jibrin Ubale Yahaya*

Department of Political Science, Nasarawa State University Keffi, Nigeria

*Corresponding Author: Jibrin Ubale Yahaya, Department of Political Science, Nasarawa State University Keffi, Nigeria. Email: jibrinubaleyahaya@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Security, whether perceived or real, is a strong foundation for human and societal developments. Therefore, a breach in security among a people is not just a bane to advancement but destroys achievements sustained over years in no time. To this end, security remains paramount in all facet of human Endeavour. Security templates are dynamic and formulated to fit the needs of the particular society. Nigeria operates a centralized system of security, in which the command and control is structured in top-down fashion. For many years, there have been calls for an autonomous, semi-autonomous and decentralized security apparatus in the country, through the creation of state police and co-optation of grassroots vigilantes. The spates of violence in various parts of the country have multiplied these calls a thousand times over and are louder than ever. In 2014, in Maiduguri, ordinary citizens with sticks and some with bare hands rose against the sophisticated and well-armed Boko Haram terrorist group. This civilian force became known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The co-option of CJTF into the operations of the security arms became a game changer in the fight against Boko Haram. This paper therefore looks into the rise of the CJTF and how the use of such grassroots vigilantes can be a credible option in the call for the restructuring of the security apparatus in the country. This call is beyond just a change of strategy in the count's security outfit but an evolutionary transition necessary for the continued cooperate existence of the entity called Nigeria.

Keywords: Security, security restructuring, CJTF, state Police, terrorism

INTRODUCTION

Insecurity remains one of the greatest challenges facing Nigeria in recent years. The persistent threat of Boko Haram violent extremism in the North East; Kidnappings and banditry across the North West; cattle rustling and farmers-herders conflict in the North-central, militancy in the South, calls for succession in the South East and an uneasy calm of fear of herdsmen attack in the South West has made Nigeria a country where the points of shocks and conflicts are manifold and widespread (Pate, 2015). These various security situations across the country have substantially undermined law and order as well as the protection of lives and properties. Thomas and Aghedo, (2014:23) says,

"In recent years, the Nigerian state has been under severe insecurity which has substantially undermined law and order as well as the protection of lives and property. In fact, since the transition to civil rule in 1999 violent

insecurity has surged with different perpetrators such as militants, kidnappers, cultists, pirates and terrorists.

It is evident that these security challenges facing the nation currently are mainly internal threats which are asymmetrical and not external aggression which is mostly symmetrical. The asymmetrical nature of the conflicts Nigeria is currently facing has posed serious questions as to the ability of the Nigerian security outfit to tackle this level of insecurity.

The rate at which reports emerge, almost on daily basis, of violence against innocent communities which lasts for hours and the perpetrators disappearing into thin air are alarming. Although significant progress has been made in the recovery of the kidnapped Dapchi school girls and the Chibok girls, the nature in which these crimes were carried out and the way the girls were returned begs the question whether the security apparatus of this

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nation are in full control of every part of the country.

Also, security forces have been accused of being partial and unprofessional in their response to conflicts in some parts of the country. These perceptions are dangerous and erode the confidence the people have in the security forces. The security outfit of the country must be seen to be impartial and unaffected by politics, devoid of tribal and religious affiliations. In recent days there have been assertions from elder statesmen such as former Defence Minister, Theophilus Danjuma of ethnic bias and cover-up by the military in its operations in Taraba State. Similar accusations have been against the Police in their response to the conflict between herders and farmers in Benue, Nassarawa, Plateau, Kaduna States. These accusations, although strongly refuted by the security agencies, have increased the calls for a community oriented and decentralized security structure which the local community can relate with and trust.

