

Wahhabi Thoughts in Pakistan and the Challenges in Pakistan-Iran Relations

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ABSTRACT

The unification of the Wahhabi Sheikh and the Saudi emir in the eighteenth century and its historical continuity led to the formation of the Saudi state of the twentieth century with the official religion of Wahhabism in that country. The Saudi government uses this profession to attract the attention of the Wahhabi clergy as well as its instruments of influence and diplomacy in Islamic countries. The Pakistani state also has the ability to absorb Saudi Wahhabism for some reason, which could be exploited to curtail the influence of rival Iran and disrupt the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. This paper seeks to examine the context of Saudi Wahhabi's influence in Pakistan and to examine the impact of this influence on the relations between Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, by using a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing reliable library resources, it is assumed that the religious and religious poverty and economic and cultural poverty in Pakistan, along with the financial strength and educational centers of propaganda in the possession and influence of Saudi Arabia, Have led to the emergence and expansion of Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan. On the other hand, given the extreme conflict between this profession and the Shia religion, Wahhabi Salafism is working to confront the Shiites and challenge the Pakistani relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Keywords: Iran-Pakistan relations, Salafism, Saudi foreign policy, Wahhabism.

INTRODUCTION

The birth of Wahhabi The result of Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab's 18th century and his expansion was the result of his alliance with Mohammad bin Sa'd Amir in Ayah, which continued its process of forming the Wahhabi government of Saudi Arabia after the First World War, the official religion of this government (Authentic, 2004: 156-143). According to the Sheikh Wahabi's verdict, in the event of a lack of effort and tolerance, sword and armed war should be eliminated by superstitions and ideologies in religion, and the ground for returning to Islam was first and foreordained. (Sahebi, 1367: 70-69 and Halebi, 1382: 99-98). Accordingly, the term "Wahabi Salafism" is used to explain the performance of radical Salafi, which acts as the Saudi diplomacy arm and with the support of this country in other Islamic countries.

Regarding the existing context, the formation of Salafi-Wahhabi groups in Pakistan has not gone away from Saudi Arabia. Pakistan is a Muslim

country in Southeast Asia, where radical sects have emerged widely. This phenomenon, its social and political consequences, has not only been limited to this country, it has also spread to other countries of the region. Extreme thoughts and views the groups, such as the Sahwa Army, al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan, have been more widely spread than anywhere else, and many have benefited from these groups in Pakistan. This article seeks to study the effects of the Wahabi Salafist extremism on the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, while investigating the bases and factors that strengthen the influence of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia.

As a major Muslim country with a Sunni majority, Pakistan has the prerequisites for the influence of Saudi Wahhabism. Due to the country's revelation and financial capabilities, Saudi Arabia has provided land for Pakistani economic, educational and cultural poverty, oil wealth and educational and promotional institutions to build

and strengthen its influential groups. The Wahhabi Salafism is being used because of the sharp conflict that exists with the Shi'a, in order to prevent rival influence and disturbance in relations between Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The theoretical foundations of this research are based on the constructivist theory that emphasizes identity retrieval in the international arena.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the classical conception of the international system, governments sought to achieve national interests and increase their power in an environment without central authority, and in relation to the main drivers of the behavior of actors in the international arena, neo-realist and neoliberal studies emphasized a kind of commitment to rationality and immortality (Gilpin, 1981: 227-228). According to rationalist views, governments and actors are only pursuing their own interests and interests based on the mechanism of profit and loss or rational power and always have predefined interests (Wahhab Pour, 2005: 132). In the later theories of international relations, such as constructivism, the acceptance of material factors has been emphasized on immaterial factors such as identity, culture and discourse in foreign policy.

Structuralism is one of the analytical frameworks that has attracted many international relations scholars in recent years. Structuralism deals with the material and immaterial dimensions of social life and seeks to re-examine the non-material and normative elements neglected in realist theories. The founder of structuralist theory, Alexander Vent, believes that material abilities have their own significance and position, but can be thought of as more culturally as to the concept of structure. The immaterial structures act as a substrate of material resources. Jan Ragui also considers the most distinctive feature of constructivism in the domain of ontology, and values intellectual factors such as culture, norms, and notions (Moshirzadeh, 2005: 326, 323).

Structuralism, beliefs and minds are key to understanding and recognizing political behavior, and believes that the origin and motive of political behavior often originate from mental structure and mental perception (Jamali, 2011: 19-18). According to Nicholas O'N of, the world is the forerunner to the world that we build, not to have a low-level rule. We are the ones who make the world meaningful (Nasri, 1388: 901). The introduction of identity elements in theories of international relations is

one of the main features of constructivist theory. Identity here is the understanding and expectations of actors, whether individuals or governments. Structureists emphasize the social identities of these actors in order to explain how the interests are formed. In their view, they are the benefits of social relationships. The entrepreneurs emphasize the role of culture in international relations, and their focus is on human consciousness and the role that this awareness creates in international relations (Akbari Karimabadi, 2012: 40). Structural analysis, on the other hand, also recognizes the influence of history in shaping foreign policy. In this regard, the constructivists believe that the identity of a state is shaped by valuable references to the country's past and future. Historically, governments and statesmen put it on the back of their day-to-day operations (Vent, 2005).

