

Islam Political Culture in the Southern Mediterranean Arab Revolts: The Challenges for Europe

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the main aspects of the Islam political culture in the Arab Mediterranean revolts since 2011, in the aftermath of the "Arab spring". For much of 2010/2011/2012, 2013, 2014, the Arab revolts were still good news for Europe. European officials equated it with the events of 1989 in the Eastern Europe. The EU promised a reform of relations. The new states in the region are not as the previous one, from social change perspectives and impacts terms. This article examines the main aspects of the political Islam in the Arab Mediterranean revolts, in the aftermath of the "Arab spring," along with its growing involvement in the region, both in terms of discourse and specific facts on the ground. It explores how the political Islam has been employed, particularly by Europe, as a symbol for political empowerment of local people and democracy?

Keywords: Islamists, Muslims, Political Islam, Muslim Fundamentalism, Jihadist Movements, NATO, EU, EUMP, Muslim goodwill, Muslim State, Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Phobia, Sufism, Sufism, Political Unrest, Street Violence, Uprising, turmoil, Arab spring, Islamic State (IS).

INTRODUCTION

Could Europe be able for laying the foundation of a rational and balanced European approaches towards Arab Mediterranean revolts? In other words, rereading and defining the actual impacts of the Arab revolts from its local dimensions and regional impacts, in the context of the ongoing impacts.

For much of 2010/2011/2012, 2014, 2018, the Arab revolts were still good news for Europe. European officials equated it with the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe. The EU promised a reform of relations, with this emerged new leadership. In addition, the new states in the region are not as the previous one, from social and political change perspectives and impacts terms.

This article examines the main aspects of the political Islam in the Arab Mediterranean revolts, in the aftermath of the "Arab spring," along with its growing involvement in the region, both in terms of discourse and specific facts on the ground. It explores how the political Islam has been employed, particularly by

Europe, as a symbol for political empowerment of local people and democracy?

Changes in Leadership and State's Political System

The quick current revolt spread rapidly from Tunisia to Egypt, and then from Egypt to Libya, in one timing date, threatening entrenched regimes and the status quo. For example, Libya's revolted turned into a bloody civil war, and spilling over of armaments, everywhere in the country. By the end of 7th of February 2014, the General National Congress will end its mandate, which will lead into political vacuum in the country. In contrary, there are effectively two rival governments. One is in Tripoli, where a coalition of Islamist is armed groups from (Msrata).

The other is in (Tobruk), where a newly elected Council of Representatives (COR) and a cabinet have convened by the majority of the Libyan people. While, in Tunisia, the Muslim movement (Nahda Party) led the country into social unrest, only in the end of January 2014, and after four years, Tunis launched its new constitution.

In addition, Egypt and its revolt turned into Christian-Muslim confrontations, and it turned its destination twice (January uprising, 2011 and the road to 30 of June, 2013) with widespread of unrest and instability between the civic moments and the ousted Brotherhood. This progress led by the military rule under the Commander, Assisi, who called his Egyptian people to march against the Brotherhood presidency, Morsi, in 30, June, 2013, with widespread of unrest and instability between the civic moments and the ousted brotherhood. As result, this move, also, led to create interim government and hunting all the brotherhood elites and became under arrest. While many observers have drawn matches with the rising of the American control of the International Order and the domination of the Western alliances, and its major leading role in combating terrorism, and the eastward spread of democracy to Eastern Europe, the outcome of the Arab revolts is far from bringing political and social stability in this region.

This popular revolt has challenged authoritarian rule in the whole region, and highlighted the widespread desire for a responsible government. Libya, in particular, is an evidential and exclusion example among other Arab revolts, that NATO played a major powerful militarized intervention in the name of supporting Obama's terminology of "Arab spring".

In this regard, the Arab revolt states could be described a career of immune system factor towards democratic transition and transformation, revolts stolid in, overthrowing some regimes and shaking each other. Four years (2010/2014) have passed since the arrival of the Arab uprising, turmoil, and leaders and decision-makers have been trying to analyze such historic transformation in order to find traction in the region that has been looking different from bad to worse, with new dynamics, unknown elites and political topography^[1]. Observers noticed, during these events, the timing of the whole changes in leadership and state's political system, and new elites occupied the political landscape of the region. This would suggest that the external factor was an essential motive in advancing such stages of sudden changes in the region. Libya's Political Development since the Arab Spring Libya after the assassination of Qaddafi is divided. Since mid-2011, the country has spiraled toward civil war. Rival armed groups are fighting for control of Libya's capital.

In the East, the Libyan armed forces led by a retired general, (Khalifa Haftar), is shelling Islamist armed groups in and around Benghazi for 6 months, during 2014. By the mid-October 2014 the Libyan military brigades have entered the city heat of Benghazi and declared curfew from mid-noon to the next morning. In addition, there are effectively two rival governments. One is in Tripoli, where a coalition of Islamist is armed groups from (Misrata).

The other is in (Tobruk), where a newly elected Council of Representatives (COR) a cabinet has convened by the majority of the Libyan people. Libya's armed forces, both official and unofficial, are essentially at war with one another, with each faction strengthened by an arrangement of tribes and towns. As a result, Libya's armed forces, both official and unofficial, are essentially at war with one another, with each faction bolstered by assemblage of tribes and towns. Moreover, we are often lured toward a one-dimensional reading of Libya's turmoil. It is easy to explain Libya's breakdown as a political struggle between Islamists and secularists: the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and more jihadi factions like Al-Qaeda [2]

Versus the secularists. Components of all these dimensions are at play, but none of them alone has sufficient explanatory power, either political solutions to the elusive revolution. At its core, Libya's instability is an intensely local and regional affair, stemming from deeply entrenched sponsorship networks battling for economic resources and political power in a state tortured by a gaping institutional vacuum and the absence of a central mediator with a multitude of force.