Many studies have examined the concept of security and insecurity from different schools of thoughts (Agibiboa, 2014; Murphy, 2013), scholars have as well given enormous attention to studying some of the individual crisis facing Nigeria (Omebije, 2012; Okoye, 2015), and also the security architecture of the country has been under close scrutiny from policy makers and academicians alike (Agibiboa, 2015). In fact, there have even been solutions proffered to the nature of crisis situation facing Nigeria. These solutions range from better arming the security forces to the decentralization of the security architecture of the country by creating state and community policing as well as local vigilantes. However, the practicality, scope, operations and limitations of creating state and community police have not been adequately examined; also, few studies have used case studies to analyze the evolution, sustenance, operations and limitations of some of these solutions. This study seeks to fill the aforementioned gaps by studying the emergence, operations and shortcomings of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the North East as a specimen in efforts of decentralizing the security structure.

PRESENT SECURITY STRUCTURE AND ITS CHALLENGES

Security architectures across the world are dynamic and constantly changing to confront the challenges peculiar in that society. Thus,

every society formulates its security strategies in ways that best relate to the environment and the prevailing security issues. Tang (2004) explains that:

“If we assume a state to be a rational actor that chooses its security environment, then we must come to the conclusion that for a state to adopt a particular strategy, it has to go through a three state process, namely: assessment, planning and implementation. Implicitly then, if a state commits mistake in any one of the three-stages, it will be unlikely to adopt a fitting strategy” (cited in Thomas and Aghedo, 2014).

To this end, literature has shown that there are two broad security templates; the liberal and the conservative template. The liberal template is characterized by a loose structure, in which the command and control of the security agencies is not domiciled in one individual or location. In this template, there are several layers of autonomous and semi-autonomous security groups which take care of security issues based on geo-political jurisdiction. In the liberal security template security is decentralize, meaning each community takes charge of its security through neighbourhood security groups and vigilantes whereas the state establishes a state police. This system is practiced in most advanced societies and developed countries like the United States.

On the other hand, in the conservative security template also known as centralize security structure, the command and control of the security apparatus is headed by a single individual at the headquarters who then makes appointments to commands into other areas. This is the structure of the Nigerian security system. Since Nigeria’s political independence in 1960, the country’s security architecture has maintained a centralized structure. They further explained that the statutory responsibility of National security in Nigeria is vested in the President (the Executive arm of Government) through all such security agencies established by law.

The exclusive and legislative list gives the Federal Government the constitutional prerogative over the armed forces, police and other paramilitary. For example, despite the existence of police commands in the 36 states of the federation as well as the FCT Abuja, the central decision making authority over the police rests with the Inspector General of Police

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who is answerable directly to the President (Fayemi, 2014).

The centralized security structure has its benefits. The fact that security is domiciled with the highest authority in the country shows that security is given high priority. Furthermore, in a country like Nigeria which is sharply divided along geopolitical, ethnic and religious lines, having one unified, central security architecture serves as a unifying organ. This means that it is more difficult for any single or group of individuals with an ethnic or religious agenda to hijack the security system due to the heterogeneous composition of the security system. According to althingsnigeria.com (2014).

“Nigeria government preferred centralized police force, owned and controlled by the Federal Government to hold the country together due to multi ethnic makeup of the country. They fear that if local communities are allowed to establish police force, they will someday use them against each other during ethnic rivalry.”

These are legitimate concerns especially when a cue is taken from other African countries such as South Sudan, Rwanda and DR Congo, where a decentralize security system was prematurely implemented. However, the repeated failures of Nigeria’s centralized security structure in tackling crimes and terrorism have made many to advocate for decentralization of the Police force. It is the recurring nature of ethnic clashes and the inability to prevent reprisals that make many believe the ethnic and tribal neutrality which the security is to represent has been compromised. It is these same failures which have made the people not to trust the security apparatus as an honest broker in the prosecution of security issues.

Thomas and Aghedo, (2014; 11) say “Over five decades since Nigeria got political independence, the country’s security architecture remains structurally centralized with damning consequences for management of crime and insecurity at the grassroots.” For instance, the Governor of a state does not have the constitutional power to order the commissioner of police in that state into action. The order to the commissioner comes from the Inspector General. This is also the case with divisional heads and Local Government chairmen. This means that in the case of

security emergencies in which time is of essence, response is low and when eventually carried out, is generally weak. This makes the governors handicapped in many major security challenges even though they are the State Chief Executives

CALLS FOR RESTRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT SECURITY STRUCTURE

For a long time there have been numerous calls for wide range of reforms in the security sector of Nigeria. Literature has shown that there are two paradigms of reforms advocated for, namely; Structural Reforms and Content Reforms.