Immanuel Adler, a structural constructivist theorist, also focuses on the issue of identity, states that the identity of states is central to their definition of reality and to construct issues such as power, national interests, friends and enemies and security, and ultimately decision-making and action on their basis. He states that countries, like so many people, are prisoners of identity and value classes of the world. In other words, the beliefs, norms and attitudes of actors are always constructive of indicators such as identity and interests (Finnemore, 1996: 2). From the constructivist point of view, identity allows nations to make their world meaningful, to classify other entities and to define them as friends or enemies. Governments, with these perceptions, seek to change or maintain the status quo, unite with one country or act against others. In fact, relations between states are based on a sense that they share, not on the basis of power. So, here, identity becomes an important subject. From the constructivist point of view, the identity of the state has two distinct meanings: one of them is an individual identity that includes its internal, human, material and ideological features, and the other is social identity, which is the meaning that the actor confronts others (Aghaei, 1388: 5-4).

Structureists believe that the structure and the broker are mutually reinforcing, and social structures are the consequences of the consequences of human action. Self-structures are created as interconnected, sustained phenomena and, based on them, define their actors, identities, and interests (Moani Alamdari and Raseki, 2010: 193-191). Here, the temporary priority is given to the agent or structure; however, it should be

noted that the broker and the structure are not defined on an autonomous ontology level, therefore, they should not be related to the scientific relationship at the epistemological level. On the contrary, one has to pay attention to how the relationship between them (and not why) (Moshirzadeh, 2007: 342).

CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN STRUCTURAL THEORY

Structural engineering has had a dramatic effect on the concept of foreign policy, and it is based on the assumption that actors make their own world and foreign policy analysis of the state begins as an actor; actors interpret, decide, announce, and eventually run. This view reflects the influence of internal factors on foreign policy, and why foreign policy of different countries, despite the differences in the internal, is in many respects identical.

Governments, on the basis of their perceptions of identity, are defining their own national interests, and their foreign policy is more than this definition of benefits. According to Vennith, identities form the interests and the benefits are also the source of the behaviors and the adoption of foreign policy by governments, in which actors construct semantic structures. Governments, based on an understanding of identity, send a commentary or signal to other actors, and the other interprets this interpretation and symbols on the basis of their perception. Based on this interpretation, it sends a signal and is the result of such an interaction that its identity and the other are formed as friends and enemies (Vent, 2005: 329). So, this "other" plays an important role in shaping the identity of each actor, since most of our behavior is based on the perspective, expectation, recognition, and identification of others (Risse, 2003: 101). In general, the most important propositions of constructive paradigm, which are effective in shaping foreign policy, can be summarized as follows:

- All constructors know the reality of social reality;
- Brokers, structures, or processes and institutions interact and interconnect;
- To determine the legitimacy and predictability of the behavior of governments and to restore order, identity and interests play a special role in their eyes;
- From the viewpoint of the constructivists, power is important, but its immaterial and discursive aspects are also considered;

- The intellectual and normative structures are also important in terms of material structures, because these systems are meaningful on the basis of which the actors interpret their material environment (Shafiee and Zamanjan, 2011: 122).

SAUDI WAHHABISM OR WAHHABI SALAFISM

In this article, the foundation of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is based on the identity of the state, which, according to religious, cultural, and historical data itself, is defined as a Sunni state ruling the land of revelation, it forms the elementary part. By intensifying and expanding certain trends among the Sunnis, the government undermines sects and religions that do not match Saudi Arabia, thus expanding ties and increasing its influence in Pakistan by undermining the influence of rival Iran in expanding the relations between the two past barriers he does. In this regard, the material and immaterial factors that both are concerned with constructivist theory, the influence of Saudi Wahhabism in Pakistan, and its negative effects on the relations between Iran and Pakistan are considered. Meanwhile, the high role of religion in the national identity of Pakistanis has created a significant impact on the intangible cultural identity of Pakistani foreign policy. With this reference, there is no doubt that Iran's foreign policy and relations are in the form of a religious state, completely influenced by Islamic ideals and cultural, historical and historical data, along with attention to objective realities.

From the Sunni's point of view, the predecessor of a group of Muslims includes Companions, followers, and followers of the Prophet (pbuh). Salafism in the Islamic world was followed by the revival of a brilliant past, which included the life of the Islamic Ummah for the first three centuries (Al-Lotani, 2004: 19). Therefore, the history of the use of the word Salafi comes back to the recent centuries. Before the seventh century AH, we are more likely to encounter terms like Hadith or Hadith companions. The Hadith is the name of a group of scholars and scholars in the first Islamic centuries who have paid special attention to religious sources and narratives and hadiths (the Great Islamic Encyclopedia, 2nd JAN, 2000, the entries of Hadith, 115-113). What has now prevailed in the Salafist era is a kind of jihadi Salafism that has come to pass from the original Salafism. They believe that Islamic societies have been plagued with ignorance; an ignorance of which there was an example at the time of the

Messenger of Allah (PBUH) on the island of Al-Arab, and the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) and his followers overthrew Jihad. Today, Muslims must be prepared to use jihad tools to achieve such a sacred purpose (Peters, 1996: 128). In their view, jihad is an instrument for taking power from the corrupt elites and autocratic rulers and fighting the domination of Western unbelievers (Beverly Milton-Edwards: 10-11).