In crux, Libya suffers from a balance of weakness among its political factions and armed groups; no single entity can force others to act purely through coercion, but every entity is strong enough to veto the others. The current panorama of political polarization and the broken security sector presents the Western led coalition of 2011 military campaign with profound dilemmas. A previous approach of supporting state institutions is problematic when those institutions, whether the governmental bodies, are successfully split between two warring factions. Correspondingly, a long-planned determination to train the Libyan army can only proceed after a ceasefire and a political

compromise that produces a clearly defined road map toward the reform of security institutions. Consequently, the eventual solution for Libya's security anguishes lies in context-specific security solutions, a broad political pact and constitution. This is an area where outsiders can lend advice and measured assistance, but where the ultimate burden must be borne by Libyans themselves, solutions for Libya are only Libya solutions.

The Islamist Armed Groups

Too often, Libya's armed groups are thought to be outside of Libyan society and of the state. In fact, they are deeply intertwined into both. One of Libya's challenges is that nearly all the armed groups claim legitimacy from their affiliation with competing organs of the weak and fractured government.

Government subsidization of these groups arose from the enfeebled state of the formal army and police. The results of this prearrangement in Libya have been mixed and highly dependent on location. In some homogenous communities where the armed groups enjoyed organic roots and social ties, the forces played a role akin to a local gendarmerie, performing functions like tranquilizers interdiction, guarding schools and hospitals, and even street maintenance. But in mixed or strategically important locales, namely Tripoli and Benghazi, they have evolved into dangerously parasitic and destructive entities, pursuing agendas that are at once criminal, political, and ideological.

Conflicting to some expectations, no one faction is blameless on this front. Islamists, armed groups have all used force or the threat of force to pressure the country's elected institutions, capture smuggling, or seize strategic assets like border checkpoints, oil facilities, armories, ports, and, perhaps most importantly, airports. The Islamist armed groups in the East reflect that region's longtime alienation from the center and increasing embrace of moral devotion and transparency

The Hybridized Security Institution

Not all the armed Islamist groups operating in Libya are affiliated with the state in some way, which has led to the establishment of a mixture arrangement between formal and informal forces. Over time, most of the armed groups are subordinated themselves to the chief of staff and Ministry of Defense. Others joined the Ministry of Interior's Supreme Security Committee

(SSC), which roughly approximated the functions of the police. The SSC was always stronger in Tripoli than in other areas. Because entire armed groups joined the SSC and Shield forces, the new structures essentially preserved the cohesion and parochial outlook of the armed groups, even though under the cover of the state.

Effectively represented by the government and flush with funds, the armed groups were even more emboldened to pursue agendas that were increasingly political and self-serving. At best the Libya Shield and SSC structures were ways for the Libyan government to purchase firepower when needed to quell crises. But the new structures took on a life of their own, confusing efforts to build up the regular army. In many parts of the country, it is the armed Islamist groups, not the army, that control defense ministries, barracks, bases, and ammunition terminuses.

In the past four years, the Libya Armor has become a shadow army that has rapidly over shadowed the power of the regular forces. Ironically, the monthly government salary for Islamist armed group member exceeds that of a regular policeman and army recruit, giving the members of the Islamist armed groups or would-be recruits little incentive to join the government's formal forces.

Arab Southern Mediterranean States: Currents of Change

The (ASMS) ^[3] have never had one state that assembles all the (AANS)'s society. However, as they had common history, language, religion and traditions, they have always felt closer to other Arabs and Africans rather than any other nation. Tribal links and kinships remain evident and one family can exist in two or three or more Arab Northern states, mainly in (Libya and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Libya and Algeria). The notion of Arab identity of states (as of today) had never been revealed before (Sykes-Picot of 1916), which separated the Arabs of North Africa into separate stateless, regimes and nationals.

Historically, the compartment of the Ottoman Empire (1911 /1922) was a political incident that carried the strategic vision of neutralizing expected threat from the Turkish Empire and terminating any likely mount through partitioning and dividing the massive mass of territories and peoples that formerly comprised the former Turkish emperor into several new

nations ^[4]. In this historical context, the existing power during the collapse of the Turkish Emperor dominated and fragmented the region into a multitude of comparatively weak and, to an extent, artificial states, at odds with each other. The weakening of the state effectiveness and unpopular ruling elites amongst the Arab Northern region was referred in the political history of the region as foreign imposition characterized as illegitimate. Correspondingly, Bernard Lewis ^[5] condemns the false democratic practice in the Arab political debate, when pointing out the fraud parliamentary systems that were installed and bequeathed by Italian, British and French rule in the former colonial states.

As a matter of fact, we can see that in the removal of several Arab leaders (*poisoning Yasser Arafat, hanging Saddam Hussein, Jamal Abdel Nassir's heritages of Pan-Arabism, and assassinating Gaddafi*) ^[6] part of a plot aimed to get the region from any regional power, in term of leadership, in which can be serious qualification trying to re-organize the local traditional systems for more independent policies, from outside intervention.