The Content Reforms

See the issues confronting the security apparatus as shortage of logistics, personnel and adequate training to tackle the challenges facing the nation. Therefore, proponents of the content reforms are proposing arming the police and the military with better weapons and other equipment and more training in urban warfare (Thomas and Agbeho, 2014; althingsnigeria.com, 2014).

The Structural Paradigm

On the other hand, is calling for the overhaul of the entire architecture of the security structure. Proponents of structural reform want a restructuring of the Police force from a centralize structure to a decentralize one. They believe the present centralize structure is not positioned to solve the daunting security challenges Nigeria is facing. The structural reform paradigm advocates for the creation of community and state police.

Majority of the calls for reforms of the security sector are calls for structural reforms. In a communiqué, the 36 states governors voiced their support for a decentralized police structure and the creation of the state police. Similarly, the Vice President, Yemi Osibanjo, had, in a security summit organized by the Senate, said, “We cannot realistically police a country the size of Nigeria centrally from Abuja. State Police and other community policing methods are clearly the way to go.”

Also, a NOIPolls survey revealed that “a larger proportion of Nigerians 61 percent pledged their support for the creation of state police.” A breakdown of the figures showed that geo-political regions experiencing security

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challenges supported the creation of state police over other regions with less security concerns. For instance, figures show that North-West, North-East and North-Central had 69 percent, 68 percent and 65 percent respectively and these zones accounted for the largest proportion of Nigerians who supported the creation of State Police. NOIPolls explains that “the high occurrence of cattle rustling in the North-West, Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, and the farmers and herders’ clashes in the North-Central have continued to pose serious security challenges to the inhabitants of these regions; not to mention the loss of lives and the displacement of people.” (Cited in Vanguardngr.com)

Vice President Osinbanjo while speaking in a Lecture in Lagos says “There is need for devolution of more powers to the state with the creation of state policing and community policing as well as state controlled penitentiary systems or state prison system and creation of state court systems which will have same constitution status as the Federal High Courts.

Similarly, Police force must be decentralized if Nigeria is serious about tackling the insecurity situation pervading the land. State Government, Local Government areas and various incorporated towns and Communities must be allowed to establish their own police force that should be well trained and adequately armed.

Local populations know the criminals among them, thus they are in the best position to fist them out and get reinforcement from the state and federal police where necessary. These layers of terrorist group will make sure that any criminal or terrorist group that manage to escape the dragnet of local police will be apprehended by the state or federal police force. Cooperation between various branches of police force and other law enforcement agencies will ensure that criminals or terrorists activities will be nipped from the bud before they metastasized into the cancer that Boko Haram is now to Nigeria. Allthingsnigeria.com

Boko Haram Insurgency and the Rise of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the North East

In 2009 Boko Haram insurgency began in Maiduguri, Borno State. The name Boko Haram loosely translates as “Western education is forbidden” or its official name *Jama'at ahl al-*

sunna li-‘ da’wa wa-‘l-jihad (Sunnis for Proselytization and Armed Struggle). The group was founded by Muhammed Yusuf (1970-2009) in 2002 and was later succeeded by Abubakar Shekau. The goal of Boko Haram was to establish a Sharia government under Senator Ali Modu Sheriff (Governor of Borno, 2003-2011) (Higazi, 2015). In 2009 however, violence broke out with the security forces over the enforcement of wearing of crash helmet by motorcyclists which members of the group reneged. During the clash, an estimated 1,000 Boko Haram members were killed and the leader, Muhammad Yusuf, was extra judicially murdered by the Nigerian security forces (Agbiboa, 2012). Afterwards, the group went underground and later recuperates as a reformed group with network cells across many communities and in many states. Agbiboa, 2015 explains that.