With the fall of the Abbasids, Ahmed Bin Hanbal and later his pupil Ibn Taymiyyah, both of whom were considered as Salafist spiritual fathers, presented their votes, then shook the foundations of the Ottoman Empire and lowered their power in the Arabian Peninsula, Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab and the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century Heightened height (Decumjian, 1383: 38-37). Wahhabism born in Najd based on the views and views of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab, triggered a wave of extremism and tightening of all the Muslims, and sometimes exaggerated the Shiite to silence opponents, and called Ash' arites, Sufis and other religions as heroes. And claimed that pure Islam is a source of pride and their understanding of the book and the tradition is for all, and everyone who follows this path is a follower or an outsider of Islam.

Wahhabism has essentially served to revive Salafi's tradition. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the promotion of the regional and global position of the Shiites, the Wahhabi Salafism stood in opposition to opposition groups, and in particular the Shiites, as a result of the bloody clashes in Pakistan. In other words, the victory of the Iranian revolution encouraged their radical Salafist goals in Pakistan. There are many socio-political, propaganda-cultural groups in the Wahhabi self-referential group in Pakistan, sponsored by Saudi Arabia (Nazif Darb and Nowrooz, 2003: 155).

MANIFESTATIONS OF WAHABI SALAFISM

The Wahhabism profession is fundamentally different in many rituals and principles of belief with other Islamic religions; therefore, the main axes of the Wahhabi Salafist teachings can be as follows:

- Combating Shari'ah and Superstitions and Returning to Islam's predecessor and predecessor Saleh: On the same basis, the Wahhabis have rejected many beliefs and verbs of Muslims from different religions as polytheism and disbelief; therefore, it must

be said that the Takfiri votes seem to have gradually formed. Contrary to previous leaders, the only one who has been far too distant in this regard is the fatwa of the opposition and even the murder of them is fatwa Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi sects;

- Opposition to reality, philosophy, ijihad, Quranic commentary, Sufism and mysticism, and any innovations, as narratives: they were opposed in this way by any method that transcended appearance, and they were innovated (Muraqi, 2004: 173- 161).
- Enemy with the Shiites: From the perspective of the Wahhabis, Shi'is have created innovations in the religion of Hanif, and based on extreme and violent teachings, Shiite blood is considered to be shedding light (Heydari, 2009: 85);
- Promoting violence and jihad with dissidents: Wahhabi Salafism in today's world should be evaluated and analyzed by the element of using violence against non-Muslim religious-political motivators (Ebrahimi, 1392: 122). In this context, the principle of Jihad and its religious justification have been accepted in the Salafi-Wahhabi school. Generally, in their view, martyrdom in the way of Jihad is the fundamental chalks that accept other religious principles (Hajj, fasting, prayers, etc.) conditioned Implementing and accepting the principle of jihad and martyrdom (Atran, 2006: 139).

THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA IN STRENGTHENING THE INFLUENCE OF WAHABI SALAFISM

Saudi officials, especially in contrast to the Shiites and other minorities in the country, have pointed to the Salafist nature of their government; therefore, the expansion of Wahabi's Salafist influence in the world is measured in line with its foreign policy goals. Saudi princes, while striving to preserve Wahhabism's supremacy over other religions, will donate financial assistance alongside financial and other financial contributions to the flow of Wahhabi in order to facilitate its influence and influence in the region. "Gulf States Newsletter, 2003). Wahhabi scholars and clerics have always pushed the government to allocate more funds for Wahhabism in the world. In particular, over the past half century, the Saudi government has considered soft power and cultural diplomacy through the promotion of Wahhabism and the backing of oil dollars.

The existence of the Holy Spirit and the Holy Prophet's shrine in Arabia has led the country to a position where its leaders, with the pretense of the opening of the house of Ka'bah and the succession of the Prophet, and playing the role of the host of the Muslim Hajj and the guardian of the Holy Shrines, Sunni. In line with the political exploitation of this position, the Saudi government has appeared in the position of protecting Muslims from other countries, while the financial strength of oil revenues has made Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi influence more intact (reconciliation, 1866-18: 30); the abundance of oil revenues Saudi Arabia, and the lack of legal supervision over the form of spending it, has led its rulers to expand their influence and advancement in their countries through donations to other countries, especially the poorer Muslim countries, which have a special status among non-Arab countries. Reconciliation, 1366: 42-38). The Wahhabi sects and Al-Islamiyah's affiliated organizations and its affiliated centers have always been used to cope with the influential and compelling diplomacy of Saudi Arabia's rival, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Combating the Islamic Republic of Iran and confronting the Shi'a religion after the Iranian Revolution was one of the most important tasks and priorities of Wahhabi organizations. Of course, the Wahhabi missionaries, with heresy and blasphemous reading of many religious practices of other Islamic religions, especially Shi'ism, have not refused to resort to violence and extremism, which has led to bloody clashes and massacres, even on many occasions. In the activities of propaganda organizations to extend the influence of Wahhabism in other countries, especially through the economic poverty and Saudi geopolitical position for Muslims, especially the Sunni (Fakhri, 1993: 42-41), the country has always considered the following measures:

- Build schools and centers for teaching the Qur'an and grant them financial assistance;
- Granting scholarships to Muslim students;
- Sending Muslim students to religious schools in Saudi Arabia, which, after graduating from the universities of that country, are employed as sheikhs and Friday imams and members of the mosques and schools belonging to Wahhabi;
- Distribute free Hajj tickets, especially between the great scholars, to a desirable and appealing face and incline them to Wahhabism;

- The construction of mosques in cities and villages run by Wahhabi sheikhs and considered as the main centers of Wahhabi propaganda;
- Payment to some Wahhabi missionaries;
- The extensive distribution of Saudi books and journals in Saudi mosques;
- Use of TV channels to promote Wahhabism (Arab Ahmadi, Paeizi, 2012: 110-101).