Furthermore, comparatively scrawny states, emerged as Western protectorates ^[7] against opposition, seeking external patrons and means for the regional power struggle and survival, have remained dependent for their security on the Western former colonial powers long after formal independence. Fearing the vistas of changes, the superiority of security issues over social issues in the region is evidenced, when experts noticed that most Arab states went strongly, for military expenditures ^[8], while about 34.6 million Arabs were living under the two-dollars-a-day international poverty line, and double-rate unemployment.

It can be argued that the current round of uprising, turmoil and upheavals, now termed wrongfully “the Arab Spring”, does not constitute the first manifestation of Arab mass protests that have led to a change in the social and political structure of (AANS) societies. In fact it comes as unknown current of changes, each possessing its own grounds, circumstances, ideologies, slogans and outcomes. Right or wrong, the term of Arab spring has been used by Barrack Obama ^[9], when was advancing his policy toward the region and describing the street movements in the capitals of Tripoli, Tunisia, Cairo and Damascus.

The Arab Currents of Revolts: The Revolutions Waves

First of all, first current of change attempt took place in 1914^[10]. It was called the Arab Revolution that characterized that it had a leader, who led the revolution and the main target was ending Turkish rule in the land of Hejaz (Saudi Arabia now). This current overlapped, while the disappearing and finally the collapse of the Turkish, was the major regional episode. This development was on the internationally driven, as the revolutions were supported by two major proceedings, regionally and externally. World War I was the major global episode The British were targeting and aiming to end and replace the Turkish presence in the region. Consequently, the outcome of the revolt current was transitory as they were bereft of their of independence, when the colonial powers planed their way in that region. Throughout this period, a number of ideologies were legitimized through this current of revolt, and the main slogan was nationalism. It was considered important; in order to give confidence Arabs to get purge of any other subordination, mainly political Islam, which unavoidably meant wrenching out of any association to the Turkish rule, and the warding off of any desiring for the Turkish culture.

Secondly, the second current of the Arab revolts took place during the 50's and 60's, and the term the Arab Spring was used and invented for the first time in the French writings ^[11]. For example, Jacques Benoist- Méchin described, in his book, “The Arab revolts” that took place in the Arab region, and tried to link them to the European Revolutions of 1848, known as the ‘spring of Nations’ or people’s springtime. Comparable to the first current, the second current of Arab revolts came after two most important events, one regional and another external.

It was the World War II, which had a great collision on the revolt currents and caused them to be driven by external factors. The foreign powers and forces encouraged and even motivated these revolts as eastern powers wanted to fight the Western presence and colonizing in the Arab region. For that reason, “Justice, ‘fighting Imperialism,’ ‘progressivism,’ ‘freedom,’ “democracy” ^[12], were among other key themes during this period Thus far, the major regional episode that occurred during that period was the establishment of “Israel” and the Egyptian revolt of 1952. This led to the

backing of “Pan-Arabism” to oppose “Zionism movement,” which led to the creation of “Israel” in 1948. Late Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser proficiently endorsed pan-Arabism, as his heritage of Pan-Arabism was associated with the second current of Arab revolts. Moreover, some scholars see that when the great powers were prevented, divided during the Cold War and hegemonic involvement was thus deterred; the conditions for regional sovereignty could have been better and the region was more probably get united against the external rule. Pan-Arabism prevalent struck a harmony with and inspired other Arab leaders who guided revolts in their home countries. As a result, Pan Arabism expanded attractiveness in the Arab streets, as “Nasser” belongs to “Nasserism” the late Egyptian president (1952/1970), and had an evident influence on Arab political movements (Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq [1970/2003], Gaddafi in Libya (1969-2011) and others. This current of revolts did not target “Israel” only, but ‘other colonial’ presence in the region-regarded to be the real instigator of the “Zionist movement” and therefore the State of “Israel”. In this view, a number of circlets, destined by their association on the Western “imperialistic” powers, paid the price and were toppled in Libya, Iraq, and first and foremost in stick ^[13].

Pan-Arabism, which mainly intended sticking to Arab identity of unity, turns downed increasingly over the course of the past 60 years. For instance, the position of the Arab states was united and remarkably rock-solid facing the establishment of “Israel” in 1948 and opposing the UN partition plan. Parallel position was upheld during the 1973’ war or ‘oil crisis’. Nonetheless, the peace agreement, which signed between Israel and Egypt (1979), gravely announced the decline of Pan-Arabism. In this line of revolt development politics, most Arab states stayed away from Egypt, and the Arab League headquarter was removed from Egypt to Tunisia. A number of episodes chased and boosted this division, including Arabs controlled reaction on Israeli invasion to Beirut, the Iraqi-Iranian war.

The later war put Iraq the neighboring sister state to Syria in the opposite camp with Iraq and US’s military strike on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986^[14], with a modest reaction of the Arab states, were just a box in point. In short, Iraqi invasion of its neighboring sister state of Kuwait (1990) had serious ramifications and a direct role in the declining of Pan-Arabism and

solidarity, predominantly, Iraqi invasion, separated Arabs into two entities, one of which was enthusiastic to call for foreign intervention to attack their Arab sister states. Conceivably, the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the hanging of Saddam Hussein, the stem supporter of Pan-Arabism, affirmed the past its best of Pan-Arabism.

The second path of the analysis comes within the thoughtful context. Debatably, the current confusion of revolts or uprising, upheavals or turmoil or temporary societal disorder in the AANS might be well thought-out as the fourth current of democratization, not democracy with reference to the concept developed by Milad ELHARATHI ^[15]: democratization is not related to the family of democracy, each notion is followed by reverse one. Each notion has its own environmental society to be implemented; democracy must be born and implemented when society creates its own state, and initiated by society, in order to be its servant, thus democratization is not a society’s initiative, it’s created by the modern state, it’s a state’s initiative, in order the society be a servant of the modern state.