Boko Haram soon announced its re-emergence with more advanced tactics and sophisticated attacks, including the bombing of police headquarters and UN building in Abuja in 2011. In the first ten months of 2012 alone more than 900 people died in attacks perpetrated by the group – more than in 2010 and 2011 combined (Agbiboa, 2012, 2015).

The insurgency has resulted in the death of thousands, displacement of hundreds of thousands and destruction of properties worth billions of naira. In May 2013, the insurgency reached an alarming rate and the federal government, in an attempt to quell the bloodshed declared state of emergency in Adamawa, Yobe and Borno States. Thus, there were tighter security measures, including the development of troops from the Army, Air force, Custom, Immigration, Police and the State Security Service (SSS) which became known as the Joint Task Force (JTF) (Daily Trust, 2014).

Despite the state of emergency, violence prevailed affecting social and economic lives of citizens (Bamidele, 2016; Amnesty International Report, 2015). The violence was in two folds: one, the attacks of Boko Haram became bloodier, clandestine, daring as evidenced by the intensification of the guerrilla warfare and the increased and costly attacks on soft targets by the insurgents in the affected states (Bamidele, 2016). Secondly, the security forces responded with collective punishment on the populace

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which is basically to secure and protect the civilian population (Amnesty International Report, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2012).” Daily Trust (2014) extrapolates that;

During the period, insurgents picked specific targets and launched attacks with precision, only to disappear and appear again, continuing wave after wave of violence while the onslaught went on, security operatives began to point accusing fingers at residents in Maiduguri, in places like Ruwan Rafi, Lawan Bukar, Kasuwa Gwoza, Hausari, Shehuri, Kofa Biyu, Kula Gumna, Zajeri, Lamisula, Gamboru, Budun and other densely populated areas, seeing residents as accomplices to the insurgents who curiously disappear through attacked, JTF soldiers would cordon the general area and nab every youth in sight, the results better imagined.

This situation of civilians sometimes caught in the crossfire between security forces and Boko Haram members; extra-judicial killings, arson and looting by security agencies (Bamidele, 2016) and Boko Haram widening their scope of targeted shootings and assassinations to include anyone critical of them, including those they suspected were informants of the security operatives (Abah and Idris, 2014); and the precarious condition the state of emergency brought upon the populace prompted the people to react against Boko Haram (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018; Daily Trust, 2014).

The Rise of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

This reaction became a turning point in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Youths in Maiduguri with absolutely no training, fearlessly rose against Boko Haram members with sticks, local arrows, knives, cudgels and other crude implements which earned them the name Yan gora or its official name Boko Youth Association of Peace and Justice – also known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). In a chronicled account by Daily Trust of the rise of Civilian JTF, it says: It all started in Hausari area, where with increased pressure from security operatives and merciless attacks by Boko Haram, the youth mobilized themselves and decided to thenceforth apprehend any insurgent who crosses the area enroute the Monday Market or Babban Layi for robberies or the usual drive-by bombings or shootings Baba Lawan Jafar, the then overall Chairman of the ‘Civilian JTF’ in Borno State, was the first

youth who fearlessly chased a gunman, with only a stick in May, 2013 successfully capturing him and handing him to soldiers. Afterwards, Jafar’s friend, one Modu Milo was impressed by the brave act and decided to join the hunt. Though seen as heroes by some, others see them as “alarm blowers” in a negative sense and the therefore distanced themselves to avoid the wrath of Boko Haram. But two weeks later, Jafar and Milo were still alive, hale and hearty. So, within a short time, dozens of youths joined them. Thus the CJTF started as a community effort which later joined the security forces to help fight Boko Haram.