CULTURAL-RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS OF THE INFLUENCE OF WAHABI SALAFISM IN PAKISTAN

The foundation of Pakistan has been the religion of Islam. Of the Muslims of this country, 77% of it is Sunnis, most of Hanafi and less Shafi'i. Estimates suggest that about 20 percent of the population is Shiite. Other Muslim groups in the country are Sadat, Mongols, Pathans, Atmospheres, Ismaili religions, follow the Nizari sect of Agha Khan, Baha'is, Ahmadiyah, or Qadisis. A small percentage of Pakistan's population is also Christian and Hindu. Violent riots and violent clashes have taken place throughout Pakistan over the course of history between these various groups. Several religious ruptures, ethnic, cultural and linguistic proliferation, along with the ineffectiveness of the ruling states, have made the social and political structure in Pakistan unsustainable, fragile and fragile and assessed by many in the weak and defeated country (see: Kfir, 2007) . Strengthening the influence of the Wahabi Salafism has exacerbated this situation. Various cultural-religious factors have led to this influence:

Religious Schools and Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan

Illiteracy is high in Pakistan. In this country, about a third of men and less than two thirds of women are illiterate. Of course, in recent years, there has been some progress in these areas through foreign aid, but due to the country's population, these improvements were not enough (Pakistani Green Paper, 2010: 40-39). In contrast to this weakness, Pakistan faces a host of religious schools, schools that have had the most influence and influence in the development of extremist thoughts in Pakistan. There are currently more than twelve thousand radical Islamic religious schools in Pakistan that are not financially directly affiliated with state support. The main lesson in extreme schools is Jihad, according to the ideological combination of the Deobandi School and the Salafi School. In these schools, the content of educational programs is

such that their students see their weapons learned when they graduate (Ghods, 2005: 8). The flow of armed jihad to Pakistan's religious schools during the Afghan jihad era was supported by the Western world, the Muslim world, and the Arab world. A large part of the Saudi funds available to Pakistan in the name of Jihad in Afghanistan was limited to the provision of religious schools. Saudi Arabia is said to have contracted Pakistani army \$ 3.5 billion for jihad in Afghanistan (Khosravi, 2011: 164); but with the end of the jihad in Afghanistan, Salafi jihadist thought has not changed to the West or somehow changed against other Islamic sects. The route.

The main factors behind the growth of religious schools in Pakistan were the generosity of General Zia-ul-Haq, a Deobind who was interested in Wahhabism. Saudi-backed Wahhabi tendencies grew in his era. The Hadith's intellectual and religious flow, which is heavily influenced by the Wahhabi tradition, has become widely used in dressing for the Zia ul-Haq regime. Since the development of Wahhabi Salafism throughout the Muslim world was a major and long-term goal for Saudi Arabia with the help of petrodollars, General Zia was able to take religious schools under the umbrella of Saudi supporters. During his rule for the first time in Pakistan's history, the government sponsored the development of religious education and even required the payment of zakat to cover the cost of religious schools for its citizens.

In the context of the success of religious schools, General Zia reduced Pakistan's public education budget. By reducing the general education budget, the children of the poor families, especially at the village level, were sent to religious schools where they had been paid for their school fees. Along with this, General Zia ordered the qualifications of these schools to be recognized and be equated with scientific evidence. By forcing all religious students to study religious education, the field of recruiting graduates of these schools in public schools was made available to the country's bureaucracy (Kepel, 2006: 102-103). The army and other government agencies were required to absorb these forces in various positions. It even depended on the gradual upgrade of the military to make them fully operational and to take courses in religious schools.

The Impact of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

The occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic

based on Shiite jurisprudential doctrines provided the impetus for the expansion of Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Haq accused the Islamic Revolution of Iran of supporting Pakistani Shiites and considered the revival of extremist Sunni thought as an effective alternative to overthrowing it. At the same time, the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran was followed by the negative reaction of some Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. In this regard, the Saudi government was working to promote Sunni political Islam with a Wahhabi and conservative approach in the region. In an ideological and regional rivalry with Iran, the country has also made Pakistan an ideal destination for this goal. Saudi Arabia supported the Zia ul-Haq regime and Sunni fundamentalists, especially the Hadith group, and Iran supported Shiites. With the intensification of sectarian struggles, Sunni scholars under the influence of Wahhabism in the 1980s engaged in massive propaganda against the Shi'ism and Islamic Revolution of Iran. Subsequently, due to the wide network of religious schools, Saudi Arabia's influence in Pakistan remained intact (Khosravi, 2011: 165-164).

Religious Training of Jihadists against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan

At the same time as the Red Army invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistani schools of thought were once again given priority. In the meantime, Pakistan's religious schools provided the province of jihadists from different countries in camps for ideological education and guerrilla warfare. In this way, the deaf religious scholars undertook the ideological training of Pakistani schools of thought to train volunteers of jihad in Afghanistan. These schools also promoted sectarian and anti-Shi'i tendencies that Shi'a and its power, like communism, were a danger to be fought against (Khosrawi, 2011: 169-166). Based on the findings of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the spread of the wave of extremism, the study found that Pakistani religious school graduates are more likely to be attracted by extremist religious sects to fight in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the struggle against the Pakistani central government and rival religious groups Especially Shiites (Stern, 2000: 19).