Samuel M. Huntington in his book ^[16] went further in defining the stages of the revolutions waves, as he termed it, in which he classified the waves into three stages of revolutionary waves. Huntington argues that a reverse one followed each wave and the first wave occurred between 1828/1926, with its roots in the recent French and American revolutions. This wave swept Europe and Latin America, and was manifested by military coups. It lost momentum in the interwar period between World War I and World War II when a number of dictators rose to power, which led to a shift away from democracy toward traditional despotic or new ideologically driven, mass-based one-party regimes ¹⁷. The second wave started from 1943 to 1962, and featured coups and the creation of authoritarianism across Latin America, south and East Asia and allied occupation post-World War II. Huntington proposition that the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule fashioned a number of new states with democratic inclinations. Nonetheless, he argues that political development, especially in Latin America, took on an authoritarian cast, and the decolonization of Africa led to the largest multiplication of authoritarian governments in

history. Therefore, one-third of the working democracies in 1958 had become dictatorial by the 1970s^[18]. Ali Sarah, in the co-author work^[19] observed in the collapse of the former Soviet Union and swept Southern Europe, South America and Africa. In consequence, a number of scholars have opted to insert the current Arab revolts within this framework.

They discourse that with the commencement of the current Arab spring, the fourth wave of transformation or “Democratization of Communist and Islamic regimes began as per the fact that it has an impact on other regions and inspired revolts and demonstrations in Europe, Asia, Latin and North America; it gained its international curves. He embraces the changes, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to democratic transitions of varying success in Eastern Europe in the fourth wave of democracy. However, *Sarihan* inserts the current Arab revolts within this framework. He orates that with the arrival of the current Arab spring, the fourth wave of transformation or “Democratization of Communist and Islamic Regimes” began^[20].

The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the disappearing of Arabism, overthrowing a number of Arab regimes and the declining of historical Arab leader states, led to a power vacuum and blankness future in the region and the intervention of foreign powers (either regional or international) became foreseeable. The conventional super powers are still seeking a bigger newer role in the Arab region, mainly between USA, China and Russia, in response to the changes.

The US, Russia, China and Europe compete among each other in order to guarantee the larger scale of influence and wider traction in the region, at times using their soft power instruments, at others their historical cooperation, not forgetting economic inducements.

Iran, Turkey, and Israel, on the other hand, are the most favored regional powers with this end in view. None the less, Israel’s chances hinge greatly on a peace agreement with the Palestinians, not to mention the obvious fact that “Israel” is culturally different from the rest of the states in the region. Religion, history and culture overshadow Iran’s probabilities over Israel, as it has also succeeded in building a network of allies within the region. However, Iran does not appear to be an attractive model for many Arab states, more than ever when it comes to freedom, human rights, economy and

relations with the rest of the world. Turkey historically which is a part of the culture, history and religion of the region, come into view to have the best probability in its preferences. It presents a charming model, in theory, for its democracy, freedom and modernity, human rights, booming economy and relations with the West, along with the presence of Islamic elites in power. Up till now, the term “the Turkish Model of the Brotherhood Deep State [BDS]” has been ham it up and has put Turkey’s reputation on the line, and among other challenges, Turkey’s potential in the Arab region is spoiled by its explicit eagerness and blatant use of its soft power, which may lead to untoward effects. Hitherto, striding the path into the Arab region should be graphed suspiciously. It is well known for being one of the most hot-blooded regions, and for its convulsion is often described as a cold-blooded in quick sand. At this instance, it isn’t be difficult to fathom out the feeling of dissatisfaction that pervades, nearly every Arab society, who believes that their fate should not pivot on others, but stay on in their own hands. Unfortunately, this considered necessary outcome will not materialize until historical Arab leadership states rise and shake the dust of weakness and reluctance from their societies’ bears.

EU’S NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

A decade ago the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in an attempt to surround itself with a ‘ring of friends’ from the South, however, it now seems surrounded by a ‘ring of fire’. As the EU begins to reassess and adjust its policies towards its neighbors, it is necessary for EU to examine what went wrong, and equally important to avoid false diagnoses, in particular about what sparked the conflict in the southern Mediterranean rim, mainly in Libya and Egypt. It was long thought that the southern Mediterranean states were hostile to the Western powers, but not the EU. This has proven to be false: the current crisis in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt is a result of the European Union opposition to the authoritarian regimes. EU perceives any steps towards political and economic integration within the southern Mediterranean compound as a threat to its broader geopolitical goals. The current crisis of instability and fighting rather than it has its political and economic roots, is also not about democracy. The EU’s Association Agreements with Maghreb countries are compatible with

other existing free trade area, which governs trade relations between both regions.

The EU Association Agreements with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco do impose choice on the latter, with regard to trade^[21]. The preference of both regions was to maintain good trade relations with the EU through the Association Agreements were obstacle to achieving that aim. The Association Agreements with Algeria, for example, is also unlikely to have a significant impact on the South. In 2013, 67% of Algeria oil exports to the EU and 75% of EU exports to Algeria were commercial and industrial materials.