Within a short time, there were various groups roaming the streets and setting up road blocks in search of fleeing Boko Haram members. At first these groups operated in a rancorous way as there were no leadership structures, rules of operation and limits to their operations and so on. However, security forces and the State Government acted quickly by creating a database for CJTF, training thousands in a scheme called Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) and placing them into structures by arranging them under the supervision of CJTF sector commanders. (Ogene, 2014; Agbibo, 2016) in the North-East region of Nigeria, we have nothing less than 15,541 (Fifteen thousand five hundred and forty-one) registered civilian JTF, ranging from Adamawa (10,000 civilian JTF), Bauchi (1,200 civilian JTF), Borno (1,800 civilian JTF), Gombe (715 civilian JTF), Taraba (1,156 civilian JTF) and Yobe (670 civilian JTF). Oluwaseun, 2016).

It became evident to the security apparatus that the emergence of the CJTF could be a breakthrough to the impediments they have faced in prosecuting the war on Boko Haram and therefore they incorporated CJTF into their operations. This became the first attempt, no matter how distant it seems, of the government using decentralize security to combat terrorism. Before long, the CJTF became a necessary tool in combating the Boko Haram menace as they were placed jointly with the military and police at check points, they were incorporated into military operations and they were used in conducting stop and search.

Many scholars have adjudged the incorporation of the CJTF into the security apparatus as a huge success. Bamidele, (2016) says, “Many of the

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Boko Haram members who feared the civilian JTF ran out of Maiduguri and out of the major towns of the state to villages, and quite a number have travelled to neighbouring countries.” Also, Omenma and Hendricks (2018) conducted a statistical analysis using descriptive procedures, correlation using the Pearson coefficient and comparative analysis using the independent samples t test to compare the consistency and intensity of Boko Haram attacks and Troop Responses (TRs) at pre-CJTF and Post-CJTF involvement. They found out that the mean number of Boko Haram attacks was significantly higher before than after CJTF intervention. And the main contributory factor was the shift in active and passive supports of the civilian population to the military, which increased the strategic and operational intelligence gathering, combat strength and more proactive military in counterterrorism. Agbiboa (2018) examined CJTF and local hunters (Yan Faratua) as ‘knowledge brokers’ in sharpening up the counterterrorism surveillance of the Nigerian Military. In the study, Agbiboa maintains that CJTF and the local vigilante serve as a reliable micro intelligence unit due to their extensive knowledge of the population.

Reasons for the success of CJTF and Local Vigilantes in the Fight against Insurgency

CJTF are known to be brave and daring, despite being targets in Boko Haram attacks, they are remained resolved to identifying and exposing Boko Haram members. The structure of the CJTF and their operations can be seen as a specimen for a larger case of restructuring the centralized Nigerian Security apparatus. The following are identifiable reasons CJTF have earned the trust of the populace and become partners with combatants of the Nigerian security forces against insurgency in the North East.

One, the Civilian JTF is community-based and inspired and sustained by grassroots involvements: Oluwaseun (2016:5) says “Civilian JTF represents a veritable example of citizen- driven communal response to security challenge and an indication of how terrorism can be tackled and prevented.” The structure of CJTF is such that members of each sector are from the community they protect. The CJTF rarely take people from different locality to serve as security operatives in another community. The fact that the local community

knows and can identify the members of CJTF means that trust is easily built. Trust makes room for easy intelligence gathering and intelligence is indispensable in the fight against insurgency or any crime for that matter (Oluwaseun, 2016). Therefore, CJTF and the local vigilantes act as the first line of intelligence gathering through swift identification of strange faces in their communities and helping security agencies arrest suspected Boko Haram members. Oluwaseun, (2016) says “the civilian JTF emerged to address the intelligence failure of the special task force against Boko Haram terrorism in the terrain of north-east region.” Furthermore, as the CJTF are members of the community, it easy for the group to exploits their knowledge of the communities to identify suspected Boko Haram members or other suspicious individuals (Okereke, 2013).