The Dewbandian Connection with the Wahhabi Salafism

After the defeat of the Indian Muslims in 1857 and the full domination of Britain, the first class scholars of the first division of the sects came to

investigate the causes of the defeat, and by establishing the religious school of Deoband, which at that time was a small village, taught jihad for the re-release of India at the head of the material A lesson. Dewandi scholars later became effective in the independence of the Indian subcontinent and the establishment of Pakistan. In recent times, an important event that strengthened the viewpoints of the Deobandi School was the transformation of Afghanistan and the occupation of the country by the Red Army of the Soviet Union. Religious schools paid special attention to jihad training, and religious schools were supported by the Pakistani government, and in the international division of labor in the Afghan Jihad, the financial support of religious schools to the rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region, and in the forefront of them, Saudi Arabia and the UAE United Arab Emirates. At the same time, the Deobandi School was linked to the Salafi-Wahhabi school, and today the Deobonds are believed to have a similar resemblance to Wahhabism. They are very sensitive to Wahhabism against other Islamic sects, and they provide specific interpretations of monotheism and polytheism ("The Taliban from Appearance to the fall", www.esalat.org).

Before the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Red Army in 1979, the influence of the Wahhabi Salafist institution in Pakistan was not very influential in Pakistan, and whatever was the influence of the Deobandi school, from the point of view of the Pakistani Muslims, the Wahhabi Salafism of Saudi Arabia was thought to have been more political than a school Religious; But after the occupation of Afghanistan and the formation of an anti-Syrian alliance between the Afghan mujahideen, the West and the Arabs developed a different situation in Pakistan and the jihadist Salafist was strongly supported.

The wealth of the Arabs and the jihadist manpower led to the growth of that part of the Deobandi school, which pulled Jihad out of the text of the Sunni and Hanafi religious jurisprudence. The occupation of Afghanistan was inspired by a foreign infidel, a Dar al-Hariri, who, in order to confront the occupation of the Soviet Union, considered the religious scholars of jihad based on the teachings of the Dewandish school, as Wahhabi scholars had such an impression and encouraged the Arab youth to jihad in Afghanistan; therefore, Pakistan In this regard, it is important that these two jihadist schools have come to fruition, and their

cooperation has continued to date in the form of the al-Qaeda organization and the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of course, these two schools cannot be considered in all its dimensions, but ("Pakistan is the gateway to Army generals, political elites and party" (www.paymanemeli.com)) Despite the dominant influence of the Deobandi school, the Wahhabi Salafism is close to the Deobandi school and is penetrated in Pakistan. There is a lot of things (see: Molazi, 1386). The Wahhabi Salafist view of Pakistan has advanced to hostility with another Islamic distinction, especially Shi'a. The West, of course, also welcomes the change in the attitude of the radical Salafists, far from military confrontation with the West, and the clash between the Muslims themselves and the Shiite and Sunni conflicts, to the extent that they do not threaten the interests of the West. In fact, what has happened in Pakistan and its northern neighborhoods over the past few decades has contributed to the growing influence of the Wahhabi Salafi in Pakistan.

Smaller groups influenced by Wahhabi Salafism

The Deobandi school in Pakistan today is the official representative of the religion, and with its majority among the Sunni Muslims, its followers, especially in recent decades, have been increasing with widespread Saudi investment (Arefi, 1999: 199 and Shafie, 2005: 3); But in addition to the Deobendi school, there are many schools and religions in Pakistan that have roots of Wahhabism and somehow reflect the Wahhabi Salafist views, to the following:

The population of al-Islam al-Islam

This population is a political party that Hanbali is religious and is a member of the Hadith affiliated with the Deobandi school and is close to Wahhabism (Arefi, 2001: 271);

Hadith

This group was formed in response to Shi'a activities in the 1970s, which could be representative of the Wahhabi Salafist tendency in Pakistan in the limited dimensions;

Major

Sana'an Hanafi is a secular organization founded in the late 1970s to deal with the growth of Shi'ites (Farzin Nia, 1997: 167).

Sepah Sajdah

Sahaba is a radical group and one of the largest sectarian forces in Pakistan that has close ties

with the Taliban and al-Qaeda (David Cook, spring 2003: 31-56). This group is known more as a military group, founded in 1985 by a Sunni cleric named Maulana Hagh Nawaz Jahangvi. During its lifetime, the group has faced with cases of killing leaders or banning activity (Makarem Shirazi, 2008: 28-24);

5th Revolutionary Guards

The most important Pakistani extremist groups are the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi League, which is today famous for its terrorist operations. In fact, this terrorist group is one of the Pakistani extremist groups founded by the Sahaba tribal group to fight the Jafari movement. Lahore Jahangui, as an organization with a Wahhabi ideology, has anti-American, anti-Hindi, anti-Israeli, anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite feelings and has always been accused of being responsible for Shiite murder in Pakistan and the Afghan Millennium. In addition, it should be noted that groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyebah, Jaish Mohammad, and Shi'at Muhammad's provocateurs are described as Wahhabi's Salafism (see: Malzadi, 2009; Jamali, 2011).