The single biggest lesson from the crisis in the southern Mediterranean revolt states is that EU policy vis-à-vis its neighbors (and not just to the East) needs a stronger security component. Before the EU can help transform them into 'well-governed countries', it has to make sure there are proper state structures to deal with in the first place. Alongside helping these states improve its governmental institutions, the European Union needs to help them survive and consolidate. A State begins to function properly once effective law enforcement, intelligence and defense sectors are in place

NATO'S ASSIGNMENTS AND THE EU' ROLE

Libya is a major exporting oil country in the region, while Tunisia's economy depends on its limited resources, mainly on tourism revenues, and Egypt's economy depends on foreign aid, mainly from the United States and from international agencies' donors. In fact, Libya holds approximately (46.4 billion) barrels of oil reserves, the largest in Africa and in close proximity to Europe^[22]. In 2010, Libya produced an estimated (1.8 million barrels) per day bbl. /d of the world's 88 m barrels a day of oil of which (1.5 million bbl. /d) was exported^[23]. The ousted regime had planned to up its production to 3 million barrels a day by 2020, and further develop its natural gas sector in an effort to stimulate economic recovery against the backdrop of US and international sanctions during the 1980s and 1990s^[24]. France, Britain, Italy and Spain accounted for nearly (85%) of Libya's oil exports. Of these nations, Italy received over (28%) of its total oil imports from Libya which amount to (370,000 barrels) of oil per day^[25]. Italy's role was also outstanding as Silvio Berlusconi's government offered the use of seven air and navy bases for the Libyan operation at the early stages of the military

operations^[26]. Regarding France, it receives (17%) of its oil from Libya, along with Britain, which receives (8%) of its oil from Libya as well^[27]. It is also interesting to point out that France, UK and Italy were the first NATO countries that undertook sorties and military logistical assistance across Libya as part of collective efforts to enforce a no-fly zone during the initial phases of the intervention. Furthermore, Libya is, also, awash in natural gas resources with an estimated capacity (of 55 trillion cubic feet) (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA) prior to the upsurge of popular revolution, Libyan production by 2012 could be increased by as much as 50 percent if planned pipelines and gas-fired power plants would have been built [28].

The natural resources of Libya attracted NATO members to organize and lead a major military campaign in the binging of the second decade of this century. Certain advanced questions remained without imperative answers; and how such NATO's involvement, in supporting Libya's revolt that created a large amount of debatable political and economic impacts on Libya's affairs? The above arguments could explain why the NATO's intervention happened in Libya, as a show business for testing new weapons and create new bazaar of arms supply to the region. On the other, Egypt and Tunisia would be less interesting marketplace and not enriched oil supply.

The Eu' Bridging New Relations

A EU bridging new relations in the new Mediterranean Arab revolts would demonstrate the EU's political will and practical ability to lead a complex operation of critical importance to its neighborhood.

It could encourage the rifts caused by several member states to contribute to the current transition operation in the region. The EU could enhance the strategic benefits of its engagement by reaching out to the whole Mediterranean rim, which provides a strategic to the EU operations in Africa and the Mediterranean rim. Is the EU up to the task in the Arab Mediterranean countries? The fact is told, many officials and experts skeptical, especially given the Europe's preoccupation with financial and economic woes. But it's also the fact that if the authoritarian fractured states and society explodes into violence, generating thousands of refugees and displaced persons and creating a fertile environment for anti-European extreme

ism, Europe will be the first to suffer the fallout. In short, the hard dilemma for the EU' Mediterranean policy (MP) has no choice except redirect its Mediterranean policy, with new images towards the Muslim cultural political of the emerged revolt Arab Mediterranean countries.

Eu' Mediterranean Policy Dilemma (Mpd)

In order to clarify the changing context in which the EU' implements its foreign policy, several existing dimensions should be addressed. In the aftermath of the Arab revolts and uprisings, the EU has not dealt with new interlocutors, including important movements and political parties, which claim undertaking the ongoing political and social change. In view of the relative neglect of the social and political change dimensions in debates and academic literature on the EU foreign policy, this position aims how the EU improves its understanding of the Arab revolts as a political, social, and economic compound; as new dimensional factor in the Mediterranean politics. This new dimensional factor requires European political and cultural understanding, separated from the American and NATO impacts.

Ironically and institutionally, the EU has no formal united foreign policy approaches toward the Arab southern Mediterranean states and its new revolts. The European states, separately, viewed the Arab uprising in different national prospects, dependently on their pragmatic interests. For much of 2010/2011/2012, 2013, 2014 the Arab revolts were good news for Europe. European officials equated it with the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe. The EU promised a reform of relations. "*More for more*" went the slogan: ^[29] "the greater the democratic transition, the more benefits to the government".

Yet events have taken a darker turn. Tunisia ^[30] successfully held elections while Libya is fragile and still flooded with weapons ^[31]. As the picture has grown murky, so has Europe's sense of purpose. Financial package was pledged for the South-Western Mediterranean states, but only a fraction has found in this region. Concerns about rising migration and cheap agricultural imports have hampered quick delivery of trade and travel concessions that could have swayed choices of regional leaders. Until today, the EU is still conducting contradictory orientations toward the ongoing events, mainly, in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia:

assassinations taking places in these states, demonstrations in the streets as daily practice, along with political and social instability. Moreover, France went to the heart of Mali fighting in the desert while Germany promising these states with financial aid, but under improving democracy condition. Ironically to say, the EU went further encouraging the fighters from Libya, Tunisia ^[32] and Egypt to go to the battle of Syria, with heavy military equipment.