Two, Civilian JTF are conversant with the terrain, culture and religion of the region: since more of the civilian JTF are members of the community where they protect, this makes them to be familiar with the environment and the people’s culture and traditions as well as the religious affiliations. Unlike the Civilian JTF, the government’s JTF is composed of troops from all over Nigeria, who may not speak the local languages in North-eastern (Hausa, Kanuri and Shuwa Arabic), or understand the local culture, religion or geography (Campbell, 2013). The fact that these people know the terrain means that they can fish out criminals, do not desecrate festivals or violet religious rights which the government’s JTF have been accused of and which have led to alienating the public. Furthermore, the Civilian JTF speaks the local languages of the community and therefore communication is effective. There have been cases where members of the community have been fired upon by security operatives just because they could not understand what they were been told due to miscommunication.

It is obvious that the Civilian JTF has played a huge role in assisting the military in combating Boko Haram to the point that both the state Governors of Yobe and Borno as well as the President have acknowledge their role in the fight against insurgency.

However, many objections have been raised concerning using the civilian JTF as a force. These are legitimate concerns due to the history

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of vigilantes in Nigeria and how easily a vigilante group can become a force for evil. Igbokos, (2013) “concerns are already being raised in Maiduguri about the crude nature, coarse conduct and plain excesses of the civilian JTF.” There are those that are skeptical about the loyalty as well as the militia tendencies of the civilian JTF. An analyst says the Nigerian Government preferred centralize police force, owned and controlled by the Federal Government to hold the country together due to multi ethnic makeup of the country. They fear that if local communities are allowed to establish Police force, they will someday use them against each other during ethnic rivalry. (allthingsnigeria.com, 2014).

Another dimension of concern is that the activities of civilian JTF have endangered the common man and the community in general. Boko Haram members usually carry out reprisal attacks on civilian JTF and the community in general. In a Human Rights Watch Report, it described the vigilantes as “a worrisome new dimension to the violence”, saying Civilian JTF members “inform security forces about presumed local Boko Haram activity” and that “the Islamist group then retaliates against both the neighborhood vigilante group and the broader community.”

(Cited in Ogene, 2014). For instance, after the brave move by Jafar (the first man said to capture a Boko Haram member with his bare hands), Boko Haram staged a mock funeral procession and approached Hausari with concealed weapons. The insurgents opened fire on unsuspecting residents, killing many, including a 90-year-old woman and a nine-year-old girl all in the name of reprisal. (Daily Trust, 2014)

There are concerns that the Civilian JTF can be used as a tool in the hands of politicians to victimize their opponents. The way groups emerge during time of elections or other political functions. These groups are then used to promote the interest of an individual or group of people who usually are their sponsors by intimidation and harassment.

The economic implication of the Civilian JTF on the State Government is another factor to consider. The State Government is said to have, as far back as, 2013 trained over 1,678 of civilian JTF purchased many vehicles for the group in order to encourage them and establish a

plan to train at least 20,000 and provide them with jobs through a programme known as Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES). The State Government therefore places the registered members on monthly financial stipend (Daily Trust, 2014). This clearly shows that the rise of the civilian JTF created additional financial burden on the State Government.

Relating the Civilian JTF to Decentralization of the Police Force

One of the first civilian Joint Task Force was formed in early 2013 in Adamawa State in North East of Nigeria. It was made up of community vigilante formations, including neighborhood guards and hunters guilds. The task force carries out community policing through reconnaissance. The members watch over the community and accost any strange or suspicious people that enter. They operate in cells and carry a combination of traditional and modern weapons. They mount road blocks, conduct area patrols and mount guards at entry points and borderlines of their communities.

What They Have Done

Chukwuma, A (2017): stated that vigilante groups are based on three models. The first is communal neighborhood guards, the second the village hunters’ guild, and the third is the government recognized Civilian Joint Task Force. Communal neighborhood guards are village based vigilante outfits dedicated to community defence. Hunter’s guild is the vanguard of traditional hunters and warriors that intervenes to reinforce the operation. Since their emergence, vigilantes have contributed a great deal in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. They have reinforced and complemented the efforts of Nigeria’s Armed Forces, particularly in the areas of grassroots reconnaissance and intelligence.