THE ECONOMIC FIELDS OF WAHABI SALAFISM IN PAKISTAN

John Dolard and Leonard Dub believe that the emergence of extreme behaviors always requires previous failures and these failures always lead to aggressive behaviors (Dollard & Doob, 1939: 1). These failures may be due to political-social or economic deprivation. With regard to the economic context, the influence of the Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan should be noted that the widespread wealth of oil is the tool of the power of the Wahabi Salafists, and on the other hand, the economic situation and widespread poverty have made it possible for the Wahhabis to participate in various political and religious groups or cultural institutions and schools. Religious affairs strengthen their influence. Although the results of some studies, regarding the extreme Salafi range from some wealthy countries, challenge the relationship between poverty and violence (Sagemon, 2005: 5), but as has been said, some scholars have defended this connection. The rich, with the vast revenues from oil exports and free from the control of their people, have the possibility of internal control and the use of these revenues in line with foreign objectives. In the pursuit of foreign goals, the use of poverty of other countries for political and cultural influence is the cause of work. Poverty can be considered from different perspectives, but more poverty is considered in

the financial and economic aspects. Poverty in the economic sense is the inability to meet the human and fundamental needs and lack of a minimum wage. The solution to these needs is to achieve a decent and desirable life and is considered as a prerequisite for reaching perfection.

Economic Poverty in Pakistan

Pakistan's economic situation is not in the situation. Despite the large population and high growth rate, this country does not have much per capita income. Gross domestic product is low in the country, and per capita production and low productivity rates make it one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the World Bank's 2014 data, gross domestic product (GDP) was \$ 944,873,900,000, ranked 44th in the world (<http://www.google.com/publicdata>). There are no significant natural resources in Pakistan and do not even meet domestic needs. The foundation of this country's economy is agriculture, which accounts for nearly half of the workforce (Farzinnia, 1997: 17). The industry in Pakistan does not have a decent place. Unemployment and hardship are major problems in the country, and its economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid and money sent by Pakistanis working abroad, especially in the Gulf States. Most of the country's currency is supplied through the export of cotton and textiles and rice. In addition, most government revenue comes from tax revenue, customs duties and other taxes (Farzinnia, 1997: 86).

In the field of exports and imports, the country is always facing a negative trade balance. Therefore, the country depends on foreign and domestic loans and loans. A huge portion of its budget is used to repay government debts. About 40 percent of the costs are also paid to the military. Meanwhile, government efforts for more economic growth require increased energy consumption, especially oil and gas imports (Lall, 2007: 12-13). The country's economic downturn is basically due to political instability, massive financial corruption of the government, the influence and cost of the military and the lack of national solidarity. Therefore, the government's efforts to create economic and industrial prosperity in the country have not succeeded (Qanbarlu, 2011: 223-222).

The rich Wahhabis and the influence of the Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan

Pakistan's economic poverty has been very effective in strengthening the position of

Wahabi's Salafism, and Saudi Arabia has played a key role in this regard (Farzin Nia, 1997, 106-112). The country has become a major source of growing and exporting Salafism and Wahhabism in the contemporary world by enjoying oil wealth. Saudi Arabia has always responded positively to the Pakistani people through economic and financial assistance, especially in times of crisis, as a contribution to the realization of Saudi political and religious goals in Pakistan (Naimian, 2005: 71). Saudi Arabia, as one of the richest and richest countries in the Persian Gulf region, contributed greatly to supporting the mujahideen in the war after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to help the Afghan mujahideen fight the Soviet Union (Farzinnia, 1997: 186). But since the extreme organizations and groups have attacked the West and the United States, the Saudi government was inevitably far from them, but the aid of the wealthy citizens and Wahhabi Arabia were not cut off to these groups.

The Role of Wahhab Salafists in Iran-Pakistan Relationships

From the proclamation of Pakistani independence in 1947 until the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, friendly and cooperative relations have dominated the relationship between Iran and Pakistan (Zahid Ali Khan, 2004: 169). In this regard, in particular, the Regional Civil Organization (Arsidi) and the Baghdad Treaty (Treaty of Sento) have been the appropriate framework for deepening and expanding ties (Jami'i mosque, 1988: 381-380 and 65). But after the Islamic Revolution, a new situation that arose with the fall of the Shah's regime and the formation of the Islamic Republic in Iran was considered a threat to US interests in the region and the Gulf sheikhs. The power vacuum in the Gulf security system and the reflection of the Islamic Revolution in the region increased the fears of the United States and the regional governments. New issues also sought to lure Pakistan to self-defense, which had lost its greatest support, the Shah, and the rich Arabic countries on the Gulf coast to Pakistan as the best and most reliable supporter. Pakistan thus actively entered the regional policy scene. Following the Marxist coup d'état in Afghanistan in 1979 and its military occupation by the Soviet Union, the importance of Pakistan to the United States increased rapidly. This new position has attracted widespread military and financial assistance from the United States and the rich Arab states of the Persian Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia

and the United Arab Emirates. Of course, the rapprochement of Pakistan with the United States, which was the first enemy of Iran, has consistently been the determining factor in the political relations between the two countries after the victory of the Islamic Revolution.