The question where the EU foreign conducts is going in the Mediterranean? For some of the immediate neighbors, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, and Malta, the Arab revolts events were unsettling. Others, like France and Britain, "Waved the flag of democracy and human rights" ^[33]. The pro-democracy camp won out in 2012. However, if bad news flows across the Mediterranean rim after 2012, Europe could divide over an old dilemma of democracy and political stability.

As the social and political unrest in the Arab Mediterranean countries approached to the fourth Anniversary (2011/2014), a number of national and multinational organizations in the EU should have to start to think of possible scenarios for post-revolts in the region, eager to provide guidance to whatever type of government succeed the current regional regime. Central to almost all of those proposals so far has been an emphasis on some kind of democratic governance for post-Arab Mediterranean revolts. Indeed, even Egypt's own Brotherhood Party ^[34] that rules Egypt for one year declared what it labeled "A Vision of a Democratic Egypt". Not surprising, this declaration contains all the "buzzwords" about democratic government and the rule of law that appeal to an international community eager to have any alternative take hold. The problem of course is that a democracy cannot be created ex nihilo. In virtually all the Arab Mediterranean countries that are now considered mature democracies, democracy only arrived at the end of an often-lengthy process of state building. This process, over time, created a number of institutional checks and balances between the state and its citizens that are the essence of democratic governance.

It is almost that in some Arab Mediterranean states this process has not even started. Indeed, both the policies of the Arab Mediterranean revolt states but particularly those of the authoritarian governments were meant to prevent the emergence of these truly national institutions. Since independence of the Arab

Mediterranean, states from foreign rule have never been asked to think of themselves as truly national citizens. All the institutions in civil society that traditionally provide identity to a country's citizens were systematically eviscerated. As a result, several Arab Mediterranean countries has neither the institutions to create a modern democracy nor the historical imagination, or a history of state-society interaction that augurs very well for a move toward a more democratic political system.

Assuming that the outcome of the ongoing revolts in the Arab Mediterranean states will mean the removal of the old authoritarian governments, the economic, social, and political challenges, and their people will face in its aftermath will be enormous. In addition, the revolt state will confront a simultaneous need to restructure its economy away from excessive reliance on the state and revenues. Its new leaders will need to come up with a political formula that is acceptable to a number of different players, including its social organizations traditionally moreover; they will need to create a system of law that serves all its citizens equitably. Furthermore, they will need to construct a political system that guarantees at least a minimum of checks-and-balances so that Arab Mediterranean citizens feel empowered and true citizens.

Indeed, all of this will need to be done within an EU' political framework and economic packages, specifically for the new Arab Mediterranean economy that creates all kind of opportunities for different players, individuals, families, to pursue their own interests at the expense of whatever kind of new Arab Mediterranean State may emerge. This is, needless to say, an enormous set of tasks even more politically advanced EU's nations would find difficult to accomplish. And it is perhaps not surprising that in light of all these difficulties, the EU has to suggest some forms of political consultation through the local governments, whether they will successfully make the transition from this solution to a true democracy, remains to be seen.

The Arab Mediterranean countries face multiple overlapping challenges that will provide, many opportunities for distinct groups to derail a possibly emerging democratic process. Although we cannot know what the outcome will be at this point, we do know that the road ahead, in light of the country's history of disenfranchising its citizens, will likely be very difficult and

uneven. It is identical, in the aftermath of the Arab Mediterranean revolts, that its time, for the EU, to lie down the foundation of a rational and balanced European approach towards Arab Mediterranean society's contemporary politics of change.

In addition, rereading the actual impacts of Arab revolts, from its local dimensions and regional impacts, is a task for Europe. The EU should change its old fashion of Mediterranean politics into understanding the new re-creations of the new Arab Mediterranean States, the challenges and prospects.

Because a neutral debates through, conflation or incorporation, subjects such as political Islam, or Arab revolts with its social changes, and EU' Mediterranean Policy (MP), one may wonder about what kind of conclusions would be drawn^[35]. Moreover, it should be bear in mind that the ongoing changes which targeting the creation of new state, through demolishing the authoritarian one, against the old idea that the state creates its society, a new question should be addressed. Before the Arab revolts, the authoritarian state worked as the creator or instrument of its society, but now such course changed into the society changes its state to be a servant of its interests.

Furthermore, absence of a united EU' Mediterranean policy, and its affiliation to the American interests, always plays against the European closeness to the Arab of the South Mediterranean (ASM). The deportation of the European old fashion Mediterranean policy toward its Arab Mediterranean countries is an urgent task, in order to implement a balanced and rational policy of understanding^[36].

The existence of the memorial colonialism period and its cultural memories impacts, as a historical impact and motivations of feedback, matters have to be clarified from the European side. Effective and prospective understanding of the Southern, Eastern Arab Mediterranean societies and its politics of change lay in the European scarifications (politically and economically), which it should be proven loudly.

Europe and Muslims Coexistence

Consequently, the dilemma of mutual understanding and culture of fears and heaters require building of human bridges in order both societies become acceptable to each other. The coexistence of the Europeans and the Muslim's interactions regularly ignored in the EU's past

Mediterranean policy conduct. The cultural troublesome of “Islamists,” “Muslims” “Political Islam,” “Muslim Fundamentalism,” “Jihadists Movements,” “Islamic State” that the western media enrich it through falls applications and implications.