Their cooperation and partnership with the military contributed to the finding of the first abducted Chibok Girl to escape from the militants in May 2016. Despite their laudable achievements, there are legitimate concerns about the activities of vigilante groups. These include fears that their unguarded deployment could be counter-productive in the long run. While they may be important in the short term in disrupting Boko Haram activities and serving as local partners in a successful terrorism strategy, arming militias is not a long-term

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policy. This is particularly true if unintended consequences are to be avoided.

Already there have been allegations of forced recruiting, child and woman soldiering and extra-judicial killings of suspected insurgents. In addition, there are fears that the vigilantes could degenerate and proliferate into mercenary militias.

Chukwuma (cit) further highlighted that vigilante activities often give rise to reprisal attacks on communities by the insurgents. The loose organizational and leadership structure of vigilante groups makes them susceptible to infiltration and internal sabotage.

Generally, the involvement of vigilantes in counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria has been a subject of contentious debate. It's apparent that they have contributed to improving security for some communities. But there are also concerns that in the long run they could pose a threat given their heavy-handed approach. Examples include extra-judicial killings, violation of human rights, extortion and criminal impunity.

The rise of the Civilian JTF have shown that it is possible to incorporate a civilian force with the military and police on a community policing level and achieve great results. It also shows that the active involvement of the state government is needed in order to bring together such force.

Thirdly, the composition of the Civilian JTF shows the manner in which the state police or community police can be structured. The State Police must be indigenes of the State whereas, the community police must comprise of the indigenes of the community or wards. It should be only on rare occasions that any deployment outside the locality of the community police jurisdiction can take place. Fourthly, there must be active collaboration among the various layers of security structures from bottom-up. This means that the community police can call for reinforcement from the state police when an incidence is escalating and in turn, the state police can request support from the Federal Police or federal military in case of further escalation.

However, the rise and operations of the civilian JTF has brought up some fears. It is clear that the fear of impunity from the activities of the

state police and community police is real if their activities are not closely securitized and if there is no proper disciplinary code of conducts of its members. Also, the case for reprisal is very possible since the members of the community police are well known to everyone. The criminals or terrorists can target the families and friends of the members of the community police for reprisals. Thirdly, the financial implication for the development of state police is one of the major impediments to the creation of state police. It is obvious as seen with the Civilian JTF that creating community police is capital intensive how much more police state. Regrettably, most of the states in Nigeria depend heavily on the federal government allocation to remain afloat. Worst of all majorities of the states owe salaries and other entitlements of their employees. Thomas and Aghedo (2014) explains that:

In 2014, the National Conference recommended that additional 18 states should be created to make Nigeria a Federation of 54 States (National Conference Report, 2014). Paradoxically, the fragmentation of Nigerian federation results in more centralization because the sub-national units are not viable and so necessarily rely on the central government for survival. For example, it has been alleged that only three of the current 36 states can pay their workers' salaries in a month without recourse to the monthly revenue disbursement from the central government. Thus, sub-national units only serve as access to power positions and participation in the sharing of political and economic goods especially oil rents – the so-called 'national cake'.

This implies that it is necessary for the states to become more financially viable before they can embark on the creation of state and community police. For it will be worse of for the states and communities if arms and sophisticated ammunitions as well as the backing of the constitution is given to people whose welfare are not catered for.

Independence and neutrality: despite the fact that the state police and community police are meant to be answerable to the state governor, there must be need for these forces to have a high degree of independence and neutrality in their operations. The State police must be seen to be impartial and not a tool for prosecuting sectarian or ethnic conflicts.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

However, despite the possible shortcomings and fears in the creation of state police, it is still regarded as one of the veritable alternative to ending the various attacks and violence in the country. There is need for the constitution to be amended to create room for the creation of state police and community police in form of vigilantes who leaves and reside within the community.

A decentralized security structure has worked in other countries and Nigeria will be no exception irrespective of the diverse multi-ethnic make-up of Nigeria.

However, necessary measures should be put in place by the federal legislatures to quickly nationalize any local or state force who turn into ethnic militia or fail to follow the constitution.

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