A comparative study of the relations between Pakistan and Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution shows that despite potential capabilities and potential for cooperation, relations have evolved from the form of close cooperation during the Shah's regime to interconnected relations with cooperation and competition in the years after the Islamic Revolution. . Considering the many fields of cooperation, cultural relations between the two countries have been more favorable (Jahooruddin, 1999: 93-84). In the continuation of these activities, the barriers raised by the Salafi Wahhabi have progressed even to the martyrdom of Iran's cultural advisory staff. In the case of economic relations, significant cooperation, especially within the framework of the ECO, is organized. In the future, especially in the field of energy, including Iran's supply of gas to Iran, expansion of cooperation can be developed; however, it is imperative to try to resolve some of the obstacles caused by external pressures of trans-regional or regional powers (Ahmed, 2006: 1- 2), while the probable insecurities from the Salafist extremists should not be ignored. On the other hand, Iran, as the largest Shiite country, has not been indifferent to the fate of Shiites in different countries. Regarding the population of Shiite attention in Pakistan, Iranian authorities have always criticized the Shiite killing of Wahhabi Salafists in Pakistan. In addition to Iran's proximity to Pakistani Shiites, the country has expressed dissatisfaction with the security of its eastern borders, which causes unauthorized access by these extremist groups.

SALAFIST DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INFLUENCE OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN

The Islamic Revolution of Iran, as a major phenomenon in the second half of the 20th century, left many political-social consequences, including in relations with other countries. This influence was visible in Islamic countries, especially in Shiite societies. Through their self-esteem, they began to create or strengthen political parties or political-religious organizations (Goldberg 1986: 239) to promote their role in their countries. The Shiites' awareness of their

religious identity led to their politicization in their countries. Shiites tried to transform their demographic advantage into political power (Broning, 2008: 66-75).

In different countries, they felt that the Shiite regime formed in Iran had a high potential to support them at the internal and external levels and among the mainly Sunni Muslim communities of the Islamic countries. Trusting on this support, they found a strong motive for confronting their social political issues (Naimian, 2005: 67). Although the Salafist-Wahhabi controversy created a space that some threatened the stability of the Middle East Muslim region and the ghost of power struggle between Sunnis and Shiites, they spoke from Syria to Pakistan (Nasr, July 2006).

Pakistan as a major eastern neighbor of Iran was a country that quickly affected the expansion and depth of the Islamic Revolution, and the evolution of the Islamic Revival movement (Hashmatzadeh, 2008: 229), especially among the Shi'ites, was clearly evident. The country, with a population of more than 180 million, is the seventh most populous country in the world and the second most populous Islamic country after Indonesia (Arefi, 2006: 37). 20% of this population are Shiites (Safi, 1366: 177). This amount, according to the total population of Pakistan, includes less than 40 million people. Of course, Pakistani Shiites do not have much geographic focus and are scattered throughout Pakistan (Arefi, 2006: 110).

The Shiites of Isma'ili make up a percentage of the Shiites (Hafez Nia, 2000: 17). In the new space provided, two months after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Pakistani Shiites poured out a social plan to address two important issues: one to determine leadership for the Shiites, and the establishment of an organization that they could pursue within the framework of those political- Follow their religion. The main achievement of this community was the formation of the movement for the implementation of Jafari jurisprudence led by Mufti Ja'far Hussein.

The Shi'a organization's activities in the framework of this movement have forced all the anti-sectarian groups in Pakistan repeatedly into the most severe reactions. To the extent that the Sahaba Corps, as a Salafist-Wahhabi group, assassinated the second leader of the movement, Aref Hosseini. While the Pakistani government appeared to be an impediment to strengthening the Shiite position of the country and its

influence on the Islamic Revolution of Iran (Mohammadi, 2006: 425).

The organized Shiite Pakistani participation in the Movement of Jurisprudence has led to the 1988 election, and since then, Shiites have always had considerable presence in State, National, Senate and State Cabinets (Arefi, 2006: 421-419); therefore Antistatic opponents did not stop their violent actions against the Shiites, and their killings and assassinations by the Wahhabi Salafis continued to be roughly continued, killing and killing wider than other countries in Pakistan.

This was until the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, especially before Zia-ul-Haq's establishment of close ties with Saudi Arabia, the Pakistani Sunni and Shiite relations were generally peaceful and did not appear to be widespread organized and sectarian violence in the country. ; Of course, Zia-ul-Haq's policies stirred up Shiites and their political response (Gilles Kepel, 2006: 102).

One of the main reasons for the formation of the Sahaba Army, formed by Saudi-influenced Salafi and Wahhabi thinking, has been to combat the possible dangers of the Shiites and fear their political and religious power. The Sahwa Sahaba Group wants Pakistan to be officially introduced as a Sunnite land. The main source of income for this group was the extreme and wealthy Sunnis who settled in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. In fact, the formation of the Revolutionary Guards is a reaction to the formation of Iranian jurisprudence. After the establishment of Ja'fari's instigation of jurisprudence as a Pakistani Shi'a defender, Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) with the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iraq encouraged a group of Dewandi immigrant Muslims to fight against the activities of instigating Ja'fari jurisprudence, which eventually formed the Companionship Corps in 1985 Led

PAKISTANI WAHHABI SALAFISTS ARE OPPOSED TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

During the Pahlavi era, despite some neglected issues due to regional rivalry and religious differences, friendly relations and political alignment were the dominant factor in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1357 in Iran, which was considered as a great phenomenon in the second half of the 20th century, its effects contributed to the

developments in the Middle East countries, and their feedback influenced Iran's relations with the countries and nations of the region (obeying, 2006: 204). After the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, hostilities against the Shiite and Shi'a Iran grew. (Authentic, 2004: 177-176). Saudi Arabia has been influencing Wahhabi Salafists to confront the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through pressure on Shiites in Pakistan. In recent years, thousands of Pakistani Shiites have been sacked in military and food and drug trafficking or have been killed in armed and terrorist attacks by Wahhabi Salafists (Ahmadi, 2011: 238-237).