These classifications of state or society are not found on the ground as it speaks. Consequently, the EU’s coming implantation of its policy in the region should be based on certain criteria, which will be developed in the concluded remarks. Dealing with unfound enemies in the region through politics of fear of others faith (Muslim Faith) has a consequence of widening the political gap between the two entities. Islam is a faith, is not politics, in the pragmatic terms, neither a political ideology, it is a policy of faith in social and cultural relations among its believers. Muslims of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean are a very traditionally liberal through their long history. The Islamic faith is a liberal in its contents and its implications, but it could be argued that its implications, in a few societies, not in a complement to its basic teachings^[37].

As a matter of fact, these classifications of state or society are not found in the region and on the ground as it speaks. Consequently, the EU’s coming implantation of its policy, in the region, must consider the above actual mentioned descriptive terms. Dealing with unfound enemies in the region, politics of fear of others faith (Muslim Faith) has a consequence of widening the political gap between the two entities.

Islam is a faith, is not politics, in the pragmatic terms, neither a political ideology, it is a policy of faith in social and cultural relations among its believers. Muslims of the southern and eastern Mediterranean are a very traditionally liberal through their long mutual history. The Islamic faith is a liberal in its contents and its implications, but it could be argued that its implications, in a few societies, not in a complement to its basic teachings. Ironically, the hard dilemma for the EU’ Mediterranean policy is discovered in several scientific researches which conducted with my MA’ students (Benghazi University, Libya). It was based on its contradictory interests and policies implemented in the region and its selective states to deal with, special treatment outside the framework of the EU’ foreign policy and its donations policy handicapped. Moreover, a proper understanding to the actual components

of change in the Arab uprising context is the EU’s deportation conduct from the “Islamic State,” “Political Islam” “Islamists” and “Muslim State” delusion and politics of rainbow. Indeed, the question of Israel and Palestine which has a rooted cultural and religious’ implications and applications in the conflicts by the EU’ Mediterranean Policy for long time without any European neutral role or a stable policy, considerations have to be addressed.

Final remark, Europe should leave the Mediterranean to the European Northern and Eastern and Southern Mediterranean revolts states to meet their challenges and create their mutual coexistence, and destination without intervention from outside political geographical role. To date, the EU has been skittish regarding any Mediterranean crisis and the emerging of the Islamists, notably in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. The EU should reconsider its recalcitrant stance.

In short, after all, the *raison d’être* of its 12-year old Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been to develop and use Europe’s capabilities to take care of problems in its backyard where other areas not engaged. Having gradually scaled back some of its unrealistic initial ambitions, the EU nonetheless has conducted several peace keeping missions in Africa. Moreover, the EU should re-advertise its “unique” ability to integrate civilian stabilization and reconstruction tools, from police trainers to experts in building judicial and governmental institutions in the southern Mediterranean Arab countries

THE GEO-ECONOMIC SECURITY DILEMMAS

The geo-economic security dilemmas to the EU Mediterranean Policy (EUMP) are identical. The indecisiveness of the EU’ participation on NATO’s operation of Libya’s revolt critically impacts (Common Security Defense Policy) (CSDP) and (Common Foreign Security Policy) (CFSP) legitimacy, but even more critical long-term decisions on the geo-economic consideration s may dilute the EU’s Mediterranean Policy^[38] Before the ' EU even attempts to forge large-scale international crisis management missions via [CSDP), with European manpower, resources, logistics, and equipment to field significant combined, and joint operations', ' three key geo-economic challenges already weaken the EU’ effectiveness Mediterranean policy'. Such weaknesses arise primarily from

the EU's 27 members and serious dependencies verging on geo-economic security dilemmas. They center on continued membership, extended trade, and needed energy, all areas impacted by globalization that threatens the EU's ultimate success from its six-decade-old integration.

Indeed, the EU's energy dependency on Algeria and Libya^[39] determine the most troublesome geo-economic linkage, tying together key aspects of membership and trade. Even as specific member states' domestic indebtedness, such as Greece, Ireland, and Spain, plagues the EU's geo-economic energy dependency on Libya and Algeria may actually damage the CSDP^[40]. In fact, the EU' leadership highlight its Mediterranean policy (MP) rehabilitation, as evidence that its policy of slow, deliberative engagement works. For example, on October 11, 2004, the EU's Council of Ministers, citing Libya's willingness to surrender its (*Weapon of Mass Destruction*) (WMD) program and compensate victims for "Libya's past terrorism," agreed to lift the trade and arms embargo against Libya. Explaining the move, European Commission Ambassador Marc Perini credited "the constant and confident dialogue entertained by both sides".

In addition, in 1995, European foreign ministers meeting in Barcelona launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership^[41] that sought to establish political and security dialogue, gradually establish a free trade zone, and encourage civil society. The EU initially excluded Libya but, four years later, the EU Presidency invited Libyan observers to attend a follow-up conference in Stuttgart. There, they extended Libya an offer of membership upon the lifting of UN sanctions and the Libyan government's acquiescence to existing Barcelona protocols. European policy (EUP) is cynical, however, based more on a desire to promote trade and constrain African migration to the (Schengen zone Visa), and less on any human rights or political reform concerns.

Changing Dimensional Eu's Policy Context

In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions and uprisings, the EU has not dealt with new interlocutors, including important movements and political parties, which claim undertaking the ongoing political and social change. In view of the relative neglect of the social and political and social change dimensions in debates and academic literature on EU foreign policy, this position aims how the EU improves its understanding of Arab revolts as a political,

social, and economic, as new dimensional factor in the Mediterranean politics.

This new dimensional factor requires European political and cultural understanding, separated from the American and NATO impacts^[42]. It is identical, in the aftermath of the Arab revolts that its time, for the EU, to lay the foundation of a rational and balanced European approaches towards Arab Mediterranean societies. In other words, rereading and defining the actual impacts of the Arab revolts from its local dimensions and regional impacts, in the context of the delayed move toward their state social change will be introduced.

However, in order to clarify the changing context, in which the EU' implements its foreign policy, 'several existing perspectives', and dimensions should be addressed: The EU-Mediterranean coexistence current course should be changed into new understanding of recreation of the New Arab Mediterranean States, taking on consideration its challenges and prospects. Because a neutral debates through, conflation or incorporation, subjects such as political Islam and EU' Mediterranean Policy, one may wonder about what kind of conclusions would be drawn.

It should be bear in mind that the ongoing changes targeting the recreating the new state through demolishing the authoritarian one, against the old idea that the state creates its society. Before the Arab revolts, the authoritarian state worked as the creator of its society, but now such course changed into the society changes its state to be a servant of its interests.

CONCLUSION

The emergence of the Arab revolts in the Southern Mediterranean region highlights a number of important trends within the EU and Arab revolts framework. It become evident that Europe has difficulties in organizing a united stand toward the outcomes of the Arab revolts, and lack of understanding these revolts movement in the framework of new trends of political culture. Europe could not be able for laying the foundation of a rational and balanced European approaches towards Arab Mediterranean revolts. In other words, Europe has no united and defining the actual impacts of the Arab revolts from its local dimensions and regional impacts, in the context of the ongoing impacts. For much of 2010/ 2011/2012, 2013, 2014, the Arab revolts are still good news for Europe.

The EU promised a reform of relations. “*More for more*” went the slogan: “the greater the democratic transition, the more benefits to the government”, but without any evidence of real support. A EU bridging new relations in the new Mediterranean Arab revolts would demonstrate the EU’s political will and practical ability to lead a complex operation of critical importance to its neighborhood.

The absence of a united EU’ Mediterranean Policy and its continuing affiliation to the American interests ^[43], always plays against the European closeness to the Arab Southern Mediterranean. In addition, the deportation of the European old fashion Mediterranean policy toward its Arab Mediterranean revolts is an urgent task, in order to implement a balanced and rational policy of understanding. Consequently, the existence of the memorial colonialism period and its cultural memories, as a historical impact and motivations of feedback, matters have to be clearly enough from the European side. Moreover, effective and prospective understanding of the Southern, Eastern Arab Mediterranean societies and its politics of change lay in the European scarifications (politically and economically), which it has to be voiced loudly. Furthermore, the dilemma of mutual understanding and culture of fears and heaters require building of human bridges in order both societies become acceptable to each other.

It could encourage the rifts caused by several member states to contribute to the current transition operation in the region. The EU could enhance the strategic benefits of its engagement by reaching out to the completely Mediterranean rim, which provides a strategic to EU operations in Africa and the Mediterranean rim. Is the EU up to the task in the Arab Mediterranean revolts? The fact is told, many officials and experts skeptical, especially given Europe’s preoccupation with financial and economic woes. However, it is also the fact that if the authoritarian fractured states and society exploded into violence, generating thousands of refugees and displaced persons and creating a fertile environment for anti-European extremism, Europe will be the first to suffer the fallout. In short, the hard dilemma for the EU’ Mediterranean policy (MP) has no choice except redirect its 'Mediterranean policy,' with new images towards the cultural Muslim political of the emerged revolt Arab Mediterranean countries ' ^[44]. The new states in the region are not as the previous one, from social change

perspectives and impacts TERMS. This article examined the main aspects of the political Islam in the Arab southern Mediterranean revolts, in the aftermath of the “Arab spring,” along with its growing involvement in the region, both in terms of discourse and specific facts on the ground.

It explored how the political Islam which has been employed, particularly by Europe, as a symbol for political empowerment of local people and democracy! Nonetheless, the political and social unrest aspects become a regional phenomenon in the next door of Europe; whereas Europe observing the developments there as a political failure of its Mediterranean Policy. It’s, also the political and social defeat of the imported Arab spring.

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FOOTNOTES

- [1] Tunisian uprising (December, 2010), Egyptian uprising (January, 2011), Libyan uprising (February, 2011), Syrian uprising (March, 2011).
- [2] Al-Qaeda is the Ansar Sharia, with same ideology with different tactics.
- [3] ASMS refers to Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.
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- [6] These leaders were, during their rule, in confrontation with the foreign powers, mainly with the western interventional foreign conduct

- [7] Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria become French protectorates, and Libya becomes an Italian colony.
- [8] See: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2010 figures.
- [9] All media sources, during the development of Arab Spring, refer to the usage of this term to President Obama.
- [10] It was the *Great Arab Revolution, led by Sharif Hussein*, in 1914.
- [11] Jacques Benoist-Méchain, *Un printemps arabe*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1959.
- [12] These slogans established during the confrontation between West-East cold wars, and advanced further by Jamal Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi leadership.
- [13] For further detailed discussion see: <http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/70bd3afb-a759-4a2b-8b93-0c72019e42a4/another-spring-by-fadi-elhusseinipdf.pdf> (accessed 20.01.2014).
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- [18] *Ibid*. 88.
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- [28] EU commission 'embassies' granted new powers, 2011.
- [29] Tunisia, European Commission, 2012.
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- [33] The Brotherhood formed its own party entitles "Justice and Freedom Party" and wins the 2012 election.
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