The growing influence of Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan and the unrest caused by sectarianism and anti-Semitism in this country are among the insecurity centers in relations with Iran. Pakistan has always been concerned about the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran among its Shiites, and preventing this influence and preventing the promotion of Shiite culture has been Pakistan's foreign policy axis against Iran (Preacher, 2011: 33-32).

Given the importance of the Shi'a issue in the relations between Iran and Pakistan, the slaughter of Shiites by the Salafist-extremist extremists (Pakistan Security Report 2008, 14-15) has been a major concern of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The country has called the Pakistani government responsible for protecting the physical and psychological security of the Shiite community and has always emphasized extremism. In short, the issue of protecting the security of the Shiites of Pakistan in the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with that country has had a negative effect on that country, because in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Shi'a Islamic ideology is a discourse organization that understands foreign events and structures, and actions, Influences the external reactions and behavior of the country (Firoozabadi, 2007: 86).

The Companions of the Sahab with Salafi-Wahhabi thought to have banned Shi'a mourning and declared Shi'a as an infidel minority and banned the activities of Iranian culture houses (Mohr, 1372: 169). In an ongoing anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian anti-Iranian campaign in Pakistan in August 1988, Seyyed Aref Hosseini, the head of the movement for the execution of Ja'fari jurisprudence and pro-revolutionary Iran, was killed by unknown individuals (Lang, 1993: 241), who was the source of the charge of the Wahabi Salafi. In

addition to the history of the Shi'ite massacre, the Revolutionary Guards have seriously considered the terrorist acts against the Islamic Republic. The attack on various cultural and diplomatic institutions, the assassination of staff, military, and diplomats in Iran has been one of these measures (Amraei, 2004: 249), part of which was the participation of the Jahangian Army (Sahaba Army Branch) as an organization with a Wahhabi ideology and with feelings Anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite.

Following the coup d'état of General Musharraf in 1999, he stated that he was seeking to resolve the root causes of sectarian issues in relations with Iran and resolve the murder case of the head and staff of the House of Culture of the Islamic Republic. With the finalization of the case and the execution of the assassin in 2001, the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Pakistan would appear to improve (Nasim Zehra, 2003: 86), but the realities have prevented a fundamental transformation.

On the other hand, Salafist-Wahhabi extremists have played a role in threatening the security of the border and the border regions of Iran, but the two governments have sought to dominate the border security. But despite the many governments' agreement on security cooperation, including the extradition of offenders, actions such as the assassination or hostage-taking of Iranian nationals and frontier guerrillas is more or less persistent, and its factors contributed to the hostility with the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Wahhabi Salafists. Considering the Wahhabi Salafist view of the Shiites who consider them infidels (Al-Ahmadi Lefokari, 2007: 18), the Salafists' view of Iran as a manifestation of the negative Shi'ite state and government and their violent acts, a sign of deep hostility towards the Shiites and the Islamic Republic of Iran Is. This issue is a fundamental obstacle that could threaten the continuation of the friendly and historical relationship between the two countries (Rashid, 1382: 162).

CONCLUSION

Salafi thought has a long history in Islam, but after the outline of the religious views of Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab and his alliance with the Saudi emir, Salafist thoughts of the Wahhabi nature went further towards other scholars, especially the Shiites. By establishing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century, the identity of this state and the country was recognized by Wahhabi, and the government, especially after discovering vast oil

reserves, gained wealth that was effective in securing capital for overseas purposes, including the promotion and expansion of Wahhabism. The Wahhabi profession, which considers itself to be pure Islam, has always introduced Shiites outside of religion, but after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Saudi government has tried to use this tool to confront the Shi'ites by defining its different identity. Rival

In the meantime, the Pakistani nation, which is the second-most populous Muslim country, is economically poor in its entirety. This poverty has increased the educational and cultural poverty of the country, so while Pakistan faces some external challenges facing its neighbors, according to the Islamic identity that it holds itself, the religious context has largely led the country to Sunni Approaches. Concerns over the influence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, especially among Pakistani Shiites, have strengthened the proximity of the region. In contrast to Saudi Arabia, it seeks to attract Pakistani recruits through its religious education centers to rely on oil wealth, religious affiliations and socioeconomic poverty in Pakistan. Meanwhile, with widespread propaganda through the construction of mosques, the influence of schools and religious centers, financial support and economic assistance, Wahhabi Salafism in Pakistan is strengthened.

Given that the Wahhabi Salafists are prepared to resort to violence against other Islamic religions, especially Shiites, sectarian conflicts, which have the necessary contexts in terms of the demographic and religious composition of the country, have created a climate of tension in relations between the Wahhabi and Shiite thinkers. Repeatedly it takes a bloody form. Meanwhile, the Wahhabi Salafis have tried to directly attack the security of Iranian institutions and interests and the interests of the country. Therefore, in a general summit, Saudi Arabia, while taking advantage of the religious extremists to expand its influence, has sought to challenge the historical ties between the two neighboring countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran and make the way of the influence of Shiite Iran in that country hard slowly.

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